Terpstra v. State, WD 80967

• Decision Date: 02 January 2019
• Docket Number: WD 80967
• Parties: Rita Lynne TERPSTRA, Respondent, v. STATE of Missouri, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

565 S.W.3d 229

Rita Lynne TERPSTRA, Respondent,

v.STATE of Missouri, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, et al., Appellants.

WD 80967

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: January 2, 2019

Roger G. Brown, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Katherine S. Walsh, St. Louis, MO, for appellants.

Before Division Three: Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

The Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("LIRC"), the Missouri Department of Employment Security ("DES"), and Robert Lambert ("Lambert") (collectively "Defendants") appeal from the trial court's judgment in an age discrimination action which awarded actual damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs to Rita Lynne Terpstra ("Terpstra"). The Defendants allege multiple errors occurred at trial involving questioning of the venire panel about issues of law, the admission of irrelevant evidence, the submission of punitive damages, the amount awarded in punitive damages, and the amount awarded for attorneys' fees. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background¹

In January 2012, Terpstra filed suit against the Defendants. After years of discovery, Terpstra was granted leave to file an amended petition in March 2016. The amended petition alleged in Count One that the Defendants engaged in age discrimination in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), section 213.010 et seq. ,² by failing to promote Terpstra, age 55, to the position of senior claims supervisor at the Jefferson City Regional Claims Center ("JCRCC") in August 2010 when two openings existed.³ The amended petition alleged in Count Two that the Defendants retaliated against Terpstra in violation of the MHRA by prematurely terminating her temporary position as senior claims supervisor in March 2011 after Terpstra filed age discrimination complaints with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").

Terpstra's claims were tried to a jury beginning in November 2016. Terpstra presented evidence that she was denied two promotions to senior claims supervisor in 2010, and that the Defendants promoted two younger, less qualified persons to the positions. Terpstra presented testimony from other employees, over the Defendants' objection, suggesting that the Defendants engaged in a scheme of promoting younger, less qualified applicants over older, more qualified applicants. Terpstra also presented evidence that three employees who had been promoted to senior claims supervisor were later demoted due to inappropriate email use.

The jury found in favor of Terpstra on Count One, and awarded her $20,000 in actual damages against DES and Lambert; $260,000 in punitive damages against DES; and $20,000 in punitive damages against Lambert. The jury found in favor of the Defendants on Count Two.

Terpstra filed a motion asking the trial court to award reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and post-judgment interest ("Terpstra's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs"). Terpstra's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs sought an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,175,248.90; costs and expenses in the amount of $27,200.26; and post-judgment interest at 5.5 percent on the total judgment. Terpstra later amended her request for costs and expenses to $15,000. Terpstra also filed a motion asking the trial court to conform the judgment and to enter judgment against the LIRC on Count One ("Terpstra's Motion to Conform the Judgment"). Terpstra's Motion to Conform the Judgment asserted that, because Lambert is an employee of the LIRC, and because DES is a division of the LIRC, the LIRC was legally responsible for the acts of age discrimination attributed by the jury to DES and Lambert on Count One.

On May 5, 2017, the trial court issued its judgment ("Judgment") in conformance with the jury's verdicts, and ruling Terpstra's motions. The Judgment found that the jury's finding in favor of Terpstra and against Lambert and DES on Count One, the age discrimination claim, also bound the LIRC. Thus, the Judgment awarded Terpstra actual damages in the amount of $20,000 from the LIRC, DES, and Lambert. The Judgment awarded Terpstra punitive damages in the amount of $20,000 from Lambert, and in the amount of $260,000 from DES, as set forth in the jury's verdicts. The Judgment awarded Terpstra $731,562.30 in reasonable attorneys' fees and $15,000 in costs and expenses, from the LIRC, DES, and Lambert. Finally, the Judgment awarded post-judgment interest at 5.75 percent on all amounts awarded to Terpstra.

Following the entry of Judgment, Defendants DES and Lambert filed a motion titled "Defendants' Motions and Suggestions in Support of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative for a New Trial, or in the Alternative for an Elimination and/or Reduction in Fee Awards" ("Post-Trial Motion").⁴ The Post-Trial Motion argued that entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial was required because the trial court erred in admitting testimony from "me-too" witnesses about discriminatory statements, actions, or conduct unrelated to the instant action; because Terpstra improperly instructed the venire panel on the law during voir dire; because the trial court erroneously admitted emails which led to the demotion of three employees that were not relevant; and because the trial court's award of attorneys' fees was based on a misapplication of the law.⁵ The Post-Trial Motion alternatively argued that, because the trial court's award of attorneys' fees was based on a misapplication of law, the trial court should eliminate or reduce the attorneys' fees award. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Post-Trial Motion.

The Defendants appeal. Additional facts will be discussed where relevant to the Defendants' points on appeal.

Analysis

The Defendants assert six points on appeal alleging error during voir dire, in the admission of evidence, in the submission and award of punitive damages, and in the award of attorneys' fees. We address each point separately.

Point One: Terpstra's Discussion of the Law During Voir Dire

The Defendants' first point on appeal argues that the trial court erred "in permitting Terpstra's counsel to improperly instruct the venire panel on the law during voir dire because it was not relevant to identifying whether the potential jurors harbored any bias or prejudice against either party in that counsel could have determined the same information without invading the province of the court." [Appellants' Brief, p. 25]

The purpose of voir dire " ‘is to determine which persons harbor bias or prejudice against either party which would make them unfit to serve as jurors.’ " Dieser v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr. , 498 S.W.3d 419, 436 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting State v. Nicklasson , 967 S.W.2d 596, 608 (Mo. banc 1998) ). "Counsel is afforded wide latitude in questioning ‘the venire panel to determine preconceived prejudices which would prevent them from following the court's instructions.’ " Id. (quoting Nicklasson , 967 S.W.2d at 608 ). As such, " ‘the trial [court] is vested with the discretion to judge the appropriateness of specific questions, and is generally vested with wide discretion in the conduct of voir dire.’ "

Adkins v. Hontz , 337 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Mo.App. W.D. 2011) (quoting State v. Baumruk , 280 S.W.3d 600, 614 (Mo. banc 2009) ). We will not reverse a ruling made by the trial court during voir dire unless it "clearly and manifestly indicate[s] an abuse of such discretion." Id. at 718. "The trial court abuses its discretion when a ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Id. at 716. An abuse of discretion alone will not support reversal. The party claiming error thus has " ‘the [additional] burden of showing a real probability that [they were] thereby prejudiced.’ " Dieser , 498 S.W.3d at 436 (quoting Nicklasson , 967 S.W.2d at 608 ).

" ‘Counsel may not tell prospective jurors what law will be applied in the case or what instructions will be given to them.’ " State v. Brown , 902 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Mo. banc 1995) (quoting State v. White , 722 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) ). Here, the Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion during voir dire on three occasions when it permitted Terpstra's counsel to violate this principle. We disagree.

First, the Defendants complain that Terpstra's counsel was permitted, over the Defendants' objection, to ask whether members of the venire panel believed a person was required to file an internal grievance before filing suit for discrimination. After the Defendants' objection was overruled, Terpstra's counsel briefly explained the process for filing a complaint with the MCHR. The next morning, the Defendants moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the Defendants' motion for a mistrial noting that "a short explanation of the law, just to clarify the jurors' bias, is appropriate."

On appeal, the Defendants do not claim error in the denial of their motion for a mistrial. Instead, they argue that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Terpstra to discuss the procedure for filing a discrimination lawsuit. This claim of error is not preserved for appellate review. The Post-Trial Motion did not address this aspect of voir dire. The Post-Trial Motion's discussion of voir dire was limited to the contention that Terpstra was erroneously permitted to discuss "the definition of discrimination and the burden of proof," and in so doing, made incorrect statements about the law. [Doc. 94, p. 2] "Rule 78.07(a) requires all allegations of error ... ‘to be included in a motion for new trial in order to be preserved for appellate review.’ " Goudeaux v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Kansas City , 409 S.W.3d...