Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Stockwell

• Decision Date: 16 March 1889
• Citation: 118 Ind. 98,20 N.E. 650
• Parties: Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Stockwell.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

118 Ind. 98

20 N.E. 650

Terre Haute & I. R. Co.

v.Stockwell.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 16, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Putnam county; Silas D. Coffey, Judge.

Action to recover the value of professional services, brought by Dr. George W. Stockwell against the Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

John G. Williams, for appellant. S. A. Hays, for appellee.

Berkshire, J.

There are two errors assigned: (1) The court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. (2) The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. The complaint, in substance, alleges that in the year 1884, the appellant, by its employes, operating and running a locomotive engine and train of cars over its railroad track, through Reelsville, a station on the line of its railroad, then and there ran said locomotive engine against one William McCray, and then and there, and thereby, seriously injured him by then and there causing a compound comminuted fracture of both bones in the left fore-arm, etc.; that the injury was of a character so serious as to require immediate attention; that the said station is many miles distant from the principal offices of the appellant, and from the residences of its principal officers, and that one John Trindle was the conductor in charge of said train, and, as the agent of the appellant, employed the appellee, who was a resident surgeon and physician at said station, to render professional services to the said McCray, and that he did, in accordance with said request and employment, render the said McCray surgical aid and attention from the ------ day of ------, 1884, to the ------ day of ------, 1885, and that his services and employment were made known to the company immediately after the accident, and it had full knowledge thereof; that the said services so rendered were of the value of $300; that the said conductor was the highest representative of the appellant, and the superior officer present when the accident occurred and said employment made. A bill of particulars is filed with the complaint as a part of it.

We are of the opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action. It is not necessary that we determine whether or not, under the circumstances averred, the conductor, as the agent of the company, had authority by a single employment to bind the company for the services rendered. It is shown that the injury occurred; that the conductor employed, as the agent of the company, the appellee to render the services; that when the services were rendered the appellant had full knowledge of all the facts; and that the appellee was never discharged by the appellant. We are of the opinion that, if the services were rendered under the employment, as stated, and with a full knowledge of all the facts at or about the time of the accident or employment, and that the appellant permitted the appellee to go on and render services after it had acquired such knowledge, it thereby became liable for the services rendered; that is to say, the company,-having been informed of the accident, the employment of the appellee by its conductor, claiming to act as its agent; that the appellee was acting under the employment,-if it did not intend to hold itself responsible for the services rendered, it became and was its duty to so notify the appellee, and its failure to do so was a ratification of the employment as made by the conductor. Railroad Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358;Railroad Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. 188;Railroad Co. v. Prince, 50 Ill. 26;Railroad Co. v. Morris, 67 Ill. 295;Railroad Co. v. Mahoney, 82 Ill. 73; Beach, Contrib. Neg. 221, 222.

The first reason for a new trial is that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence. The second reason is that the verdict is contrary to law. We may consider the two reasons together. The evidence establishes the facts of the accident, the employment by the conductor; that he was the superior officer present when the accident occurred; and that the appellee rendered the services sued for. The agent of the appellant at the station where the accident occurred testified that on the same day, and soon thereafter, the conductor came into the office and sent telegrams, both to the general superintendent and general agent of the company, that the train of which the conductor...