Terrell v. James, 18749
| Decision Date | 23 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 18749,18749 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Georgia A. TERRELL, Respondent, v. Norma Jean B. JAMES, Appellant. |
Jefferies & Groves, Greenwood, for appellant.
William T. Jones, Greenwood, for respondent.
The plaintiff-respondent in this action recovered a verdict for actual damages for personal injuries sustained when a station wagon driven by plaintiff was in collision with a pickup truck driven by defendant-appellant. The case was tried at the February 1967 term of the Court of Common Pleas for Greenwood County, and the appeal is from an order of the circuit judge denying defendant's motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto, or in the alternative, for a new trial.
Defendant contends that she was entitled to a judgment non obstante veredicto in that (1) there was no proof of actionable negligence on her part, and that (2) plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In deciding whether the defendant was so entitled, it is elementary that the evidence and all the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom have to be taken most strongly against the defendant and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We, accordingly, proceed to review the evidence and state the facts in the light of the foregoing principles.
The collision occurred at about 10:15 A.M. on February 20, 1965, a bright, clear, sunshiny day, at the intersection of Eastman Street and Oakwood Drive in Harris Plant Village, near Greenwood, South Carolina. Oakwood Drive runs north and south, and Eastman Street runs east and west, dead-ending in Oakwood Drive, both streets being thirty feet in width. Plaintiff was proceeding south on Oakwood Drive, and defendant was proceeding east on Eastman Street and making a left turn into Oakwood Drive. At the time of the collision there were no traffic signals or stop signs in place on either street. Prior to the collision, however, there had been a stop sign on Eastman Street at the intersection to Oakwood Drive, which sign, however, had at some time prior to the collision been improperly removed or destroyed. Precisely when this occurred the record does not disclose. The evidence of one witness would indicate that it was a year or two prior to the accident, while another witness testified that the sign was in place 'shortly before' the collision, but admitted on cross-examination that it could have been removed a considerable time before the date of the collision. The plaintiff testified that she thought the stop sign was still in place; did not know that it had been removed, and that she considered Oakwood Drive to be a 'through street'. Both plaintiff and defendant were thoroughly familiar with the area and defendant admitted that she knew at the time 'that Oakwood was a through road or street'. The highway patrolman who investigated the collision testified, without objection, that Oakwood was a 'through street', and a passenger in the defendant's vehicle, also without objection, testified to the same effect.
The speed limit on Oakwood at the time was 35 miles per hour, and no witness testified that plaintiff was exceeding that limit. She herself testified that she was driving about 30 miles per hour and that as she approached the intersection she saw the truck driven by the defendant approaching the intersection, and took her foot momentarily off of the accelerator, but the truck slowed as if it were going to stop at the intersection, upon which plaintiff returned her foot to the accelerator and when she was about thirty steps from the intersection she realized the truck was not going to stop, applied her brakes and swerved to the left. The defendant admittedly did not stop before entering the intersection and the collision occurred somewhere near the center of the intersection, the impact being between the left front corner of the vehicle driven by plaintiff and the left door of the pickup truck. After the impact, the truck was largely in the northbound lane of Oakwood Drive, and the front end of plaintiff's car was to her left of the center of Oakwood Drive, the truck being at about a 45 degree angle to Oakwood Drive with its right front wheel near the eastern curb. There were no obstructions to the view of either driver, and as defendant approached and entered Oakwood Drive, she admittedly could see several blocks north on Oakwood Drive, but failed to see plaintiff until immediately before the impact.
The foregoing is not a complete recitation of the evidence, but it is quite sufficient, we think, to show that when viewed in the light of the applicable principles of law, there was abundant evidence of actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, and that the issue of contributory negligence, if any, on the part of the plaintiff was for the jury.
The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury the statutory law relating to both a 'through' highway and a 'stop' intersection, the court having charged Code Sec. 46--423 with respect to vehicles entering either a through highway or stop intersection and the rights and duties of...
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