Terrell v. Mr. Cooper Grp.

Decision Date02 July 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 20-0496 (CKK)
PartiesLORI E. TERRELL, Plaintiff, v. MR. COOPER GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Lori E. Terrell ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, has filed this civil action against "Mr. Cooper Group, Inc." ("Defendant"). Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on December 30, 2019, in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 1. On January 21, 2020, Plaintiff moved to amend her pleading and filed her Amended Complaint therewith. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 99. Defendant was not properly served with Plaintiff's pleadings, but became aware of the Amended Complaint on January 21, 2020, when Plaintiff filed her motion to amend. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 3-4. Defendant subsequently removed the Amended Complaint to this Court on February 20, 2020. See id. at ¶¶ 1-8.

Following removal to this Court, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, at 1. Plaintiff opposed Defendant's dispositive motion and also filed a motion to remand her case back to Superior Court. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 9, at 1. On August 12, 2020, this Court issued an Order denying Plaintiff's remand motion and granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See Order, ECF No. 14, at 1. The Court dismissed the Amended Complaint, which included 90 pages of impenetrable allegations, because it did not provide a sufficiently clear statement of Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 15, at 4-6. Nonetheless, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without prejudice and directed Plaintiff to amend her pleading by September 11, 2020, or risk the dismissal of her case. See Order, ECF No. 14, at 1.

Since then, the parties have filed a variety of new motions on the docket, which are now pending before the Court and ripe for review. Specifically, Plaintiff has filed a [16] Motion to Vacate this Court's August 12, 2020 Order, a related [18] Motion for "Court Docket/Record Correction," and a miscellaneous [19] Motion for Order. Plaintiff has also filed two copies of her Second Amended Complaint on the docket. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 18-2 & 19-1. Plaintiff also requests relief in two opposition filings, submitted on [25] October 16, 2020 and [30] November 12, 2020, respectively. In turn, Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended pleading, requesting the outright dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint. See Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 23, at 1. Finally, Defendant filed a motion for clarification, which also remains pending. See Def.'s Mot. to Clarify, ECF No. 21, at 1.

Upon consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole,1 the Court will DENY each of Plaintiff's pending motions, and will GRANT Defendant'smotion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. For the sake of clarity, the Court will address each of the pending motions in turn.

A. Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 16)

On August 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate this Court's August 12, 2020 Order. Although not a model of clarity,2 the Court construes Plaintiff's motion to (1) challenge this Court's removal jurisdiction, (2) request an interlocutory appeal of the Court's August 12, 2020 Order, and (3) request a stay of Plaintiff's deadline to file an amended pleading. As explained below, the Court will deny each of these three requests.

1. Removal Jurisdiction

From what the Court can discern, Plaintiff's motion to vacate appears to request reconsideration of the August 12, 2020 Order, to the extent it found that this Court has removal jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case. See Pl.'s Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 16, at 1-2 ("Relevantly, to the purpose of ordering, consider whether a non-sham, legitimate, proper, actual, or otherwise effective, request for removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 exists meeting the unambiguous, applicable, requirements giving rise to exercise Court jurisdiction, authority and power, including,for consideration under the 'Removal Statute(s) . . . "). While Plaintiff does not specify the procedural basis for her motion, the Court construes Plaintiff's motion for review of an interlocutory order as one made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 490 F. Supp. 3d 190, 194 (D.D.C. 2020).

Rule 54(b) allows the Court to revise "any order or other decision" that "adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). "[T]his jurisdiction has established that reconsideration [under Rule 54(b)] is appropriate 'as justice requires.'" Lyles v. District of Columbia, 65 F. Supp. 3d 181, 188 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 (D.D.C. 2005)). A court's discretion under Rule 54(b), however, is "limited by the law of the case doctrine and subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again." Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 3d at 194-95 (quotation omitted). "'The law-of-the-case doctrine dictates that the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result,' absent extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 195 (quoting Al Bahlul v. United States, 967 F.3d 858, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). In general, a court will grant a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order "only when the movant demonstrates: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the discovery of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a clear error in the first order." Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity, 319 F. Supp. 3d 70, 81 (D.D.C. 2018).

The Court will not vacate its August 12, 2020 Order, which held that Defendant properly removed this action to federal court. To begin, Plaintiff offers no coherent argument as to why removal jurisdiction is improper in this action, or why some legal error, intervening change in thelaw, or new evidence now requires reconsideration of this Court's August 12, 2020 Order. See, e.g., Pl.'s Mem., ECF No. 16-1, at 19-30. At most, Plaintiff's rambling filing reargues points asserted in her original motion to remand, which this Court has already addressed in full. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 15, at 2-4. A Rule 54(b) motion "cannot be used to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled or to present theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier." Shvartser v. Lekser, 330 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 (D.D.C. 2018) (quotation omitted).

Moreover, upon a subsequent review of the record as a whole, the Court again concludes that Defendant properly removed this action to federal Court. Defendant first received notice of Plaintiff's original complaint on January 21, 2020. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at ¶ 3. Defendant then removed the case to this Court on February 20, 2020. See id. at ¶ 5. Therefore, removal came within thirty days of Defendant's receipt of Plaintiff's complaint, in compliance with the time-period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Defendant also complied with § 1446(a) by providing a copy of all "process, pleadings, and orders" received by Defendant in this action at the time of removal, see Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at ¶ 6; Docs. from D.C. Sup. Ct., ECF No. 1-1, at 1-222, and with § 1446(d) by filing a notice of removal with the D.C. Superior Court, see Not. of Filing, ECF No. 1-2, at 1. Furthermore, Defendant promptly provided written notice of removal to Plaintiff. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at ¶ 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Finally, Defendant's removal of this action complied with the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), that a party remove a civil action over which the district court has "original jurisdiction." At the time of removal, this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Plaintiff asserted a federal claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and also on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, see Not. of Removal,ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 9-19; Mem. Op., ECF No. 15, at 4.

For these reasons, the Court finds no reason to vacate its jurisdictional findings in the August 12, 2020 Order under Rule 54(b). As such, Plaintiff's motion to vacate on the August 12, 2020 Order on this ground is DENIED.

2. Interlocutory Appeal

In her motion to vacate, Plaintiff also requests that this Court certify for interlocutory appeal its August 12, 2020 Order denying her motion to remand. See Pl.'s Mem., ECF No. 16-1, at 30-34. Section 1292(b) provides for interlocutory appeals from "otherwise not immediately appealable orders, if conditions specified in the section are met, the district court so certifies, and the court of appeals exercises its discretion to take up the request for review." Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 n.10 (1996). To satisfy the conditions of § 1292(b), the moving party must demonstrate that the order at issue (1) involves a controlling question of law; (2) offers substantial ground for difference of opinion as to its correctness and; (3) if appealed immediately, would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Even if the movant establishes the three criteria under section 1292(b), the Court may still deny certification, as the decision to certify an order for interlocutory appeal is entirely within the district court's discretion. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995). Moreover, "[a] party seeking certification pursuant to § 1292(b) must meet a high standard to overcome the strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against...

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