Territory v. Chavez.
| Decision Date | 01 September 1896 |
| Citation | 45 P. 1107,8 N.M. 528 |
| Parties | TERRITORYv.CHAVEZ. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, San Miguel County; before Chief Justice Thomas Smith.
Jose Chavez y Chavez was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.
Where an accomplice, who has been released on his own recognizance, though previously convicted of crime, is a witness for the state, evidence of such release, is admissible, as affecting his credibility.
Veeder & Veeder, for appellant.
John P. Victory, Sol. Gen., for the Territory.
The defendant was convicted in San Miguel county for the murder of Gabriel Sandoval, and sentenced to death, and the cause is brought here on appeal. It is claimed for the accused that the only witnesses whose testimony directly connected the defendant with the crime charged are accomplices in the crime. The credit to be given to their testimony was therefore of the highest importance. To shake that credit, it was sought, on cross-examination of each of such accomplices, to show that he had a past history for criminal actions, which, if exposed, would have had a material influence upon the weight to be given his testimony by the jury. It is claimed that the right to so cross-examine was denied, and that the court committed error in so doing. The attack upon the credit of a witness must ordinarily be confined to proof of general reputation, and specific acts may not be shown, unless relating to the interest, bias, or prejudice of the witness. But, according to the more modern American cases, the attack may also be made on cross-examination, in which the witness may be required to disclose matters in his own history, provided they clearly affect his credibility, even though they may tend to disgrace him. See, also, opinion of Lord Eldon in Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 216. The latitude of such cross-examination is to enable the jury to understand the character of the witness they are called upon to believe. It is to be presumed that the witness will protect himself, as far, at least, as the truth will permit, and no one can know better the favorable circumstances. The answers thus given upon such collateral matters cannot, of course, be contradicted. Upon these general propositions, see La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich. 54, and note; State v. Miller (Mo. Sup.) 13 S. W. 832; 1 Greenl. Ev. 455; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 476. The extent to which cross-examination will be permitted is no doubt, in a large measure, in the discretion of the trial court; and it is difficult to draw the line as to where the legal discretion as to the admission or the exclusion of such testimony commences, and where it ends. The truth is the thing to be sought. Assaults upon a witness by cross-examination into collateral matters cannot be allowed to gratify the caprice or the displeasure of those against whom he testifies; and intrusions into private affairs, which are calculated merely to wound the feelings, humiliate, or embarrass the witness, will not be permitted. Ephland v. Railroad Co., 57 Mo. App. 147; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 455-461. As was said by Mr. Wharton, “If witnesses were to be compelled to answer fishing questions as to any scandals in their past lives, the witness box would become itself a scandal which no civilized community would tolerate.” Whart. Cr. Ev. § 472. But a clear distinction is to be taken between those matters called for on cross-examination which merely excite prejudice against the witness, or tend to humiliate him or wound his feelings, and those matters, on the other hand, which are calculated, in an important and material respect, to influence the credit to be given to his testimony. As to the latter class, the witness cannot be shielded from disclosing his own character on cross-examination, and for this purpose he may be interrogated upon specific acts and transactions of his past life; and if they are not too remote in time, and clearly relate to the credit of the witness, in an important and material respect, it would be error to exclude them. Greenl. Ev. §§ 455-461; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 476, Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 129. How far justice may require such examinations to go, how much time should be spent upon them, what should be excluded for remoteness of time, and what for being trivial or unimportant, must depend in some measure upon the circumstances of each case. Watson v. Twombly, 60 N. H. 491. And these are questions addressed primarily to the discretion of the trial court, but the discretion should be liberally exercised. Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 282. The latitude in cross-examinations is particularly necessary where spies, informers, and accomplices are used as witnesses; otherwise the life of the person on trial must often be wrongfully endangered. Phil. & A. Ev. 917; 2 Phil. Ev. 422. Whether the facts showing the infamous or disgraceful record of the witness be drawn from a stranger, who comes forward unexpectedly to deliver material testimony, or be drawn from one who, though known to the parties, may be unknown to the jury, or some of them, there is no other way of discovering his credibility to the jury, unless, perchance, his character should be so utterly bad, and publicly known, as to furnish means of attack as to general reputation. Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. 43.
With these general statements, we will now examine the record upon this subject. Guadalupe Cabellero and Julian Trujillo were, if their testimony is to be believed, accomplices and co-conspirators with the defendant in the assassination of Gabriel Sandoval, and were called as witnesses against him, together with one Manuel Gonzales y Baca, who testified as to defendant's admissions in regard to his flight from Las Vegas after the discovery of the body of the murdered man. It was shown, upon examination of these men upon the voir dire, that they had been convicted of crime and sent to the penitentiary. Their pardons were then produced by the prosecution. These pardons operated to restore them to competency as witnesses, but did not restore their credit. etc. Curtis v. Cochran, 50 N. H. 244. It further appears that the witness Cabellero had been convicted of larceny and sent to the penitentiary; that he was indicted for the murder of one Patricio...
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Richards v. United States
...law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense." (5 S.W. at page 529.) The actual holding in Territory v. Chavez, 1896, 8 N.M. 528, 45 P. 1107, is only that a pardon restores a witness' competency, although Curtis v. Cochran, supra, is quoted on the question of cr......
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Cox v. State
...we embraced and applied the teachings of 3A Wigmore, Evidence, § 983 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Wigmore quotes from Territory v. Chavez, 8 N.M. 528, 532, 45 P. 1107, 1108 (1896): "(A) clear distinction is to be taken between those matters called for on cross-examination which merely excite prej......
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Arnold v. United States
...State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909. And the inquiry has been sanctioned in the absence of an authorizing statute. Territory v. Chavez, 8 N.M. 528, 45 P. 1107; Hadley v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 P. 458, 462. In the latter case it was said: "The general rule, in the absence of a statute ......
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State v. Silva, 24,273.
...they should consider the inducements and influences of hope, or promises, under which such testimony is given." Territory v. Chavez, 8 N.M. 528, 538, 45 P. 1107, 1110 (1896). Bias and a motive to fabricate, even when evidence of a deal is absent, should be presented to a jury for its consid......