Terrones v. Allen

• Decision Date: 02 March 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 86-C-863.
• Citation: 680 F. Supp. 1483
• Parties: Thomas M. TERRONES, Plaintiff, v. T.W. ALLEN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

680 F. Supp. 1483

Thomas M. TERRONES, Plaintiff, v. T.W. ALLEN, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 86-C-863.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

March 2, 1988.

Steven Bush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Vincent Todd, Gregory Dallas, P.C., Denver, Colo., for defendants.

ORDER

CARRIGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his arrest and the subsequent revocation of his driver's license violated his constitutional rights.

The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff was arrested by the defendant Allen, an Aurora, Colorado police officer, for driving while intoxicated. Plaintiff's driving privilege in Colorado was at that time under revocation, but he showed Allen a Kansas driver's license. Allen took the plaintiff to the Aurora police station and administered a breath-alcohol test. The test results indicated that the plaintiff's breath contained .241 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Allen then served the plaintiff with a "Notice of Revocation or Denial" of his Colorado driver's license.¹

After a revocation hearing requested by the plaintiff, the hearing officer issued these findings:

(1) Plaintiff was driving a motor vehicle when he was stopped by Officer Allen;

(2) Probable cause existed for Officer Allen to contact the vehicle because of a complaint made by a citizen to the officer;

(3) Reasonable grounds existed for Officer Allen to request a breath-alcohol chemical test;

(4) The chemical test was given within an hour after the stop;

(5) The chemical test complied with the applicable rules; and

(6) The breath alcohol level was 0.241 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

The hearing officer revoked the plaintiff's driving privilege for one year. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, and did not seek judicial review of the agency order.

According to the amended complaint, the district attorney for Colorado's Eighteenth Judicial District confessed a motion to suppress all evidence in the criminal case as the fruits of an unlawful stop and detention of the plaintiff by the defendant Allen. Subsequently, all criminal charges against the plaintiff were dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that "the charges brought against him, and the revocation of his Colorado Driver's License were the result of the defendant Allen's unlawful stop and without probable cause." (Amended complaint, para 7.) He further alleges that his "arrest was in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and to due process of law." (Id.)

Although the plaintiff's driving privileges have been reinstated because the revocation period has expired, his driver's history continues to reflect a revocation order, and the plaintiff seeks a ruling requiring the defendant John Doe, an unknown person who will be appointed Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Revenue, to expunge the revocation from the plaintiff's record.

Defendant John Doe has filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Summary judgment is proper under Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c) if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The parties have briefed the issues and oral argument would not materially assist my decision.

An arrest not based on probable cause violates the constitution and can be the basis for recovery under § 1983. Sartin v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 535 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1976). The Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person made prior to or during an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("it must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has `seized' that person").

A plaintiff, however, will not prevail under § 1983 for claims arising out of an arrest where the arrest was supported by probable cause. Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir.1985). See Buchanan v. Sowa, 592 F.Supp. 1009 (D.Ohio 1984) (arrest of plaintiff by officers, who reasonably believed that a crime was being committed, was based on probable cause and did not give rise to § 1983 liability); Greene v. Brown, 535 F.Supp. 1096 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (if probable cause to arrest is established, a plaintiff may not recover for a civil rights violation arising out of the arrest). "A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

While the issue of whether the defendant Allen had reasonable cause to stop and probable cause to arrest the plaintiff presents a factual issue, the defendant John Doe contends that the revocation hearing officer's finding that the defendant Allen had probable cause to stop the plaintiff is binding in this proceeding under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.²

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "it is sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the fact finding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity." University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3226, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). In Elliot the Court held that a state administrative proceeding, quasi-judicial in nature, resolving disputed issues that the parties have had an opportunity to litigate, is entitled to the same preclusive effect in a § 1983 action filed in federal court as it would be accorded by the state courts. The Court reasoned that:

"Giving preclusive effect to administrative fact finding serves the value underlying general principles of collateral estoppel: enforcing repose. This value, which encompasses both the parties' interest in avoiding the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and the public's interest in conserving judicial resources ... is equally implicated whether fact finding is done by a federal or state agency.

"Having federal courts give preclusive effect to the fact finding of state administrative tribunals also serves the value of federalism." Id. 106 S.Ct. at 3226.³

In United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966), the Court said:

"When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." Id. 86 S.Ct. at 422.

Thus the hearing officer's finding that Officer Allen had probable cause to stop the plaintiff is binding in this proceeding and bars the plaintiff's claims against the defendant Doe if: (1) the hearing officer was acting in a judicial capacity; (2) Colorado courts apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to administrative findings where the agency is acting in a judicial capacity; and (3) Colorado courts would apply either res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the finding that Allen had probable cause. I shall address these requirements in the order just presented.

A. Judicial Capacity.

"Whether an administrative determination rises to the level of a `judicial proceeding' is an open question that depends upon the circumstances of each case." Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir.1985). Here, the plaintiff was represented by counsel at his revocation hearing, and had the right to subpeona witnesses. The hearing officer's decision was subject to review in the state courts. Significantly, none of the pleadings and documents submitted by the plaintiff suggests that the hearing officer was acting in any capacity other than a judicial capacity when he presided over the revocation hearing. Thus I conclude that the hearing officer was acting in a judicial capacity when he upheld Officer Allen's revocation of the plaintiff's license.

B. Agency Decisions and Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel.

Colorado courts have held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be applied to administrative actions. See, e.g., Umberfield v. School Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974) (school board's decision in a proceeding to dismiss a tenured teacher under the Teacher Employment, Dismissal, and Tenure Act was res judicata in a subsequent administrative proceeding before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission); Industrial Commission v. Moffat County School District, 732 P.2d 616 (Colo.1987). In the last cited case, the court declared that "the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were developed in the context of judicial proceedings, but may be applied to administrative actions as well." 732 P.2d at 620. The court there stated:

"The findings and conclusions of an administrative agency may be binding upon the parties in a subsequent proceeding if the agency that rendered the decision acted in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues of fact which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate." Id.

Thus it is clear that in a proper case, a Colorado court would apply either res judicata or collateral estoppel to the determination of an administrative agency.

C. Whether Colorado Courts Would Apply Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel to the Hearing Officer's Conclusion.

Because I already have concluded that the hearing officer was acting in a judicial capacity when he upheld revocation of the plaintiff's license, and that a Colorado court would, in an appropriate case, apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to an administrative decision, I must decide whether a Colorado court would apply either res judicata or collateral...