Terry v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 July 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action 9:17-cv-03097-MBS-MGB
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Christine Terry, Plaintiff, v. The Beaufort County School District, Defendant.

Christine Terry, Plaintiff, v. The Beaufort County School District, Defendant.

Civil Action 9:17-cv-03097-MBS-MGB

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA BEAUFORT DIVISION

July 16, 2018

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case was removed from the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas on November 15, 2017. (Dkt. No. 1.) On December 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand. (Dkt. No. 7.) For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 7).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant The Beaufort County School District (the "Defendant" or the "School District"); she alleges that the School District "is a public school district as set forth" in South Carolina Code § 59-17-10 "operating and controlling the public schools located in Beaufort County, South Carolina as an authorized political subdivision of the State of South Carolina." (Compl. ¶ 2.) She alleges that she "is a certified teacher," and she "was contracted" by the Defendant "as a teacher at Whale Branch Middle School during the 2015-2016 school year." (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff further alleges that "[i]n the fall of 2015, Plaintiff had a sudden and unexpected impairment of her vision," and she "was given a leave of absence from her teaching to seek medical attention." (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) According to Plaintiff, "[i]nitially, . . . [her] sudden and unexpected vision impairment could not be adequately explained by her medical providers," but after "extensive testing and evaluation, Plaintiff was diagnosed with permanent and irreversible vision impairment on March 9, 2016." (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiff alleges she "immediately informed the Defendant of her diagnosis." (Compl. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff further alleges that on March 11, 2016, she met with Defendant's Human Resources Specialist, and during that meeting, she "was informed by an employee of the Defendant that because of her diagnosis of permanent and irreversible vision impairment, she would need to 'resign or be terminated.'" (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) According to Plaintiff, she "did not want to 'resign or be terminated,' but wanted to continue teaching." (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that after she consulted with the South Carolina Commission for the Blind, she "requested that the Defendant retain her as a teacher and make reasonable accommodations to assist her in keeping her job as a teacher." (Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant "provided no assistance or resources to the Plaintiff in suggesting or evaluating what accommodations might be available" but instead "insisted that the Plaintiff request specific accommodations that she would need to teach with vision impairment." (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff requested an "assistant or aid in the classroom until she could receive the training and equipment she would need," but "Defendant's Human Resources Specialist advised the Plaintiff that it was unreasonable to expect the District to hire another person." (Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.)

According to Plaintiff, she "subsequently amended her accommodation request in writing to include the use of a guide dog and special equipment," and in May of 2016, "the Defendant entered into a contract to employ the Plaintiff as a teacher for the 2016-2017 school year at the same school in a position to be determined." (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.) After entering into this contract, however, "[o]n June 13, 2016, the Plaintiff was informed by the Human Resources Specialist that the accommodations she . . . requested were not reasonable and that she was being terminated as of July 1, 2016." (Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiff alleges that she "was informed on multiple occasions that she was being terminated from employment because of her impaired vision." (Compl. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff lists the following causes of action in her Complaint: violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and "Wrongful Termination/Discrimination on account of Handicap." (See generally Compl.)

DISCUSSION

In Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Plaintiff contends that remand is appropriate, asserting that Defendant's "Notice of Removal fails to establish the jurisdiction of this court." (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 2 of 3.) Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant is a political subdivision of the State of South Carolina, and "the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits for money damages in federal court by citizens against a State or political subdivision of a state." (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 1, 3 of 3.) Plaintiff states, "Where the Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over an action against a State or its political subdivisions, remand under 42 U.S.C. §1447(c) is mandated." (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 3 of 3.)

"The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal." Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921)). On a motion to remand, courts are obligated to "construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the 'significant federalism concerns' implicated." Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). "If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary." Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 (citing In re Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993); Cheshire v. Coca-Cola Bottling Affiliated, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D.S.C. 1990)).

In the case sub judice, Plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act plainly "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as federal law creates the claim, see Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1058 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The federal district court would have had original jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] ADA claim because it arose under federal law."); Sanders v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, Civ. A. No. 0:15-cv-02313-JMC, 2016 WL 5349085, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2016). Plaintiff contends, however, that this case should be remanded due to the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment provides: "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." "Even though the language of the Eleventh Amendment preserves sovereign immunity of only the States of the Union, it is settled that this protection extends also to state agents and state instrumentalities, . . . or stated otherwise, to arm[s] of the State and State officials." Cash v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)).

The Defendant in this action is the Beaufort County School District, and as the parties recognize, case law in this district is conflicting as to whether a school district is an arm of the State of South Carolina. In Child Evangelism Fellowship of South Carolina v. Anderson School District 5, 438 F. Supp. 2d 609 (D.S.C. 2006), Judge Herlong noted that "[t]here are conflicting opinions . . . from the District of South Carolina" on the issue of "whether a school district 'is to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend." Child Evangelism, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 618-19 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). Ultimately, after examining the record, Judge Herlong "conclude[d] that the Eleventh Amendment does not provide immunity" to the defendant, Anderson School District 5. Id. at 621.¹ On the other hand, in Smith v. School District of Greenville County, 324 F. Supp. 2d 786, 796 (D.S.C. 2004), then-District Judge Floyd stated, "[T]he Court is of the firm opinion that the relationship between the Defendant school districts and the state is so close and thelaws of this state are such as to render the Defendant school districts as arms of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. That is, to allow these cases to go forward would offend the notion that the state is to be accorded the respect owed to it as a joint sovereign." See also Eldeco, Inc. v. Skansa USA Bldg., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524, 527 (D.S.C. 2006) (Judge Duffy noted that the District of South Carolina "has had varying opinions on whether South Carolina school districts are arms of the State," but concluded that the Charleston County School District is "an arm of the State of South Carolina" and dismissed the complaint against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it "is immune from private suit"); Grady v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. Seven, Civ. A. No. 7:13-cv-02020-GRA, 2014 WL 1159406 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2014) (Judge G. Ross Anderson concluded that the defendant Spartanburg School District Seven was not immune). Thus, there appears to be no consensus among the District Judges in the United States Court for the District of South Carolina as to whether a school district in South Carolina is an arm of the State.

Here, Plaintiff has asserted a claim pursuant to a federal statute, and Defendant removed it to federal court.² As explained herein, however, removal on the facts of this case does not give riseto a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. At bottom, the question of whether Defendant has Eleventh Amendment immunity requires an analysis of several factors, many of which are not readily ascertainable on the record before this court. See Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 221-24 (4th Cir. 2001) (in evaluating whether the "Granville County (North Carolina) Board of Education enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity," the...