Terry v. Bock, CIV. 01-CV-40372FL.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 01-CV-40372FL.,CIV. 01-CV-40372FL. |
| Citation | 208 F.Supp.2d 780 |
| Parties | Frederick L. TERRY, Petitioner, v. Barbara BOCK, Respondent, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Frederick Terry, Freeland, MI, Pro se.
Brenda E. Turner, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Debra M. Gagliardi, Michigan Attorney General Office, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
Frederick L. Terry, ("petitioner"), presently confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his application, filed pro se, petitioner challenges his conviction on two counts of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L.A. 750.316; M.S.A. 28.548. For the reasons stated below, petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.
Petitioner and co-defendant Eddie Coleman were charged with two counts of first-degree felony murder and one count of armed robbery, for an incident which took place in Garden City and Detroit, Michigan on January 1, 1997. Following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court, petitioner was found guilty as charged.
Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress two statements that he made to the police. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on his motion to suppress on March 28 and March 31, 1997. Officer Kenneth Williams of the Detroit Police Department testified that he was assigned to be the investigator of this case on January 2, 1997. Officer Williams learned that petitioner had been arrested at the scene of a fatal car accident and taken to Detroit Receiving Hospital. Petitioner was released from the hospital on the morning of January 2, 1997 and brought to police headquarters. Officer Williams indicated that petitioner had some lacerations to his face but no major internal injuries. Officer Williams testified that his first contact with petitioner came at about eleven thirty in the morning in the interview room of his office. Officer Williams spoke with petitioner for about thirty seconds before petitioner told him that all that he had to say at that time was "Eddie Coleman", gave Williams an address, and stated that he was tired. Williams asked petitioner what the name Eddie Coleman meant, and petitioner replied that he was the driver. Williams testified that he had not begun interrogating petitioner at the time that this statement was made, because he first needed to process petitioner by doing a "print card" and an interrogation record. Williams claimed that petitioner had volunteered this information concerning Coleman. After making this statement, petitioner was conveyed back to the ninth floor of police headquarters. (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, hereinafter "E.H.T.", 3/28/97, pp. 34-38).
Officer Williams spoke with petitioner again at four o'clock in the afternoon. Prior to speaking with petitioner, Officer Williams advised him of his constitutional rights. Officer Williams used a standard advice of rights form that the police department provided to its officers. Petitioner informed Williams that he had completed the tenth grade at Cody High School. Williams asked petitioner to read his constitutional rights out loud, which petitioner was able to do. Petitioner read and initialed every one of his constitutional rights on the rights form. Petitioner indicated to Williams that he understood every one of his constitutional rights. Detective Williams testified that petitioner had no difficulty reading the advice of rights form. Petitioner did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of any substance. Petitioner did not complain that he was tired or hungry. Petitioner informed Officer Williams that he had been arrested and interrogated before by police officers and was familiar with these types of proceedings. Petitioner signed the constitutional rights form at 4:20 p.m. (Id. at pp. 39-45). After completing the constitutional rights form and the interrogation record, Officer Williams again asked petitioner if he was tired, hungry, or under the influence of intoxicants. Petitioner indicated that he was not tired, hungry, or under the influence. Petitioner also stated that he was making the statement freely, voluntarily, without any threats or promises. Petitioner again admitted that he understood his constitutional rights. Petitioner then proceeded to make his statement to Officer Williams. Petitioner's statement was completed by 5:35 p.m. (Id. at pp. 45-49). Officer Williams acknowledged that petitioner had lacerations on his face and there may have been some injuries to his hands. Officer Williams testified, however, that petitioner did not complain that he was in pain or agony nor did he ask that the questioning stop. (Id. at p. 50). On cross-examination, Officer Williams acknowledged that petitioner had told him that he had been smoking "fifty ones", which is a combination of cocaine and tobacco, the day before the interrogation. (Id. at pp. 55-56).
Petitioner testified that he had been involved in an automobile accident on January 1, 1997 and that he received injuries as a result of the accident. After receiving medical treatment, petitioner was transported to police headquarters and questioned by Officer Williams. Petitioner testified that he asked Officer Williams for an attorney and told him that he was tired because he was up all night. Petitioner was escorted back to his cell, where he was able to get some sleep. However, petitioner was later awakened and taken back to a room on the ninth floor of police headquarters to be interviewed by Officer Williams. At this point, Officer Williams told him that Eddie Coleman was putting everything on petitioner and showed him what was purportedly Coleman's statement. Petitioner could not actually read the statement, however, because his eyes were "red and puffy" and "were almost closed" as a result of his injury. (Id. at pp. 74-82).
Although Officer Williams asked petitioner if he wished to waive his rights, petitioner claimed that he did not understand what was meant by waiving his rights. Petitioner claimed that he made the statement to Williams because Officer Williams had told him that Eddie Coleman had made a statement against him and told petitioner that if he didn't cooperate, he would be sent to prison for the rest of his life. (Id. at pp. 90-92). Petitioner acknowledged that he had been questioned by police on a prior occasion for an unrelated criminal case in 1996 and had signed a waiver of rights form and given a statement in that case. (Id. at pp. 93-95).
The trial court ruled that petitioner had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. The court did not believe petitioner's testimony that he did not understand what it meant to waive one's rights, in light of the fact that he had this experience [of being interrogated by police] one year earlier. The court also observed that petitioner was not a juvenile but was a thirty one year old man who did not appear to have any emotional or mental problems. The court noted that in terms of education and intelligence, petitioner appeared to understand things "perfectly". The court also took into consideration petitioner's prior experience with the police. The court noted that there was no evidence that the questioning was prolonged. The trial court observed that when petitioner complained of being tired, he was returned to the ninth floor [where his cell was located]. The court further found that neither Officer Williams nor petitioner complained that he could not continue with his interview because of his medical condition. Although acknowledging that petitioner had received injuries in the car accident, the court found that there was no evidence from the record that these injuries prevented petitioner from voluntarily making a statement. The court noted that there was no evidence that petitioner asked for medical attention, that he asked for food, or that he was deprived of any sleep. The trial court, in fact, observed that petitioner did not complain that he was tired at 4:20 p.m., when the second statement was made. Accordingly, the court ruled that petitioner's statements were admissible. (E.H.T.3/31/97, pp. 22-26).
At trial, Barbara Meixner testified that she was working at the 7-11 store in Garden City, Michigan on January 1, 1997, when a person approached the counter, informed her that he had a gun, and began striking the register with his hand. Meixner gave the man money because she believed he had a gun. Meixner observed the man get into a white car and drive towards Ford Road. (Trial Transcript, hereinafter "T"., 12/16/97, pp. 193-199).
Robert Shaw was using the money machine at the 7-11 store in Garden City on January 1, 1997 when an individual wished him a Happy New Year. As Shaw went to the store counter to make a purchase, Meixner informed him that she had just been robbed by the man who had wished Shaw a Happy New Year. Shaw looked out the door and observed this individual driving a white Ford Tempo which was occupied by another individual in the passenger seat towards Ford Road. Shaw followed the vehicle in his car before losing sight of it near Merriman Road. Shaw called the Garden City Police and gave them the license plate number and description of the vehicle. (Id. at pp. 220-225).
Officer Kenneth Boeth of the Redford Township Police Department received a radio broadcast to be on the lookout for a white Ford Tempo which had been involved in an armed robbery in Garden City, Michigan. Officer Boeth observed a vehicle which matched that description. When Boeth went to pull the vehicle over, the vehicle accelerated speed and began to violate traffic signals. As the vehicle approached eighty miles per hour and went through another red signal, Officer Boeth lost sight of the...
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