Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391

• Decision Date: 10 November 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C-83-693-WS.
• Citation: 676 F. Supp. 659
• Parties: Thomas C. TERRY, Dan Fields, Jim Crowe, Keith Barker, James A. Richards, Don Wright, David L. Giltz, Dale Bishop, Tony Baity, James R. Davis, Don Britt, Lonnie Davis, Jim Wilson, David C. King, Donald E. Henderson, Arthur Jarrell, Ron Ray, J.C. Greer, Gary Peebles, Harold Dyson, Ed Strange, Sam E. Callahan, George C. Blankenship, Jr., Paul Embry, Clayton Worley, John R. Marshal, and Robert C. Munsey, Plaintiffs, v. CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS, LOCAL 391; and McLean Trucking Company, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

676 F. Supp. 659

Thomas C. TERRY, Dan Fields, Jim Crowe, Keith Barker, James A. Richards, Don Wright, David L. Giltz, Dale Bishop, Tony Baity, James R. Davis, Don Britt, Lonnie Davis, Jim Wilson, David C. King, Donald E. Henderson, Arthur Jarrell, Ron Ray, J.C. Greer, Gary Peebles, Harold Dyson, Ed Strange, Sam E. Callahan, George C. Blankenship, Jr., Paul Embry, Clayton Worley, John R. Marshal, and Robert C. Munsey, Plaintiffs, v. CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS, LOCAL 391; and McLean Trucking Company, Inc., Defendants.

Civ. No. C-83-693-WS.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina, Winston-Salem Division.

November 10, 1987.

Ellen R. Gelbin, Robert M. Elliot, Winston-Salem, N.C., for plaintiffs.

J. David James, Greensboro, N.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, present and former members of Local 391, International Brotherhood of Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, and former employees of McLean Trucking Company, Inc., have brought this action pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement against McLean Trucking Company and breach of the duty of fair representation against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters of America and Local 391. Plaintiffs also allege that all Defendants were involved in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs' rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Plaintiffs also demand a jury trial.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters of America, and this proceeding was stayed with respect to McLean Trucking Company upon McLean's filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Presently pending before the court is a motion to strike the Plaintiffs' jury demand filed by the remaining Defendant, Local 391.

The parties have submitted briefs and the court heard oral argument in conjunction with the final pre-trial conference on September 30, 1987.

This matter presents a close question concerning whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial for a Section 301/breach of duty of fair representation claim. The case law which has confronted the question directly is split, and some of the rationale for granting a jury trial may have been altered by the United States Supreme Court's determination in United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), and DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), that such suits are not analogous to common law contract or tort actions.

Few circuit courts since the Supreme Court's rulings in Mitchell and DelCostello have approached the jury issue in fair representation actions, and the one which most closely addressed the issue ruled in favor of a jury. Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C.Cir.1984).¹ The district court cases since 1983 are sharply divided, however, with some construing the Supreme Court decisions broadly and others following the narrower construction in Quinn. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds the latter position more persuasive, and therefore denies Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' jury demand.

Defendant correctly points out that Section 301 does not provide an independent statutory right to a jury trial. The very general language of Section 301 merely grants jurisdiction in federal courts. Defendant also contends, however, that Plaintiffs' Section 301 claim is not an action "at common law" within the meaning of the seventh amendment² and therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to a trial by jury. In support of this contention, Defendant notes the distinction drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell and DelCostello between "hybrid" Section 301 claims and their common law components. In DelCostello, the Court reasoned that because the plaintiff in a Section 301/fair representation suit must demonstrate both the employer's contract violation and the union's breach of duty to prevail against either party, the two underlying claims are "inextricably interdependent." 462 U.S. at 164-65, 103 S.Ct. at 2290-91 (citing Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 66-67, 101 S.Ct. at 1565-66 Stewart, J., concurring in judgment, quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 1976). Consequently the hybrid cause of action is not equivalent to the standard common law contract or tort claim, but is a product of labor law which was not recognized at common law.³ The Supreme Court's conclusion does not preclude applicability of the seventh amendment to such actions, however. The Court has clearly stated in other decisions that the seventh amendment embraces not only those causes of action which the common law recognized, but all suits "in which legal rights were to be ascertained or determined." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533, 90 S.Ct. 733, 735, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970). The question is not whether the rights existed at common law or were created by statute, for it is well established that the seventh amendment "requires a jury trial upon demand" where a statute "creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1008, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). Rather, the question is whether the rights Plaintiffs assert in their hybrid Section 301 action are legal or equitable.⁴

On this point the Supreme Court's observation in DelCostello is not dispositive. In Ross the Court mentioned three factors for determining the legal nature of an issue, and the "pre-merger custom with reference to such questions" is only the first of these. 396 U.S. at 538 n. 10, 90 S.Ct. at 738 n. 10. Moreover, DelCostello merely implies that the common law did not speak to hybrid Section 301 claims, and does not say that they are equitable.⁵ Whether a claim is legal or equitable for seventh amendment purposes depends also on "the remedy sought; and ... the practical abilities and limitations of juries," Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n. 10, 90 S.Ct. at 738 n. 10, and in fact the Court has previously implied that the type of remedies involved is more important than whether the cause of action had a common law counterpart. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96, 94 S.Ct. at 1009; see also Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d at 646; Kinzel v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 88 F.R.D. at 362.

In addition to requesting reinstatement and other injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek punitive damages and other monetary relief for lost wages and health benefits and for mental and emotional distress. Because McLean has ceased operation and is not presently before this court, injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement is no longer possible. The current law also indicates that Plaintiffs' punitive damage claim may not lie against Local 391, Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Assn., International, 759 F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir.1985); see also International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 49-52, 99 S.Ct. 2121, 2126-27, 60 L.Ed.2d 698 (1979) (Railway Labor Act); Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 1258-59, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (1964) (NLRA § 303a).

The law is not clear as to whether lost wages constitute legal or equitable relief in Section 301 claims. The Supreme Court has recognized the inappropriateness of jury trials in Title VII actions, acknowledging circuit court decisions which denied jury trials where claimants sought reinstatement and back pay. See Great American Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 5th Cir.1969) (treating back pay as part of the statutory equitable remedy); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 2703, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981). This position is based in large part on the language of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), which "expressly authorizes only equitable remedies," Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375, 99 S.Ct. at 2350, see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978), and which leaves the awarding of back pay to the equitable discretion of the trial court. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 584, 98 S.Ct. at 872 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 1975). In order to fashion appropriate relief within the constraints of Title VII, the Court has found back pay to be a "make-whole" remedy, not outside of equity. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419-21, 95 S.Ct. at 2372-73. See also Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 573, 30 L.Ed.2d 655 (1971).

Courts have treated actions under other statutes differently, however. In Lorillard v. Pons the Supreme Court distinguished the limiting language of Title VII from the broader remedial provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") which expressly permit recovery of "legal or equitable" relief. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c). The Court further reasoned that since the ADEA also incorporates the procedural aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and since Congress must have known that the FLSA has been interpreted to include jury trials, by providing for legal relief Congress must have intended to extend the right to a jury to ADEA actions. Id., 434 U.S. at 582-83, 98 S.Ct. at 871.

In addition, the Court observed that although the ADEA does not specify which types of relief are legal or equitable, since "employment, reinstatement or promotion are equitable ... `legal relief' must refer to" "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation" within the meaning of the FLSA. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 583 n. 11, 98 S.Ct. at 871 n. 11. Since lost...