Terry v. Talmontas
| Decision Date | 26 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11 CV 6083 |
| Parties | BOOKER T. TERRY, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN TALMONTAS, and KEVIN JOHNSON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Booker T. Terry has sued Steven Talmontas, a sergeant with the Will County Sheriff's Office, and Kevin Johnson, a police investigator with the Frankfort Police Department (collectively "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants misstated and omitted material facts in obtaining an arrest warrant against him for alleged battery of a foster child, Matriana. The arrest warrant was issued, and Plaintiff was arrested, indicted, and held for nearly two years in prison awaiting trial before the State's Attorney dropped the charges, concluding there was inadequate evidence to support them.
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and under Illinois law for malicious prosecution. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff's claims are time barred, probable cause existed for his arrest, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendants acted with the malice necessary to support a malicious prosecution claim. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claimand denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution claims.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of resolving this Motion to Dismiss. See Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).
On August 13, 2009, Plaintiff Terry was at the residence of his then estranged wife, Sherri Terry, at 1174 Cherry Lane, Beecher, Illinois. (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Sherri Terry was a foster parent to three children - Matriana, 8, Matthew, 7, and Sean, 10. (Id.)
In the early morning hours of August 14, Plaintiff and Sherri Terry called 911 because Matriana, who had high-functioning autism and a history of seizures, was lying unresponsive in her bed and appeared to be having a seizure. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 20.) The paramedics arrived and found Matriana in her bed, unresponsive, but with no visible injuries. (Id.) The paramedics did not report seeing anything else out of the ordinary in the house. (Id.)
The paramedics asked Plaintiff to carry Matriana down to the ambulance waiting outside, and the paramedics transported her to St. James Hospital in Chicago Heights, Illinois, and later to Hope Children's Hospital in Oak Lawn, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 22.) Matriana was examined by doctors and was found to have suffered a subdural hematoma (serious bleeding in the brain). (Id. ¶ 23.) Further examination revealed small bruises on her buttocks and upper arm, a scraped knee, and a small scratch on her arm. (Id. ¶ 29.) No other trauma was documented. (Id.)
The Will County Sherriff's Office Major Crimes Task Force was enlisted to assist the Beecher and Frankfort police departments investigate the matter. (Id. ¶ 24.) Corporal Jeffrey Dopke of the Beecher Police Department was the head detective assigned to investigate. (Id.¶ 25.) Defendant Johnson, a police investigator with the Frankfort Police Department, and Defendant Talmontas, a sergeant with the Will County Sheriff's Department, were called in to assist in the investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 24.)
On August 15, 2009, Dr. Christian Denouden, one of Matriana's treating physicians, told Corporal Dopke that he believed Matriana's head injury was not caused by a "casual fall," but was caused by her hitting something or someone hitting her. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Corporal Dopke also learned from Matriana's biological father that she had a history of seizures. (Id. ¶ 28.)
On August 17, 2009, Defendant Johnson interviewed a nurse, Sylvester Young, who sometimes watched Sherri Terry's foster children while she was at work. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Young first reported that on the night of August 13, 2009, he was in the house with the three foster children and Plaintiff and that he was the one who called 911 that night. (Id. ¶ 31.) Young claimed that around midnight he heard a thump and saw Plaintiff running into a bedroom. (Id.) He claimed that he went to see what was going on and found Matriana unresponsive. (Id.) Upon further questioning by Defendant Johnson, however, Young recanted his original story and admitted he had lied. (Id. ¶ 32.) He then claimed that he had actually left the Terry residence around 11:00 p.m. on the evening of August 13, and that Plaintiff was the only adult in the house when he left. (Id.)
Also on August 17, 2009, Defendant Talmontas and Corporal Dopke assisted in interviews of foster children Matthew and Sean. (Id. ¶ 33.) The interviews were led by a children's counselor and were videotaped. (Id.) Matthew claimed Plaintiff hit Matriana a few days earlier, but when asked for details Matthew first said she was struck in the afternoon while she was upstairs and he was in the kitchen; he then changed his account and said it was at night while he was asleep and Matriana was in her own bedroom; then, he said it was while he was inhis room asleep and Matriana was downstairs. (Id.) Sean stated that no one in the house, including Plaintiff, had hit him, Matthew or Matriana, and that if any of the children were ever disciplined, their only punishment was being placed in time-out. (Id. ¶ 36.) Sean insisted that neither he nor any of the other foster children were subjected to physical abuse, despite multiple attempts by the counselor to get him to say otherwise in a period lasting over fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶ 37.)
On August 18, 2009, Defendants Talmontas and Johnson met with Assistant State's Attorney ("ASA") Ken Chudwin to seek an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 39.) Defendants did not disclose to Chudwin that foster child Sean stated that he had not been struck by Plaintiff and also had not observed or heard foster children Matriana or Matthew being struck by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 40.) Defendants also did not disclose the inconsistencies and contradictions in Matthew's statements. (Id. ¶ 41.) Chudwin approved the requested charges and accompanied Defendants to Will County Court to obtain an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 46.) That same day, Judge Daniel Rozak granted the arrest warrant, and on August 31, 2009, Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to the warrant. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.)
On September 23, 2009, a grand jury was convened in Will County. (Id. ¶ 48.) Corporal Dopke was the only witness. (Id. ¶ 49.) Dopke testified that foster child Matthew heard Plaintiff beat Matriana, heard a thump on the floor and heard her crying, but did not disclose that Matthew had given at least three versions of the alleged abuse. (Id. ¶ 51.) Dopke also did not mention the interview with foster child Sean. (Id. ¶ 50.) The grand jury indicted Plaintiff. (Id.)
On June 6, 2011, the State's Attorney moved to nolle prosequi the charges against Plaintiff, meaning that the State no longer would prosecute its case against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 55.) In its motion to the court, the State's Attorney stated that Sylveter Young had changed his storyagain and had admitted that he committed fraud against the state relating to this matter. (Id.) The State's Attorney concluded that "the People believe the recent statements of Sylvester Young in conjunction with the young age and expected testimony of Matthew Hightower (the victim's brother) could not sustain our burden of proof." (Id.) The Court granted the State's Attorney's motion and terminated the case against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 56.)
From September 23, 2009 until June 6, 2011, Plaintiff was held in prison. (Id. ¶ 55.) During that time he was never tried or convicted of the charges brought against him, and he never pleaded guilty to any charges. (Id. ¶ 54.) He maintained his innocence at all times. (Id.)
According to public court documents, which the Court may consider at the motion to dismiss stage without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, see Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994), on August 31, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Beecher Police Department and the Will County Task Force and Detention Center. On April 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming Defendants Talmontas and Johnson and dismissing the Beecher Police Department and Will County Task Force and Detention Center. On June 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding a malicious prosecution claim.
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the federal notice pleading standards, "a plaintiff's complaint need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis." Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotationsomitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept[] as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and draw[] all possible inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor." Id.
However, a complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). For a claim to have facial plausibility, a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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