Tessa Rani Raybourne Gibson Carlisle Childress v. City of Dall.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-01225-DCN,2:13-cv-01225-DCN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | TESSA RANI RAYBOURNE GIBSON CARLISLE CHILDRESS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLESTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, LIEUTENANT CHITO T. WALKER, OFFICER SANDERS, OFFICER KOEGLER, SARGENT RATLIFF, D-O FNU WILSON, D-O FNU DALLAS, and D-O FNU GANT, Defendants. |
This matter comes before the court on United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker's report and recommendation ("R&R") that this court grant in part and deny in part a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants City of Charleston Police Department ("CPD"), Lieutenant Chito T. Walker ("Walker"), Officer Sanders ("Sanders"), Officer Koegler ("Koegler"), Sargent Ratliffe ("Ratliffe"), D-O FNU Wilson ("Wilson"), D-O FNU Dallas ("Dallas"), and D-O FNU Gant ("Gant"), (collectively "defendants"). Specifically, the magistrate judge's R&R recommends that this court deny defendants' motion for summary judgment only as to plaintiff Tessa Rani Raybourne Gibson Carlisle Childress's ("Childress") excessive force claim against Ratliffe in his individual capacity. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts in part and rejects in part the R&R and grants defendants' motion for summary judgment in all respects.
Childress, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 6, 2013. Childress alleges that defendants violated her Fourth and Fifth Amendment2 rights when they took her into emergency protective custody against her will on April 16, 2013. Childress further alleges that defendants violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA")3 and that defendants "conspir[ed] against [her] rights" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. See Pl.'s Compl. 4.
Childress alleges that she went to the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC") on the morning of April 16, 2013 seeking "emotional health treatment." Pl.'s Dep. 89:22-91:3. She claims that she was "distraught by [her] landlord from the day before" when he was "verbally abusive" towards her. Id. at 90:9-90:22. On April 15, 2013, the day prior to the events in question, Childress called CPD to report her landlord's "verbal abuse." Id. at 92:1-93:9. After the incident, she decided to seek help at MUSC because she "was not over" the events of the previous day. Id. Childress did not receive treatment or medication while at MUSC. Id. at 92:16-92:19. After leavingMUSC, Childress claims she went directly to CPD to obtain a copy of the police report relating to the incident from the prior day. Id. at 92:25-93:5. Upon arriving at CPD, Childress informed Wilson and Dallas that she had come for a police report "about the landlord," but that she also "needed a police report about the unauthorized access into [her] T-Mobile account." Id. at 103:2-11. Childress acknowledges that, while at CPD, she was "emotionally upset from the landlord's verbal abuse . . . from the previous day." Id. at 105:7-16.
Walker states that from January 2013 to May 2013, Childress had called CPD twenty-nine times, mostly "regarding complaints against her neighbors and to report issues [Childress] deemed worthy of police attention." Walker Aff. ¶¶ 2, 11. Walker further states that on April 15, 2013, he "was called by neighbors of [Childress] and was asked to come meet with them" to discuss their "concerns." Id. at ¶ 14. According to Walker, he met with Childress's neighbors, who discussed "several . . . incidents of [Childress's] irrational and [e]rratic behavior and advised [Walker] that they were worried about their own safety." Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Walker states that he informed Childress's neighbors that he would meet with her to discuss these complaints. Id. at ¶ 18. When CPD officials informed Walker that Childress was in CPD's lobby, he decided to meet with Childress personally, especially "[c]onsidering the fact that [he] met with her neighbors the day before." Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.
Walker met with Childress in the lobby for about fifteen minutes during which time they discussed her concerns. Walker claims that Childress "began telling [him] one of the issues she was having, but then would jump to another issue and then to another one." Id. at ¶ 20. During the conversation, Walker states that Childress "jumpedbetween four different stories and appeared to be in an irrational emotional state." Id. Childress testified that she told Walker that someone had broken into her residence and stolen one of her hats, that someone broke into her truck and placed a "white substance" on the seat, and that someone broke into her home and put the "same white substance on [her] clothes." Pl.'s Dep. 198:15-200:2.
Walker then asked Childress if she was on any medication, to which Childress responded that she was "advised that she was supposed to be on medication, but was not taking it because she had an allergic reaction." Walker Aff. ¶ 21. Walker then excused himself and contacted Elizabeth Spencer ("Ms. Spencer"), a victim's advocate at CPD. Id. at ¶ 22. According to Walker, Ms. Spencer "was familiar with [Childress] and advised that [Childress] had a long history of mental health issues." Id. At that point, Walker stated that he and Ms. Spencer "decided that the best course of action would be to place [Childress] in [protective custody] and have her transported to MUSC for an evaluation." Id. According to Walker, the decision to place Childress in protective custody "was based on her past mental health history, her irrational emotional state, and the concern for the safety of [Childress] and others, including her neighbors who ha[d] voiced concerns for their own safety the day before." Id. at ¶ 23.
Childress alleges that CPD officers asked her to go outside, and she complied even though "[n]obody gave [her] any heads up on why the EMS was there." Pl.'s Dep. 120. Childress does not allege that CPD officers forced her to go outside, but states that she was confused because "in [her] mind[,] . . . [she] only need[ed] a police report." Id. at 124:15-21; see also id. at 127-29. According to Childress, when she hesitated getting into the ambulance, Ratliffe "took his bare hands and grabbed ahold of [Childress's] leftshoulder and shook [her] around." Id. at 133:1-25. Childress further describes her encounter with Ratliffe as follows:
I mean, [Ratliffe] took his bare hands—after he threatened me, he said if I did not get into the EMS, he would physically put me in it or into a police car. . . . And then within a matter of a few seconds he took his bare hands, he grabbed ahold of my left shoulder, and he started grabbing, shaking me around, and at that point I was—he had threatened me and put his hands on me and my handbag that was on my shoulder. I had a water bottle in my left hand. I had a pen in my right hand. He grabbed both of those items and my pen . . . is still missing. . . . And he—he kind of blinded me that—with his physical abuse of me, and there was no reason for him to do that.
Id. at 133-34. According to Childress, Ratliffe grabbed her left shoulder and shook her for two to three minutes and, as a result, she could no longer see and went "into a blackout space." Id. Childress maintains that no other CPD officer touched her that day, Id. at 137:19-22; however, she does claim that Sanders and Walker were present and "visually witnessed Ratliff[e] attack" her, id. at 221:14-24. Ratliffe, Sanders, and Walker all deny that Ratliffe used force to get Childress into the ambulance.
EMS took Childress to MUSC for a medical evaluation. Childress did not report any injuries from the alleged encounter with Ratliffe to EMS nor to MUSC health care providers. MUSC personnel took blood and urine samples and released Childress. Once Childress's evaluation at MUSC was complete, she claims that Koegler told her that although she was not arrested, she had to get into his police cruiser. Id. at 206:14-25. Childress complains that Koegler did not give her the option of finding her own way home. Id. Koegler took Childress directly to her car at CPD. Id. at 208:1-24. After she arrived back at CPD, Childress again tried to get a police report. Id. As to Gant, Dallas,and Wilson, Childress complains that they did not write the police report that Childress requested. See id. at 103-05, 210-11, 217.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 31, 2014. Childress filed three responses in opposition to defendants' motion on December 3, December 10, and December 12, 2014. On March 31, 2015, the magistrate judge issued the R&R, recommending that this court grant in part and deny in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. Childress filed numerous objections to the R&R on April 7, April 8, April 9, April 10, and April 14, 2015. On April 17, 2015, Ratliffe filed objections to the R&R. The matter is now ripe for the court's review.
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the magistrate judge's report to which specific, written objections are made, and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The magistrate judge's recommendation does not carry presumptive weight, and it is the responsibility of this court to make a final determination. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). A party's failure to object may be treated as agreement with the conclusions of the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
Childress appears pro se in this case. Federal district courts are charged with liberally construing complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failurein the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim, nor does it mean the court can assume...
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