Tessier v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company

• Decision Date: 09 December 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-298-C.
• Citation: 334 F. Supp. 807
• Parties: Thomas TESSIER and the United States of America v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

334 F. Supp. 807

Thomas TESSIER and the United States of America v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Civ. A. No. 71-298-C.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 9, 1971.

Herbert Murphy, Springfield, Mass., for plaintiff. James N. Gabriel, U. S. Atty., Boston, Mass., for United States.

Bruce P. Gilmore, Jr., Avery, Dooley, Post & Avery, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

OPINION

CAFFREY, District Judge.

This matter came before the court upon defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint by reason of (1) the failure of the plaintiff to state a cause of action, and (2) for want of a necessary and indispensable party.

The pertinent facts are alleged as follows. In February of 1969, plaintiff and one Thomas Peters were soldiers of the United States Army stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. At the request of Peters, plaintiff became a passenger in Peters' automobile. Peters drove his automobile to Luduwici, Georgia, for the purpose of removing his personal property from a trailer which he had recently sold. Plaintiff assisted in transferring Peters' goods from the trailer to the car. In the course of the return trip to Fort Stewart an accident occurred, as a result of which Peters died and plaintiff suffered severe personal injuries. Plaintiff brought an action in this court directly against the decedent's insurer without naming decedent's estate or any representative thereof as a party-defendant.

Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S. C.A. 1331(a), 1332(c), and 1391. Plaintiff is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Illinois, having its principal place of business in a state other than Massachusetts. Defendant is subject to service of process in this state.

The question presented is whether or not such a direct action against the insurer without naming the insured, or without having previously obtained a judgment against the insured, is properly maintainable.

In a diversity action in a federal District Court it is incumbent upon the District Court to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, including that state's law of conflict of laws. Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 760-761 (1 Cir. 1940); Juliano v. Hobart Mfg. Company, 200 F.Supp. 453, aff'd. 303 F.2d 830 (1 Cir. 1961). It is therefore necessary for this court to determine what rule of law the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would apply.

In Hudyka v. Interstate Tire & Brake Stores, Inc., Mass.Adv.Sh. 1249 (1971), 271 N.E.2d 617, a personal injury action in which the alleged negligent conduct took place in Connecticut, the Supreme Judicial Court followed the Second Restatement of Conflicts to determine the applicable law. Hence, it appears that the Massachusetts state courts would apply Section 145 of the Second Restatement of Conflicts in this case. Comment (b), Section 162, of the Second Restatement of Conflicts indicates that the rule of Section 145 determines whether a direct action is maintainable against the insurer. Section 145 states:

(1) "The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. . . ."

For purposes of determining which state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties, Section 145(2) considers the following to be important "contacts:"

"(a) the place where the injury occurred

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is

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