Testo v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co.
Decision Date | 31 December 1921 |
Citation | 34 Idaho 765,203 P. 1065 |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Parties | LOUIS H. TESTO, Appellant, v. OREGON-WASHINGTON RAILROAD & NAVIGATION COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent |
PERSONAL INJURY - NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - RAILROAD CROSSING-DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN-NONSUIT.
1. A motion for nonsuit admits the truth of plaintiff's evidence and of every fact which it tends to prove or which could be gathered from any reasonable view of it, and he is entitled to the benefit of all inferences in his favor which the jury would have been justified in drawing from the evidence had the case been submitted to it.
2. Contributory negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury and only becomes one of law when the evidence is reasonably susceptible of no other interpretation than that the conduct of the injured party contributed to his injury and that, because of his negligence and carelessness, he did not act as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances.
3. The duty of care imposed by law upon one approaching a railroad track requires that he look and listen from a point from which he can see or hear whether or not a train is approaching.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for Kootenai County. Hon. Robert N. Dunn, Judge.
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of nonsuit. Affirmed.
Judgment of nonsuit sustained. Costs awarded to respondent.
W. B McFarland, for Appellant.
The failure of the respondent to sound a whistle or ring a bell when approaching the place where appellant was injured, and the violation of the speed ordinance passed by the city of Wallace constituted negligence per se, or at least raised a presumption of negligence. (Wheeler v. Oregon R. R. etc Co., 16 Idaho 375, 102 P. 347; Graves v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 30 Idaho 542, 166 P. 571; 33 Cyc. 735, 976; Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 P. 567; Norman v. Charlotte Elec. Ry. Co., 167 N.C. 533, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 508, 83 S.E. 835; Johnston v. Delano, 175 Iowa 498, 154 N.W. 1013; Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97.)
The evidence did not warrant the court in deciding, as a matter of law, that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence. (Graves v. Northern P. Ry. Co., supra; 33 Cyc. 823.)
He had a right to presume that any train which might pass upon the tracks which he attempted to cross would proceed at a proper rate of speed, and observe the law regarding speed within the city limits, and would comply with the statutes in giving the prescribed warnings.
"In order to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, the facts and circumstances must be such that no other inference could fairly and reasonably be drawn from them." (22 R. C. L. 1027.)
A. C. Spencer, Hamblen & Gilbert and E. R. Whitla, for Respondent.
It was the duty of appellant to look and listen before going upon the track of respondent railway company, and to look and listen from a point where observation would be effective. (Keppleman v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 190 Pa. 333, 42 A. 697; Follmer v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 246 Pa. 367, 92 A. 340; Corcoran v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 203 Pa. 380, 53 A. 240; Conkling v. Erie Ry. Co., 63 N.J.L. 338, 43 A. 666; Fort Wayne & N. I. Traction Co. v. Schoeff, 56 Ind.App. 540, 105 N.E. 924; Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Heins, 28 Ind.App. 163, 62 N.E. 455; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McClellan, 69 Ohio St. 142, 68 N.E. 816; United States Spruce Lumber Co. v. Shumate, 118 Va. 471, 87 S.E. 723; Crowson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 36 N.D. 100, 161 N.W. 725; White v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 489, 78 N.W. 585; Boston & M. R. R. v. McGrath, 179 F. 323, 102 C. C. A. 507; Griffin v. San Pedro L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 170 Cal. 772, 151 P. 282, L. R. A. 1916A, 842; Hinken v. Iowa Central Ry. Co., 97 Iowa 603, 66 N.W. 882; Clark v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 47 Minn. 380, 50 N.W. 365; Brehm v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 114 Md. 302, 79 A. 592; Lundergan v. New York Cent. etc. Ry. Co., 203 Mass. 460, 89 N.E. 625; Hines v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 119 F. 157, 55 C. C. A. 654; Nucci v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 63 Colo. 582, 169 P. 273; Griskell v. Southern Ry. Co., 81 S.C. 193, 62 S.E. 205; Cathcart v. Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 86 Ore. 250, 168 P. 308; Robison v. Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 90 Ore. 490, 176 P. 594; Golay v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 105 Wash. 132, 177 P. 804, 181 P. 700; Wheeler v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 16 Idaho 375, 102 P. 347; Burrow v. Idaho & W. N. R. R., 24 Idaho 652, 135 P. 838.)
This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by appellant, which he contends were caused by the negligence of respondent. At the time he received these injuries, appellant was an employee of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company at Wallace, Idaho. The railroad tracks of this company paralleled the tracks of the respondent in Wallace. Appellant had been working in the lower yards of the Northern Pacific Company and was going to the depot of that company. On his way he attempted to cross the main track of respondent at a point within the city limits where he claimed there was a trail or pathway used by pedestrians. There were at the time twenty or more box-cars standing on the side-track of the respondent company immediately north of the main line, obstructing this trial or pathway and the view of the main line track. Appellant stopped about eight feet from the box-cars, looked to see if there was an engine attached to them and, there being none, swung upon the bumpers between two of the freight-cars and attempted to get down on the other side, but, losing his balance, stumbled upon the main-line track immediately ahead of a passenger train of the respondent. Appellant contended that respondent was negligent in the operation of its train in that, first, it was going at a negligent rate of speed, to wit, twenty-five miles an hour, through the city, contrary to an ordinance prohibiting a speed greater than six miles per hour, secondly, in that those in charge of the train neglected to sound the whistle or ring a bell within eighty rods, or any reasonable distance from the pathway. The trial court granted a nonsuit on the ground that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence which precluded a recovery. The questions as to whether the point at which appellant attempted to cross the track was a crossing and whether or not he was a trespasser were not submitted to us and are not involved. The sole question is whether the judgment of nonsuit can be sustained on the ground of contributory negligence.
The testimony of appellant is all-important on this appeal, and, so far as material to the question under consideration, it is as follows:
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