Teters v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-05038-PHX-SPL,CV-19-05038-PHX-SPL |
| Parties | Shawn Teters, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Peoria Unified School District, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
At issue is an administrative law judge's denial of Plaintiffs' Due Process Complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 USC § 1400. (Doc. 4). Plaintiffs filed a Complaint with this Court on behalf of themselves (hereinafter "Parents") as well as their minor son, P.T. (hereinafter "Student") seeking judicial review of that denial. (Doc. 1). The Court now considers Plaintiffs' Opening Brief (Doc. 20), Defendant Peoria Unified School District's Response/Answering Brief (Doc. 21), and Plaintiffs' Reply Brief (Doc. 25). The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
On November 14, 2018, Plaintiffs first filed a Due Process Complaint with the Arizona Department of Education (ADE). (Doc. 1 at ¶ 19). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to Student—who suffers from behavioral and learning disabilities—under the IDEA. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 19). Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged Student's "Individualized Educational Program (IEP) and amendments adopted by Respondent School District," and alleged "predetermination regarding placement, a failure to collect data, a failure to conduct a Functional Behavioral Analysis (FBA), and a failure to develop a Behavior Intervention Plan (BIP)." (Doc. 4 at 2). As a result of these alleged violations, Parents unilaterally placed Student in a private special education school, AZ Aspire. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). Plaintiffs requested that Defendant pay tuition and related expenses for Student to attend AZ Aspire, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. (Doc. 1 at 10).
The ADE referred Plaintiffs' Due Process Complaint to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings for a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Doc. 1 at ¶ 21). ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer held a hearing on the Complaint over a three-day period—on February 7, 2018, February 8, 2018, and February 22, 2018—and issued a decision on July 30, 2019 denying the Complaint. (Doc. 4 at 2-3, 28).
On February 7, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court requesting a reversal of the ALJ decision. (Doc. 1). In their Opening Brief, Plaintiffs allege the ALJ erred by concluding that Student's IEPs and subsequent amendments to it were reasonably calculated to provide Student a meaningful educational opportunity. (Doc. 20 at 11). Plaintiffs request that this Court find that AZ Aspire is an appropriate placement and again seek tuition and attorneys' fees. (Doc. 20 at 28).
In this appeal, Plaintiffs allege there are various errors in the ALJ's decision such that the decision is not entitled to deference. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the ALJ's decision "ignores key documentary and testimonial evidence, is inherently inconsistent and fails to apply relevant authority." (Doc. 20 at 13). Plaintiffs argue that the decision "erroneously ignore[s]," among other things, evidence of Student's lack of progress following the implementation of his IEPs and evidence that the IEP Teams did not sufficiently consider Student's inability to function on a large campus. (Doc. 20 at 14-16). Finally, Plaintiffs argue the ALJ "ignor[ed] the now well-established standard that mere de minimis progress is tantamount to no educational benefit and thus a denial of FAPE." (Doc. 20 at 13-14).
The IDEA requires that state educational agencies receiving federal funds provide special education services for children with qualifying disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).1 The IDEA requires that public school districts provide qualifying students a "basic floor of opportunity"; it does not require that the school maximize each child's potential. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-204 (1982); accord J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 439 (9th Cir. 2010). A child receives a FAPE if the instruction "(1) addresses his unique needs, (2) provides adequate support services so he can take advantage of the educational opportunities and (3) is in accord with the [IEP]." Park, ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
Once it is determined that a child is eligible for special education, a public school district must formulate and implement an IEP, which informs how the child will be educated in light of his particular needs that result from his disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414. A student's IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. Under the IDEA, school districts are required to construct an IEP Team comprised of various school personnel as well as the student's parents to develop the IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Within a student's IEP are annual goals. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(cc). The IEP Team must consider the strengths of the child, concerns of the parents, evaluation results, and the academic, developmental, and functional needs of the child. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A). Additionally, the IDEA does not require placement in a particular school, but the IEP Team must consider alternative placements. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(d).
Under IDEA, an aggrieved party may bring a civil action in federal district court after receiving the final decision of an ALJ. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving the ALJ's decision was not met by a preponderance of the evidence. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded on other grounds as recognized in L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings," "shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party," and "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).
The Court reviews de novo the question whether a school district's proposed IEP provided a FAPE but reviews the ALJ's findings of fact only for clear error. Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo, unless the question is primarily factual. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). However, courts must not "substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
It is a matter of district court discretion to decide the degree of deference to give the ALJ's determination. Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). "[T]he fact-intensive nature of a special education eligibility determination coupled with considerations of judicial economy render a more deferential approach appropriate." Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1104 n.4 (9th Cir.2007). The Court gives particular deference to "thorough and careful" administrative findings. R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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The ALJ Decision is a twenty-eight-page order setting forth the witnesses, evidence, and issues at the hearing along with detailed findings of fact. (Doc. 4). In their Opening Brief, Plaintiffs list "critical evidence" which it alleges the ALJ "erroneously ignored." (Doc. 20 at 14-16). However, most of the evidence listed was in fact explicitly addressed in the ALJ's Decision.2 Furthermore, the ALJ states she considered the entire record, including all the testimony and every exhibit, even if not specifically addressed in the Decision. (Doc. 4 at 5, n.6). That the Plaintiffs disagree with the ALJ's ultimate conclusions regarding such evidence is not a reason for this Court to accord the Decision less deference. Because the Court finds the ALJ was thorough and careful in her findings, the Court concludes they are entitled to significant weight. This Court will consider the issues in the order that Plaintiffs briefed them.
Plaintiffs first argue the ALJ erred in concluding that Student's February IEP was reasonably calculated to provide Student a FAPE. (Doc. 20 at 16). Plaintiffs set forth three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred in concluding the IEP provided a FAPE because there was "no substantive change" from the previous IEP; (2) the ALJ applied the wrong standard when evaluating Student's progress under the IEP; and (3) the ALJ erroneously ignored the Supreme Court mandate that school districts must revisit an IEP if expected progress is not occurring. (Doc. 20 at 16-21).
Student began attending Defendant's school district in 2011, when Student was in the second grade. (Doc. 4 at 4). Due to Student's aggression and self-harming behavior,Student was placed in a self-contained behavioral support program, but returned to his home school in sixth grade. (Doc. 4 at 4-5). To prepare for starting high school, Student's IEP Team developed a "transition IEP" in March of 2017. (Doc. 4 at 5). In January of 2018, halfway through Student's freshman year, Defendant convened a "Review of Existing Data (RED)/Multi-disciplinary Evaluation Team (MET)" meeting to discuss Student's progress under the transition IEP. (Doc. 4 at 6). In February of 2018, the IEP Team had their annual meeting to discuss amending Student's IEP in response to the data collected regarding Student's progress. (Doc. 4 at 7). At the time of the annual...
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