Tewksbury v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1938
• Docket Number: 14651.
• Citation: 196 S.E. 183,186 S.C. 489
• Parties: TEWKSBURY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. (two cases).
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

196 S.E. 183

186 S.C. 489

TEWKSBURY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. (two cases).

No. 14651.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 30, 1938

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court, Aiken County; A. L. Gaston Judge.

Actions by Paul Tewksbury against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to recover total and permanent disability benefits under policy of life, health, and accident insurance.The actions were consolidated and tried together.From adverse judgments in each action, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Elliott McLain, Wardlaw & Elliott, of Columbia, and Gyles & Garvin of Aiken, for appellant.

Williams & Busbee, of Aiken, for respondent.

STABLER Chief Justice.

It appears from the record that on January 9, 1924, the defendant company issued to the plaintiff its policy of life health, and accident insurance for the face amount of $3,350.The policy contained, among others, a provision for payment by the insurer, under certain conditions named, total and permanent disability benefits.In 1933, the company began to pay the insured such benefits, and continued to do so until April, 1937.At that time, however, for reasons satisfactory to itself, it refused to make further payments or to waive the premiums according to the terms of the policy, and so notified the insured.These two actions were then brought by Tewksbury in a magistrate's court to enforce the collection of his claims.By consent of counsel representing the parties, the cases were consolidated and tried together.When the testimony was all in, a verdict was directed for the plaintiff; the motion therefor being made upon the ground that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the insured was totally and permanently disabled, and had been so at all times mentioned in the complaints.The defendant thereupon took the case to the circuit court upon exceptions charging the magistrate with error in "not allowing the jury to pass upon the issues."The appeal was heard by his honor, Judge Gaston, who sustained the judgment in each of the actions.We quote from his order: "After a full hearing in the matter, including arguments pro and con, I am convinced that under the facts as disclosed by the testimony in the causes that the Magistrate properly directed verdicts for the plaintiff, under the authority of the cases of Harman v. Life Insurance Company,184 S.C. 461, 192 S.E. 878, decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in an opinion dated September 10, 1937, and Owens v. Sovereign Camp,174 S.C. 514, 178 S.E. 125;McCutchen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,153 S.C. 401, 151 S.E. 67, and other cases."

A review of the testimony, all of which we have read and considered with care, would serve no useful purpose.As held by the magistrate and the circuit judge, it is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, namely, that the insured, at the time of the trial of the case and at the times mentioned in the complaints, was totally and permanently disabled.Of course, this conclusion is reached under this court's construction of the phrase "total and permanent disability" appearing in insurance contracts similar to the one before us.SeeTaylor v. Southern State Life Insurance Co.,106 S.C. 356, 91 S.E. 326 327, L.R.A.1917C, 910;Berry v. United Life & Accident Insurance Co.,120 S.C. 328, 113 S.E. 141, 142;Brown v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co.,136 S.C. 90, 134 S.E. 224, 225;McCutchen v. Pacific Mut....