Tex. Cent. R.R. & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Miles

Citation635 S.W.3d 684
Decision Date07 May 2020
Docket NumberNUMBER 13-19-00297-CV
Parties TEXAS CENTRAL RAILROAD & INFRASTRUCTURE, INC. and Integrated Texas Logistics, Inc., Appellants, v. James Fredrick MILES, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Dylan O. Drummond, Dallas, Glenn Sodd, Jody Sodd McSpadden, Corsicana, Michael P. McShan, Steven Gregory White, Blake L. Beckham, Dallas, James A. Moseley, for Appellee.

Joe B. Cannon, Groesbeck, Catherine B. Smith, Marie R. Yeates, Houston, Megan Sturm, Gil P. Peralez, McAllen, Warren Anderson, Austin, Richard Scott Wilson, Monte F. James, Adam Warren Aston, Michael A. Heidler, Austin, Jennifer Caughey, Houston, Stephen Gilstrap, Robert B. Neblett, Danica Lynn Milios, Austin, Christopher Franz, for Appellants Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc.

Danica Lynn Milios, Austin, Megan Sturm, Jennifer Caughey, Houston, Warren Anderson, Austin, Joe B. Cannon, Groesbeck, Stephen Gilstrap, Dallas, Monte F. James, Austin, Christopher Franz, Robert B. Neblett, Austin, Catherine B. Smith, Gil P. Peralez, McAllen, Richard Scott Wilson, for Appellants Integrated Texas Logistics, Inc.

Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Tijerina

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellants Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc. (TCRI) and Integrated Texas Logistics, Inc. (ITL) appeal from the trial court's granting of appellee James Frederick Miles's motion for summary judgment. By four issues, appellants contend that: (1-2) the trial court erred in declaring that TCRI and ITL were not "railroad companies" or "interurban electric railways"; (3) the trial court erred in granting Miles's summary judgment motion and denying appellantsmotion for partial summary judgment; and (4) if this Court reverses, attorney's fees should also be reversed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, render the judgment the trial court should have rendered, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND 1

TXHS Railroad, Inc., was formed on December 20, 2012. In 2015, TXHS amended its entity information to change its name to TCRI and amended its purpose to be "to plan, build, maintain and operate an Interurban electric railroad ...." In 2017, ITL was formed in part

To construct, acquire, maintain, or operate lines of electric railway between municipalities in this state for the transportation of freight, passengers, or both freight and passengers, with all powers conferred pursuant to and all limitations imposed by Chapter 131 of the Texas Transportation Code;
To operate and transact business as a railroad company, with all powers conferred pursuant to and all limitations imposed by Chapter 112 of the Texas Transportation Code.

Appellants were formed to create and operate a high-speed electric-powered passenger train connecting Dallas and Houston (the Project).

As part of their efforts to advance the Project, appellants "completed over 2,000 land surveys along the railway routes" that were being analyzed. In November of 2015, TCRI sent Miles a packet which included: (1) a brochure with details about the Project; (2) an outline of the survey process and information for what to expect during the process; (3) an invitation to open-house meetings; and (4) a survey permission form. Miles took issue with the survey permission form and refused to sign. After refusing to grant permission to TCRI to survey his land, Miles sued TCRI for declaratory relief seeking a judgment that TCRI could not conduct the type of survey requested in the survey permission form. Miles later amended his petition to include requests for declaratory relief that:

TCRI's [survey permission form] exceeds the scope of survey activities granted by TEX. TRANS. CODE §§ 112.051 and 131.013. [Miles] further seeks a declaration regarding TCRI's claim that it has eminent domain authority solely by virtue of statutory entitlement including, but not limited to, an order declaring that TCRI is not statutorily entitled to enter [Miles's] Property to conduct pre-condemnation surveys, inspections and evaluations.

Miles also sought attorney's fees. TCRI answered and counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that it is a railroad company and an interurban electric railway as those terms are used in the Texas Transportation Code. TCRI also sought injunctive relief to secure its right to survey Miles's property, arguing that because it is a railroad company and an interurban electric railway, it has the right to conduct surveys and examinations. ITL intervened and sought the same declaratory and injunctive relief against Miles.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Miles argued that TCRI and ITL were not railroad companies and were not interurban electric railways. He further sought final summary judgment stating that TCRI did not have the right to exercise eminent domain authority on his property and he sought to recover his attorney's fees. Appellantssummary judgment motion asked the trial court to declare that both appellants qualify as railroad companies and as interurban electric railways. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Miles, declaring that neither appellant is a railroad company nor an interurban electric railway. Miles was awarded attorney's fees for costs incurred through judgment and conditional appellate fees. Appellants’ counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice. This appeal followed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellants’ first three issues contend that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Miles.

A. Standard of Review

On appeal, we review de novo a trial court's summary judgment ruling. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In our review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). When, as here, the parties file competing motions for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, this court should review both parties’ summary-judgment evidence and determine all questions presented. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

Here, because the trial court implicitly resolved the declaratory judgment issues by ruling on motions for summary judgment, we review the propriety of the trial court's grant of the declaratory judgments under the same standards applicable for review of summary judgments. See English v. B.G.P. Int'l, Inc. , 174 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court properly granted Miles's declaratory judgment requests and, if not, enter the judgment which should have been entered by the trial court. See id.

B. Railroad Companies

By their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that neither TCRI nor ITL are railroad companies as the term is defined in the Texas Transportation Code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 81.002. Section 81.002 defines a railroad company as:

(1) a railroad incorporated before September 1, 2007, under former Title 112, Revised Statutes; or
(2) any other legal entity operating a railroad, including an entity organized under the Texas Business Corporation Act or the Texas Corporation Law provisions of the Business Organizations Code.

Id. The parties do not dispute that appellants were not incorporated before September 1, 2007; therefore, we must determine if appellants are railroad companies under § 81.002(2). In so doing, we must construe the statutory language. Our objective in statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, "which we ascertain from the plain meaning of the words used in the statute" because the best indicator of what the Legislature intended is what it enacted. Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar , 500 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. 2016) ; see also Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P. , 422 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2013). Thus, "[w]here text is clear, text is determinative of that intent." Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). We presume lawmakers chose statutory language "with care and that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind." Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen , 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). We read these words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011 ; see also TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011) ("Undefined terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning [unless] a different or more precise definition is apparent from the term's use in the context of the statute ...."). Importantly, we do not consider those words and phrases in isolation; rather, "we consider the statute as a whole, giving effect to each provision so that none is rendered meaningless or mere surplusage." TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin , 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016). Moreover, "[s]tatutory terms should be interpreted consistently in every part of an act." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Needham , 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). Finally, we presume that the Legislature intended the statute to comply with the Texas Constitution. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021(1) ; In re Allcat Serv., L.P. , 356 S.W.3d 455, 468 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding).

Miles contends that this is an eminent domain proceeding, and as such, he cites to Tex. Rice Land P's, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC , 363 S.W.3d 192, 204 (Tex. 2012) ( Texas Rice I )2 to argue that the statute must be "strictly construed in favor of the landowner and against those corporations and arms of the State vested therewith." As noted by Miles, strict construction of the statute is necessary only "in instances...

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3 cases
  • Miles v. Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 24, 2022
    ...that the Texas Central Entities have eminent-domain power as both railroad companies and interurban electric railway companies. 635 S.W.3d 684, 697 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2020). We granted Miles's petition for review and have received a substantial number of amicus briefs and le......
  • Builder Recovery Servs. LLC v. Town of Westlake
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 2021
    ...fees in the light of our ruling, and we remand the issue of attorney's fees to the trial court. See Tex. Cent. R.R. & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Miles , 635 S.W.3d 684, 690–91 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (remanding matter to trial court to redetermine equita......
  • Ex parte Turner
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • December 15, 2021
    ... ... TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC ... art. 11.073.Today, the Court ... ...

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