Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC

• Decision Date: 05 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–1020.,10–1020.
• Citation: 397 S.W.3d 162,56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449
• Parties: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and City of Edinburg, Petitioners, v. A.P.I. PIPE AND SUPPLY, LLC and Paisano Service Company, Inc., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

397 S.W.3d 162

56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 449

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and City of Edinburg, Petitioners,

v.A.P.I. PIPE AND SUPPLY, LLC and Paisano Service Company, Inc., Respondents.

No. 10–1020.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Sept. 12, 2012.

Decided April 5, 2013.

Boone Channing Slusher, Slusher & Associates, McAllen, TX, for Amicus Curiae San Jacinto Title.

Aaron Daniel Day, Texas Land Title Association, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Land Title Association.

Daniel T. Hodge, First Asst. Attorney General, David C. Mattax, Director of Defense Litigation, Office of the Attorney General, Greg W. Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, James William Kirk II, Lisa Marie McClain, Office of the Attorney Gen., Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General, Joseph David ‘Jody’ Hughes, Assistant Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General, Susan Desmarais Bonnen, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, William (Bill) J. Cobb III, Attorney General's Office, Deputy Atty. General for Civil Litigation, Austin, TX, for Petitioners Texas Department of Transportation.

Analisa Figueroa, Charles V. Willette Jr., Willette and Guerra LLP, Brownsville, TX, for Petitioner The City of Edinburg.

Mark Edward Wilkins, Rolando Quintana, Wilkins & Wilkins, McAllen, TX, for Respondents A.P.I. Pipe and Supply, L.L.C.

Justice WILLETT delivered the opinion of the Court.

Texas legal rules governing real-estate transactions demand assiduousness, lest uncertainty subvert the orderly transfer of property. This inverse-condemnation dispute over ten acres in Hidalgo County asks a simple question: Who has title to the parcel? The answer turns on the validity of conflicting recorded judgments:

1. 2003 Judgment—which the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and the City of Edinburg claim gives the City fee-simple ownership, subject to a drainage easement granted to TxDOT.

2. 2004 Judgment—which A.P.I. Pipe Supply, LLC and Paisano Service Company, Inc. (collectively API) claim gives API fee-simple ownership, subject to a drainage easement granted to the City (and, via subsequent conveyance, to TxDOT).

In 2005, TxDOT began its drainage project, and API, relying on the 2004 Judgment, brought a takings claim for the value of the removed soil. TxDOT counters that API lacks any ownership interest because the 2004 Judgment, which purports to declare the 2003 Judgment “null and void,” is itself void—to which API replies, even if the 2003 Judgment controls, API is an “innocent purchaser” entitled to ownership under Property Code section 13.001.

We agree with TxDOT. The void 2004 Judgment cannot supersede the valid 2003 Judgment; API is statutorily ineligible for “innocent purchaser” status; and equitable estoppel is inapplicable against the government in this case. Because API's takings claim fails, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss the suit.

I. Facts

The chain of title contains conflicting records, so we first describe how the City, TxDOT, and API obtained their purported interests in the land.

A. The 2003 Judgment Giving the City Ownership

Herschell White originally owned the land, and the City brought a condemnation action so it could dig a drainage channel. As compensation for the land, the commissioners awarded, and White accepted, $207,249 (plus $17,000 for damage to the remainder of the property). The special commissioners' report described the interest conveyed as a “right-of-way” but also incorporated by reference the City's original petition for condemnation, which described the interest sought as a “fee title.” No one objected to the special commissioners' award, and the trial court adopted it as the judgment of the court (the 2003 Judgment).¹

B. The 2004 Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc Giving API Ownership

A year later, the same trial court entered a “Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc” (the 2004 Judgment), which was agreed to by the City's and White's attorneys. A TxDOT employee apparently also approved the 2004 Judgment by email.²

The 2004 Judgment purported to render the 2003 Judgment “null and void.” The 2004 Judgment states that the City's interest in the land was a “right of way easement” obtained “for the purpose of opening, constructing and maintaining a permanent channel or drainage easement....” Unlike the 2003 Judgment, the 2004 Judgment did not incorporate the special commissioners' report or the City's original condemnation petition. Rather, it referred to the City's interest only as an easement, not fee-simple ownership.

C. Subsequent Title Transfers

Three months after the trial court signed the 2004 Judgment, White sold the ten acres and some surrounding property to API.³ Both the 2003 Judgment and the 2004 Judgment were recorded in the county registry before API purchased the property. In 2005, the City granted TxDOT an easement to build a drainage ditch and to remove any excavated “stone, earth, gravel or caliche.”

II. Proceedings Below

When TxDOT started digging, API filed an inverse-condemnation action against the City and TxDOT over the removed dirt. TxDOT and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the 2004 Judgment was void but saying the record was unclear as to whether API had notice of the 2003 Judgment.⁴

Upon remand to the trial court, TxDOT and the City produced evidence that the 2003 Judgment was indeed recorded in the county registry. TxDOT and the City filed a second plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that, because the 2004 Judgment was void and API had notice of the 2003 Judgment, the City held fee-simple title to the land, subject only to TxDOT's easement. The trial court denied the second plea to the jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that API was a good-faith purchaser for value since the 2004 Judgment superseded the 2003 Judgment.⁵

III. Discussion

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a matter of law we decide de novo.⁶ Evidence can be introduced and considered at the plea to the jurisdiction stage if needed to determine jurisdiction.⁷

A trial court lacks jurisdiction and should grant a plea to the jurisdiction where a plaintiff “cannot establish a viable takings claim.” ⁸ Further, “[i]t is fundamental that, to recover under the constitutional takings clause, one must first demonstrate an ownership interest in the property taken.” ⁹ Thus, if API does not own the disputed land, the takings claim is not viable and the trial court lacks jurisdiction. Given that the dispositive question is whether API is the property owner, the trial court was correct to consider the 2003 and 2004 Judgments as extrinsic, undisputed evidence.

For the reasons discussed below, we hold that API does not own the land and cannot assert the good-faith purchaser ¹⁰or equitable estoppel doctrines. We thus conclude that the trial court should have granted the plea to the jurisdiction.

A. The 2004 Judgment in Favor of the City Was Void.

A judgment nunc pro tunc can correct a clerical error in the original judgment, but not a judicial one.¹¹ An attempted nunc pro tunc judgment entered after the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction is void if it corrects judicial rather than clerical errors. ¹² “A clerical error is one which does not result from judicial reasoning or determination.” ¹³ Even a significant alteration to the original judgment may be accomplished through a judgment nunc pro tunc so long as it merely corrects a clerical error.¹⁴ If “the signed judgment inaccurately reflects the true decision of the court,” then “the error is clerical and may be corrected.” ¹⁵

Here, the change was undeniably significant. The 2003 Judgment granted a fee simple to the City, while the 2004 Judgment purported to turn the City's outright ownership into a mere easement. Again, the fact that the change was significant is not fatal to the 2004 Judgment's nunc pro tunc status. However, TxDOT and the City produced evidence showing that the 2003 Judgment correctly reflected the underlying judicial determination,¹⁶ and no party produced any evidence indicating that the 2004 Judgment was merely correcting a clerical error. That is, nothing suggests that the 2003 Judgment really meant to convey to the City an easement rather than a fee simple.

Further, the trial court in this case was by law required to adopt the award of the special commissioners, who in turn granted the fee-simple title the City sought in its condemnation petition. If parties do not timely object to a special commissioners' report, the trial court is required to enter “the [special] commissioners' findings as the judgment of the court.” ¹⁷ Objection is timely only if raised within 20 days of the special commissioners' award.¹⁸ Here, the parties point to no evidence of a timely objection. Indeed, the 2003 Judgment indicated that no party objected to the award. Therefore, the trial court could “only perform its ministerial function and render judgment based upon the commissioner'saward.” ¹⁹ The trial court did just that in the 2003 Judgment, awarding compensation for fee simple title. Conversely, the 2004 Judgment exceeded the scope of this “ministerial function” by shrinking the interest awarded by the special commissioners from a fee simple to an easement. As the special commissioners' award was not changed pursuant to timely objection, the 2004 Judgment was void.

One more timing issue cuts against API: the expiration of the trial court's plenary power. Such power usually lasts 30 days.²⁰ The 2004 Judgment, though labeled a Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, was undeniably a substantive alteration to the 2003 Judgment. However, the trial court's plenary power to make substantive alterations had expired 300–plus days before the 2004 Judgment was rendered.²¹

Because the 2004 Judgment was void, it did not convey anything to anyone. Instead, under the 2003 Judgment, the City continued to hold fee-simple title. White continued to have no interest in the land, and API...