Texas City Metal Trades Council v. Union Carbide
| Decision Date | 18 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. G-03-715.,CIV.A. G-03-715. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
| Parties | TEXAS CITY METAL TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Byron Miles Buchanan, Williams Bailey Law Firm, Houston, TX, for plaintiff.
Joseph G. Galagaza, Seyfarth Shaw, Houston, TX, for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Texas City Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO ("Plaintiff" or "the Union") and Defendant Union Carbide Corporation ("Defendant" or "the Company") each seek summary judgment in this lawsuit brought by the Union to enforce the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Parties. For the reasons stated below, the Union's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby respectfully DENIED, and the Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
The Company owns a facility in Texas City, Texas, at which a number of the Union's members work. The Parties' previous collective bargaining agreement expired on April 12, 2002. Negotiations for a new contract began in March 2002, but the Parties did not reach an agreement before their previous contract expired. At a meeting held on December 11,2002, The Union put the Company on notice that it would call a strike if the Parties failed to reach an agreement.
The Company's negotiator, Les Uhlmann, asked the Union to have its members vote on the Company's "last, best, and final offer." See Deposition of Jesse J. Sanchez, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B, at 27:21-25. Uhlmann asked if there was anything the Company could do to encourage bargaining unit members to ratify the agreement. See id. at 27:25-28:2. Jesse Sanchez, the Union's negotiator, made two suggestions. First, he asked for assurances that the Company would not file an RM petition with the National Labor Relations Board to seek decertification of the Union during the term of the contract. See id. at 28:2-6. Uhlmann agreed to this condition. Id. at 28:6. Second, Sanchez raised the possibility of severance packages for members of the bargaining unit. Id. at 28:12-29:9. The parties agreed to discuss a possible severance package for employees. Id. at 29:5-8. Uhlmann and Sanchez signed a letter of understanding, which provided:
If the Company's Last and Final offer currently on the table is ratified by the Union Membership prior to December 18th, the Company will:
— agree that during the term of the 10 year collective bargaining agreement not to file an R M Petition with the National Labor Relations Board requesting an election to determine whether or not the Union has majority support of the employees.
— agree to enter into discussions with the Union regarding a possible severance agreement for bargained-for employees with no commitment that a severance agreement will be reached and either party shall retain the right to stop discussions on this subject at any time.
Cover Letter of Understanding to Company's Last and Final Offer (Dec. 11,2002), Defendant's Exh. 7.
The Parties ratified a new collective bargaining agreement, which became effective on December 18, 2002 ("the CBA"). See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 1. On the effective date of the CBA, Sanchez sent Uhlmann a written request for a meeting to discuss the details of "a possible severance package agreement" for members of the bargaining unit. Letter from Jesse J. Sanchez, Business Manager, Texas City Metal Trades Council, to Les Uhlmann, Human Resources Leader, Dow Chemical Co. (Dec. 18, 2002). The Parties met on December 19, 2002 to discuss possible severance benefits. At the meeting, Uhlmann told the Union that there would be no limit to the number of maintenance employees who could accept the severance package. On December 20, 2002, the Parties entered into a written Side Agreement concerning severance benefits for maintenance employees. See Side Agreement (Dec. 20, 2002), Defendant's Exh. 9.
The Company also offered a number of severance packages to the operations department employees in the bargaining unit, but on the condition that five to eight operators selected by the Company would be included in the list of employees slated to receive the severance packages.1 In exchange, the Company would offer additional severance packages to approximately fifteen other operators based on seniority. On December 20,2002, Sanchez informed Uhlmann that the Union was not interested in the severance offer for the operators. See Sanchez Depo. at 48:20-49:8. The Parties never reached an agreement concerning severance packages for operators, and the Company did not implement any severance plan for that group of employees. 51:24-52:13.
In January 2003, Eddie Evans, an African American union steward and operator, filed Grievance No. 745, upon which this lawsuit is based. In the space marked "Statement of Employee Grievance" on the grievance form, Evans wrote:
Listing my name as a "selected operator." Racial discrimination & color along with retaliation. Dow management intentionally single out & scapegoat certain people. I've been one of those people for some time because of my race & color.
Texas City Metal Trades Dow Chemical Company/Union Carbide Corp. Grievance Form, Plaintiff's Exh. 3 ("the Grievance"). In the space marked "Contract Provision Relied Upon or Claimed Violated," Evans wrote:
Contract clause. Discrimination (equal treatment for (members)). All state & federal laws that govern discrimination including 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Id. In the "Remedy Requested" section, Evans wrote:
Patterns to conspire against me exist. Whatever legal remedy is necessary. Also include those who can influence within the law in America decisions to stop racism, retaliation & discrimination. Your last investigation on my harassment charge was bias as well.
Id. Sanchez amended the Grievance on February 27, 2003, to include two additional employees — Armando Victoria and Steve Burns. Sanchez amended the Grievance again on May 16, 2003, to add the word "Seniority" to the space marked "Contract Provision Relied Upon," and to request that the severance packages offered to maintenance employees be offered to the operators. See id.; Sanchez Depo. at 19:5-20:13.
Evans's supervisor denied the Grievance on January 12, 2003. After the Union attempted to process the Grievance through the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedures, the Company informed the Union in writing that it would not process the matter to arbitration. See Letter from Gary Deehan, Human Resources, to Jesse J. Sanchez (March 4, 2003), Plaintiff's Exh. 4 (). Following the Company's refusal to process the matter to arbitration, the Union filed this lawsuit under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)("LMRA"), seeking to compel the Company to arbitrate the Grievance. On June 29,2004, the Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When one party moves for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Issues of material fact are "genuine" only if they require resolution by a trier of fact. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. See id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. If the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment should not be granted. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Determining credibility, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences are left to the trier of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
In the so-called Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court established four guiding principles of arbitration. See Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); see also AT & T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (). First, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers' Int'l Union, Local 4-447 v. Chevron Chem. Co., 815 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582, 80 S.Ct. at 1352). Second, the courts are the appropriate forum in which to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Id. (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. at 1352-53). Third, in considering whether a grievance is subject to arbitration, courts must avoid consideration of the merits of the grievance. See Id. at 343 (...
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