Texas Co. v. Amos

• Decision Date: 31 March 1919
• Citation: 77 Fla. 327,81 So. 471
• Parties: TEXAS CO. v. AMOS, State Comptroller, et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

81 So. 471

77 Fla. 327

TEXAS CO. v. AMOS, State Comptroller, et al.

Florida Supreme Court

March 31, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Leon County; E. C. Love, Judge.

Suit by the Texas Company against Ernest Amos, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and another, to enjoin the collection of a license tax. From a decree of dismissal, complainant appeals. Reversed, with directions.

Whitfield J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The license tax imposed by section 46, c. 6421, Laws of Florida 1913 (Comp. Laws 1914, s 596qqqq), upon 'any corporation * * * owning, controlling or operation * * * tank cars,' applies only to corporations engaged in the business of owning, controlling or operating such cars.

A corporation engaged in producing, buying, and selling oils and oil products, which owns and uses tank cars for the sole purpose of transporting its own products, and which ownership is necessitated by the failure of the railroad companies to provide an adequate supply of such cars, cannot be said to be engaged in the business of owning tank cars.

Laws imposing license taxes, and providing a penalty for doing business without a license, are penal in their nature, and should be strictly construed.

COUNSEL E. C. Maxwell, of Pensacola, for appellant.

Van C Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and Worth W. Trammell, Asst. Atty Gen., for appellees.

The appellant, the Texas Company, a corporation, which we shall hereinafter refer to as complainant, filed its bill in the circuit court of Leon county against the sheriff of said county and the comptroller of the state, praying that they might be enjoined from proceeding further to enforce the collection of a license tax imposed against complainant as owner of tank cars under section 46, chapter 6421, of the Laws of Florida of 1913 (Comp. Laws 1914, § 596qqqq).

A demurrer was interposed to the bill, which demurrer was sustained, and complainant, not desiring to plead further suffered a dismissal and appealed.

The bill alleges, briefly, that complainant is engaged in the business of producing, buying, and selling mineral oils and oil products; that it is conducting its said business in various states, including Florida; that in connection with said business, and as a means of carrying on the same, it owns and controls a number of tank cars in which its own oils are transported over various railroads to the various selling and distributing stations operated by it; that no other use is made of such cars, and the ownership and use thereof in the manner stated is made necessary by the failure of the railroads to furnish an adequate number of tank cars to transport complainant's oil products, and that for the furnishing of said cars complainant is allowed but one-eighth of 1 per cent. per mile reduction on freight, which is much less than the cost of supplying the cars, and that the total allowance for use of said cars wholly within this state is much less than the tax sought to be collected; that complainant is taxed as a dealer in oils by wholesale, and has paid all state, county, and municipal license taxes imposed upon it by said chapter as such dealer.

OPINION

REAVES Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The sole question involved here is one of legislative intent. Was it the purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of chapter 6421, Laws 1913 (Comp. Laws 1914, § 596a et seq.), after imposing by section 38 (section 596nn) a license tax upon each place of business of dealer in oils at wholesale, to further impose by section 46 (section 596qqqq) a tax of $500 upon the tank cars owned by such dealer and used exclusively for carrying such oils to the selling stations, when the railroad companies fail to furnish enough tank cars to supply the dealer's demand? We think a careful analysis of said chapter 6421 answers this question in the negative.

It will be noted that the tax is imposed upon the 'business' in which one engages, and not otherwise.

Section 1 (section 596a) says:

'No person, firm or corporation shall engage in or manage any business, profession or occupation, mentioned in this act' unless a license shall have been procured.

Section 2 (section 596aa) imposes a county license 'upon any business, profession or occupation mentioned in this act.'

Section 3 (section 596aaa) provides for the transfer of 'business licenses' with the 'business for which they were taken out,' and section 59 (sections 596v, 3447) imposes a penalty upon 'any person, * * * firm, * * * or association that shall carry on or conduct any business or profession' for which a license is required without first obtaining a license.

It will be noted that the statute, in section 1, uses the words 'business, profession or occupation,' and in section 59 the words 'business or profession.' These words are more cumulative than distinctive, and appear to all be comprehended in the word 'business.'

'Occupation,' as commonly understood, signifies the business which one principally engages in, and 'profession' refers to a character of business not involved in this case, so that we shall confine our further discussion to the one statutory word 'business' and try to answer the question: What does the statute mean by the word 'business,' and does the bill show the complainant not to be engaged in the business of owning or controlling tank cars?

'Business' is a word of large significance, and denotes the employment or occupation in which a person is engaged to procure a living. Goddard v. Chaffee, 2 Allen (Mass.) 395, 79 Am. Dec. 796.

'The term 'business' as used in a law imposing a license tax on businesses, trades, professions and callings, ordinarily means a business in the trade or commercial sense, one carried on with a view to profit or...