Texas Dept. Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda
| Decision Date | 02 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-0619.,01-0619. |
| Citation | 133 S.W.3d 217 |
| Parties | TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND WILDLIFE, Petitioner, v. Maria MIRANDA and Ray Miranda, Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Howard G. Baldwin, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Jeffrey S. Boyd, Thompson & Knight, Harry W. Deckard, Office of Attorney General, Nelly R. Herrera, Office of Attorney General, Julie Caruthers Parsley, Public Utility Com'n, and Lisa Royce Eskow, Attorney General's Office, Austin, for Petitioner.
Emmett R. Harris, Law Office of R. Emmett Harris, Jerry Don Evans, Uvalde, TX, for Respondent.
Justice WAINWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to parts I., II., III.A., III.B., III.C.2., III.C.3., III.D., and IV., in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, and Justice SMITH joined, and a plurality opinion with respect to Part III.C.1., in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, and Justice SMITH joined.
Maria Miranda sustained injuries after a tree limb fell on her at Garner State Park in Uvalde County. Maria and her husband Ray sued the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department,1 alleging negligence and gross negligence. The Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction, to which it attached supporting evidence, and argued that sovereign immunity barred the Mirandas' claims. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and a unanimous court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court could not consider evidence in support of the plea because the Department did not allege that the Mirandas' pleadings were a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction. 55 S.W.3d 648, 652.
In accord with our decision in Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex.2000), we hold that the trial court in this case was required to examine the evidence on which the parties relied to determine if a fact issue existed regarding the alleged gross negligence of the Department. Due to the unusual confluence of standards erected by the Legislature for waiver of sovereign immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute, plaintiffs must plead gross negligence to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Further, if the plaintiffs' factual allegations are challenged with supporting evidence necessary to consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, to avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Because the Mirandas failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged gross negligence of the Department, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment dismissing the case.
The Mirandas' third amended petition contains the following allegations: In April 1998, the Mirandas and their family were camping and picnicking as paying guests at Garner State Park, owned and operated by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. The Mirandas asked a park ranger to recommend a campsite that would be safe for children. While standing next to a picnic table at the recommended campsite, a falling tree branch approximately twelve inches in diameter and fifteen feet long struck Maria on the head. As a result of the incident, Maria suffered extensive injuries to her head, neck, and spine. Ray suffered mental anguish and other damages related to his wife's injuries.
On May 7, 1999, the Mirandas filed suit against the Department, alleging negligence and later amended their suit to add gross negligence claims. With respect to the gross negligence claims, the Mirandas alleged that the Department "knew of the dangers of its falling tree branches, failed to inspect, failed to prune, failed to alleviate or remove the danger, and consciously and deliberately failed to warn Plaintiffs of the extremely dangerous condition," "knew that its property contained hidden, dangerous defect [sic] in that its tree branches which have not been inspected or pruned regularly fall," failed "to make safe the dangerous condition of its campsite trees," and "failed to warn or make reasonably safe the dangerous condition of which it was aware." In addition, the Mirandas alleged that the Department's conduct was "willful, wanton, or grossly negligent."
Over a year after the Mirandas filed suit and after the parties conducted discovery, the Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, arguing that the Mirandas' allegations were insufficient to invoke a waiver of the Department's sovereign immunity under the standard established in the Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute.2 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.001-.109; id. §§ 75.001.004. The Department attached evidence in support of its plea. The Mirandas filed a response to the Department's plea and their third amended original petition. In their response, the Mirandas stated that they relied on evidence attached to the Department's plea, including written discovery responses from the Department and the deposition the Mirandas took of assistant park manager Craig VanBaarle. At the trial court's hearing on the Department's plea, the parties addressed the allegations in the Mirandas' third amended original petition. The next day, the trial court denied the plea. The Department filed this interlocutory appeal claiming that the trial court erroneously denied its plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. Id. § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the plea, stating that the Mirandas pled a premises defect cause of action based on gross negligence under the recreational use statute. 55 S.W.3d at 652. The court of appeals rejected the Department's argument that there was no evidence to support gross negligence, holding that "the trial court was not authorized to inquire into the substance of the claims because the Department did not specifically allege that the Mirandas' allegations were pled merely as a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction." Id. ().
The Department contends that the court of appeals erred in relying solely upon the conclusory allegations found in the Mirandas' petition to affirm the trial courts denial of the Department's plea to the jurisdiction and in disregarding the Department's evidence submitted with its plea. Specifically, the Department contends that gross negligence is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the Mirandas' claims and that its evidence affirmatively negates gross negligence. The Department further argues that because the Mirandas failed to plead specific facts alleging gross negligence in their petition or introduce evidence to controvert the evidence in the Department's plea, they failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with the litigation.
After originally dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction, we granted the Department's petition on motion for rehearing. Before we consider the substantive issues presented, we first determine whether we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.
When there is no dissent in the court of appeals, this Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals only if the court of appeals' decision "holds differently" or conflicts with "a prior decision of another court of appeals or of the supreme court on a question of law material to a decision of the case." Tex. Gov't Code 22.001(a)(2);3 Schein v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex.2002); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex.2001). Two decisions conflict for purposes of establishing our jurisdiction under section 22.001(a)(2) when the two cases are so similar that the decision in one case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other. Schein, 102 S.W.3d at 687-88; White, 46 S.W.3d at 867. "The conflict must be on the very question of law actually involved and determined, in respect of an issue in both cases, the test being whether one would operate to overrule the other in case they were both rendered by the same court." Christy v. Williams, 156 Tex. 555, 298 S.W.2d 565, 568-69 (1957) (citation omitted).
The Department contends that this Court has jurisdiction over its interlocutory appeal because the court of appeals' decision here conflicts with our opinion in Bland. In Bland, we held that a trial court "may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised." 34 S.W.3d at 555 (emphasis added). While recognizing that "a dilatory plea does not authorize an inquiry so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction," we explained that "because a court must not act without determining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction to do so, it should hear evidence as necessary to determine the issue before proceeding with the case." Id. at 554. "The court should, of course, confine itself to the evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issue." Id. at 555.
In Bland, we included examples of when relevant evidence may be considered in determining whether jurisdiction has been established. See id. at 554. We also observed that when the defendant contends that the amount in controversy falls below the trial court's jurisdictional limit, the trial court should limit its inquiry to the pleadings. Id. In that situation, we concluded, "the plaintiff's pleadings are determinative unless the defendant specifically alleges that the amount was pleaded merely as a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction." Id.
In this case, the court of appeals inaccurately stated and then misapplied Bland's holding. 55 S.W.3d at 650-52. The court of appeals held...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys.
...are not automatically entitled to Takings Clause protection.").6 Heald & Wells, supra note 4, at 856.7 See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004) (requiring the state to meet the summary judgment standard of proof); Dallas County v. Wadley , 168 S.W.3d 3......
-
In re Lubbock
...the plaintiff[ ] an opportunity to replead." Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. , 487 S.W.3d at 160 (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004) ).III. DiscussionA The Lubbock Diocese contends that mandamus relief is appropriate because the First Amendment ......
-
McNeill v. Phillips
...2005, no pet.) ). We also review a plea questioning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). ANALYSIS In Mathews v. Eldridge , the issue was:[W]hether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment req......
-
Andrade v. Naacp of Austin
...the Texas Constitution” (quoting City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tex.1995))); see also Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–28 (Tex.2004). The voters assert two equal protections claims. Broadly, they complain that voters who cast paper ballots ......
-
Damage Award For Man Injured In Bus Accident Reduced Where Defendant Was A Governmental Unit
...liability is treated as an affirmative defense and must be pleaded as such, or else waived. Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. Governmental immunity specifically protects the State and state agencies as well as the state's "political subdivision" including ......
-
Texas Whistleblower Act
...librarian was employee rather than independent contractor), disapproved on other grounds by Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004); Permian Basin Community Ctrs. v. Johns , 951 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ) (holding that, although empl......
-
CHAPTER 2 Standards of Review and Scope of Review
...632 (Tex. 2015).[46] Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012); see also Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) ("We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders' intent.").[47] Heckman v. Willi......
-
Texas Whistleblower Act
...librarian was employee rather than independent contractor), disapproved on other grounds by Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004); Permian Basin Community Ctrs. v. Johns , 951 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ) (holding that, although empl......
-
Texas whistleblower Act
...librarian was employee rather than independent contractor), disapproved on other grounds by Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004); WHISTLEBLOWER: TEXAS ACT §34:1 Texas Employment Law 34-4 Permian Basin Community Ctrs. v. Johns , 951 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex.......