Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brock
Decision Date | 17 March 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 3822.,3822. |
Citation | 26 S.W.2d 322 |
Parties | TEXAS EMPLOYERS' INS. ASS'N v. BROCK. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Cherokee County; C. A. Hodges, Judge.
Action by Jasper Brock, by his fatherJ. R. Brock, as next friend, against the Texas Employers' Insurance Association to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board.From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
April 10, 1929, appellee, Jasper Brock, fifteen years of age, in the course of his employment as an employee of J. W. Sessions, insured by the appellant insurance company under the Workmen's Compensation Law(articles 8306-8309, R. S. 1925), was injured by a falling tree.Not satisfied with the action of the Industrial Accident Board on the claim he presented to it for compensation for the injury suffered, appellee(by his father, J. R. Brock, as next friend) brought this suit against appellant.
It appeared from the evidence heard at the trial that at the time appellee suffered the injury in question he was a strong, hardy, healthy boy, fifteen years of age.He weighed 142 pounds, and was able to do, and was doing, the same kind of work (sawing logs) his father was doing, and earning the same wages, to wit, from $2.50 to $3 per day.As a result of the tree falling against and upon him, appellee's collarbone was broken in two places, and that testimony indicated he suffered a fracture of the base of the skull—a "basal fracture," physicians termed it.He was unconscious for three or four days after he suffered the injury; was never afterward to the date of the trial August 29, 1929, able to do any kind of work; his weight had decreased from 142 to 118 pounds; he had been spitting up blood since the accident to the date of the trial, and suffering from pain in his lungs, head, arm, and shoulder, and his eyes became crossed so that one object appeared to him to be two objects, and as a consequence he could not read a newspaper or book, he said.Physicians testified that appellee evidently had suffered a "shake-up of the vital nerves in the base of the head;" that there was no known remedy for the condition his eyes were in; that medical authorities taught that a basal fracture might result in epilepsy and insanity; and that they did not think appellee would "ever be able to perform hard labor," but thought he was totally and permanently incapacitated to perform such labor.While appellee lived with his father, the latter did not own a home, nor real property of any kind, and was not able to support and maintain appellee, he said.For that reason appellee had been working much of the time he should have been going to school.Both appellee and his father testified to an intention, if the compensation due the former was paid in a lump sum, to invest the money in a farm.
On special issues submitted to them the jury found: (1) That the injury appellee received resulted in "his total incapacity to perform labor"; (2) that such total incapacity was permanent; (3) that manifest hardship and injustice would result to him if the compensation he was entitled to was not paid to him in a lump sum.On said findings, an agreement of the parties"that (quoting) the wage upon which the compensation rate is to be based in this cause is $3.00 per day—that is, that the actual daily wage of $3.00 amounts to an average daily wage under the statutes of $10.38 per week or $1.48 per day," and the evidence, judgment was rendered in appellee's favor against appellant for $10.38 per week for 401 weeks, to be paid in a lump sum amounting to $4,162.38, "less a discount at the rate of six per cent. per annum compound interest on the unmatured weekly payments at the time of the payment of the judgment," and less $21 already paid by appellant.It was provided in the judgment that one-third of the amount of the recovery in appellee's favor should be paid to his attorneys in conformity to a contract he entered into with them.
Wm. M. Cramer, James P. Swift, and Harry P. Lawther, all of Dallas, for appellant.
Brazil & Musslewhite, of Lufkin, for appellee.
WILLSON, C. J.(after stating the case as above).
While the declared purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Law is that the compensation therein provided for shall be paid "from week to week"(article 8306, § 18), it authorizes the payment of such compensation in a lump sum "in special cases where in the judgment of the board (or court) manifest hardship and injustice would otherwise result."Article 8306, § 15.It is insisted it did not appear from the pleading and proof that this was such a special case, and that the trial court therefore erred when he rendered judgment determining to the contrary and providing for a lump sum payment by appellant to appellee.
The allegations in appellee's petition (supported by evidence, as appears in the statement above) were, substantially, that the injuries he suffered had totally and permanently incapacitated him for work; that he had no income and no means of support; that his father had a large family, and was not financially able to support him; that, if the compensation he was entitled to was paid to him in a lump sum, he could and would invest it so it would "bear such revenue as would maintain and support him;" and that, unless such compensation was so paid, "great and manifest hardship and injustice" would result to him.
If it...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 7-day Trial
-
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mitchell
...would be. The legal discount of 6 per cent. was made by the court. There was not a discount at a less sum than the legal rate of interest. It is believed that there was no error to appellant's prejudice. See
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jasper Brock, 26 S.W. (2d) 322, lately decided by this The appellant next insists that the appellee's compensation should have been computed under first subsec. 5 instead of first subsec. 1 of section 1, article 8309, R. S. Part. The jury... -
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Herron
...court should have defined the same so as to enable the jury to intelligently answer such issue. Appellant cites no authority in support of such complaint. The Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth district, in
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Brock, 26 S.W. (2d) 322, 324, par. 5, held that the words "manifest hardship and injustice" were words in common use, and that it should be assumed the jury knew the meaning of the same as well as the court knew it. See, in this connection,... -
Bankers' Lloyds v. Seymour
...Corsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 216 S. W. 464, 466; Western Indemnity Co. v. Corder (Tex. Civ. App.) 249 S. W. 316, 317; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Cahal (Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 957;
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Brock (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S.W.(2d) 322; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 36 S.W.(2d) 704; Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Wonderley (Tex. Civ. App.) 16 S.W.(2d) Subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 1 of article 8309, R. C. S. 1925,... -
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Henson
...define "manifest hardship and injustice" as those words were used in special issue No. 10. The words are used in their common and ordinary sense. In this view we are in accord with the Court of Civil Appeals of Texarkana in
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brock, 26 S.W.(2d) 322. Appellant's points 10, 11, and 12 raise no questions that we feel called upon to consider. They each complain that the court erred in holding that findings of the jury were not against the preponderance of thethe conclusions reached by the Waco Court of Civil Appeals, in its opinion by Judge Stanford, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Nettles, 21 S.W.(2d) 31, is correct. This view has been adopted by the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Brock, 26 S.W.(2d) 322, and Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Mitchell, 27 S.W.(2d) 600. See also Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Holloway et al., 30 S.W.(2d) 921, by the...