Texas Industries, Inc v. Radcliff Materials, Inc, 79-1144

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Citation: 451 U.S. 630,101 S.Ct. 2061,68 L.Ed.2d 500
• Docket Number: No. 79-1144,79-1144
• Parties: TEXAS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. RADCLIFF MATERIALS, INC., et al
• Decision Date: 26 May 1981

68 L.Ed.2d 500

101 S.Ct. 2061

451 U.S. 630

TEXAS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,

v RADCLIFF MATERIALS, INC., et al.

No. 79-1144.

Argued March 3, 1981.

Decided May 26, 1981.

Syllabus

Petitioner and respondents manufacture and sell ready-mix concrete. A purchaser of concrete from petitioner filed a civil action against petitioner in Federal District Court, alleging that petitioner and certain unnamed firms had conspired to raise concrete prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and seeking treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act. After learning through discovery that respondents were the alleged co-conspirators, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against them, seeking contribution should it be held liable in the original action. The District Court dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that federal law does not allow an antitrust defendant to recover any contribution from alleged co-conspirators. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held : There is no basis in federal statutory or common law for allowing federal courts to fashion the right to contribution urged by petitioner. Pp. 2063-2070.

(a) Congress neither expressly nor implicitly intended to create such a right of contribution. Nothing in the Sherman and Clayton Acts or in their legislative history refers to contribution, and there is nothing to indicate any congressional concern with softening the blow on joint wrongdoers. Rather, the very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of joint wrongdoers. P. 2066.

(b) The federal courts are not empowered to fashion a federal common-law rule of contribution among antitrust wrongdoers. Contribution does not implicate "uniquely federal interests" of the kind that oblige courts to formulate federal common law. Moreover, even though Congress may have intended to allow federal courts to develop governing principles of law in the common-law tradition with regard to substantive violations of the Sherman Act, it does not follow that Congress intended to give courts as wide discretion in formulating remedies to enforce the Act or the kind of relief sought through contribution. There is nothing in the Act itself, in its legislative history, or in the overall legislative scheme to suggest that Congress intended courts to have the power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted. Pp. 2067-2070.

(c) Regardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments on the complex policy questions presented by petitioner's claimed right to contribution, this is a matter for Congress, not the courts to resolve. P. 2070.

5th Cir., 604 F.2d 897, affirmed.

Benjamin R. Slater, Jr., New Orleans, La., for petitioner.

Dando B. Cellini, New Orleans, La., for respondents.

Sol. Gen., Wade H. McCree, Jr., Washington, D. C., for United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the federal antitrust laws allow a defendant, against whom civil damages, costs, and attorney's fees have been assessed, a right to contribution from other participants in the unlawful conspiracy on which recovery was based. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits. 449 U.S. 949, 101 S.Ct. 351, 66 L.Ed.2d 213 (1980).¹ We affirm.

I

Petitioner and the three respondents manufacture and sell ready-mix concrete in the New Orleans, La., area. In 1975, the Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp., which had purchased concrete from petitioner, filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana naming petitioner as defendant; ² the complaint alleged that petitioner and certain unnamed concrete firms had conspired to raise prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1, which provides in relevant part:

"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."

The complaint sought treble damages plus attorney's fees under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15, which provides:

"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti- trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." ³

Through discovery, petitioner learned that Abraham believed respondents were the other concrete producers that had participated in the alleged price-fixing scheme.⁴ Petitioner then filed a third-party complaint against respondents seeking contribution from them should it be held liable in the action filed by Abraham. The District Court dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that federal law does not allow an antitrust defendant to recover in contribution from co-conspirators. The District Court also determined there was no just reason for delay with respect to that aspect of the case and entered final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that, although the Sherman and the Clayton Acts do not expressly afford a right to contribution, the issue should be resolved as a matter of federal common law. Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (1979). The court then examined what it perceived to be the benefits and the difficulties of contribution and concluded that no common-law rule of contribution should be fashioned by the courts.

II

The common law provided no right to contribution among joint tortfeasors. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 196 U.S. 217, 25 S.Ct. 226, 49 L.Ed. 453 (1905); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 50, pp. 305-307 (4th ed. 1971). See Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng.Rep. 1337 (K.B.1799). See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 86-87, n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1578, n. 16, 67 L.Ed.2d 750. In part, at least, this common-law rule rested on the idea that when several tortfeasors have caused damage, the law should not lend its aid to have one tortfeasor compel others to share in the sanctions imposed by way of damages intended to compensate the victim. E. g., Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78, 81-82 (1870). See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.Pa.L.Rev. 130, 130-134 (1932). Since the turn of the century, however, 39 states and the District of Columbia have fashioned rules of contribution in one form or another, 10 initially through judicial action and the remainder through legislation. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S., at 86-87, and n. 16, 101 S.Ct., at 1578, and n. 16. Because courts generally have acknowledged that treble-damages actions under the antitrust laws are analogous to common-law actions sounding in tort,⁵ we are urged to follow this trend and adopt contribution for antitrust violators.

The parties and amici representing a variety of business interests—as well as a legion of commentators ⁶—have thoroughly addressed the policy concerns implicated in the creation of a right to contribution in antitrust cases. With potentially large sums at stake, it is not surprising that the numerous and articulate amici disagree strongly over the basic issue raised: whether sharing of damages liability will advance or impair the objectives of the antitrust laws.

Proponents of a right to contribution advance concepts of fairness and equity in urging that the often massive judgments in antitrust actions be shared by all the wrongdoers. In the abstract, this position has a certain appeal: collective fault, collective responsibility. But the efforts of petitioner and supporting amici to invoke principles of equity presuppose a legislative intent to allow parties violating the law to draw upon equitable principles to mitigate the consequences of their wrongdoing. Moreover, traditional equitable standards have something to say about the septic state of the hands of such a suitor in the courts, and, in the context of one wrongdoer suing a co-conspirator, these standards similarly suggest that parties generally in pari delicto should be left where they are found. See supra, at 2063.⁷

The proponents of contribution also contend that, by allowing one violator to recover from co-conspirators, there is a greater likelihood that most or all wrongdoers will be held liable and thus share the consequences of the wrongdoing. It is argued that contribution would thus promote more vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws and thereby deter violations, one of the important purposes of the treble-damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See, e. g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2333, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485, 97 S.Ct. 690, 695, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262, 92 S.Ct. 885, 891, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 20 L.Ed.2d 982 (1968). Independent of this effect, a right to contribution may increase the incentive of a single defendant to provide evidence against co-conspirators so as to avoid bearing the full weight of the judgment. Realization of this possibility may also deter one from joining an antitrust conspiracy.

Respondents and amici opposing contribution point out that an even stronger deterrent may exist in the possibility, even if more remote, that a single...