Texas Pacific Railway Company v. Samuel Watson

• Decision Date: 04 May 1903
• Docket Number: No. 223,223
• Parties: TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err. , v. SAMUEL E. WATSON
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

190 U.S. 287

23 S.Ct. 681

47 L.Ed. 1057

TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v SAMUEL E. WATSON.

No. 223.

Argued and submitted March 20, 1903.

Decided May 4, 1903.

This action was originally commenced in a Texas state court by the appellee Watson, to recover the value of 64 bales of cotton, less insurance thereon. The cotton was alleged to have been destroyed by fire on January 3, 1896, while stored upon what was known as the O'Neil cotton platform near the depot of the railway company at Clarksville, Red River county, Texas. The fire was averred to have been occasioned by the negligence of the railway company in the use of a defectively constructed locomotive and in the careless operation thereof while passing said platform. Subsequently the insurance company was joined as plaintiff, and recovery was asked of the full value of the cotton. Upon application of the defendant, based upon the fact that it was incorporated under the laws of the United States, the cause was removed to the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Texas. In the latter court an amended answer was filed. This pleading contained general and special demurrers, a general denial, and a special answer setting up various defenses. The general and special demurrers were subsequently overruled, and defendant excepted. A trial was had, and it was shown by the evidence that at the point where the fire in question occurred the track of the railway company ran east and west, and the train which it was asserted caused the fire in question was moving eastward, and a strong wind was blowing from the north. A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff Watson and against the railroad and against the plaintiff insurance company in favor of the railroad. Judgment was entered on the verdict; the judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit (50 C. C. A. 230, 112 Fed. 402), and the cause was then brought to this court by writ of error.

Messrs. David D. Duncan, John F. Dillon, and Winslow S. Pierce for plaintiff in error.

Messrs.J. W. Bailey, E. S. Chambers, and Amos L. Beaty for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

The various assignments of error relied upon in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error will be disposed of in the order therein discussed.

First. In several assignments it is claimed that the circuit court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of witnesses to the effect that at or about the time of the fire complained of, and about the time of the passing of the locomotive which it was charged occasioned the fire, the witnesses observed other fires at various points not far removed from the place where the cotton was burned and south of and near to the railway track. In the light of the decision of this court in Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454, 470, 23 L. ed. 356, 362, we think this evidence was competent as having a tendency to establish that the destruction of the property of the plaintiff was caused by the locomotive in question, and as tending to show negligence in its construction or operation.

Second. In an assignment of error it was contended that the appellate court erred in holding that the trial court properly admitted testimony to the effect that certain witnesses did not know of and saw no opportunity for the cotton to have caught fire except from the locomotive in question. The evidence in the record is in narrative form, and that portion relating to the criticized testimony merely recites that at the time said evidence was offered from each witness 'defendant then and there objected, because the evidence was of a negative character and would not be relevant, and further, because it was in the nature of a conclusion of the witness to the effect that the fire had originated from the engine.' Whether the question which elicited the testimony complained of was objectionable cannot be determined from the record, nor does the objection seem to have been addressed to an omission to state the facts which induced the belief that no other opportunity existed for the cotton to have caught fire than was afforded by the operation of the locomotive. Evidence of the surrounding circumstances and conditions which by a process of exclusion would have tended to establish that the burning of the cotton could not have been caused other than by the locomotive in question would, we think, have been clearly relevant. As the record stands, we think the assignment in question was without merit.

Third. A further contention is that the appellate court erred in permitting a question to be answered despite the objection that 'the evidence sought to be elicited was not such as was the subject of expert testimony, but the endeavor was to substitute a conclusion of the witness for that of the jury, and it was not allowable by a hypothetical question, such as this and the answer thereto, to prove the bad equipment of the engine in the face of the actual testimony that the equipment was all in good order.' The following is the question referred to:

'Suppose an engine should come along, and in the course of 4 miles and 1/4 should set out, say,...