Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Snider

• Citation: 321 S.W.2d 280,159 Tex. 380
• Decision Date: 28 January 1959
• Docket Number: No. A-6997,A-6997
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Parties: TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Mrs. O. J. SNIDER, Administratrix, Respondent.

Page 280

321 S.W.2d 280

159 Tex. 380

TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Mrs. O. J. SNIDER, Administratrix, Respondent.

No. A-6997.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 28, 1959.

Rehearing Denied March 18, 1959.

Bibb & Green, Marshall, Earl Roberts, Longview, J. T. Suggs, Wm. C. Dowdy, Jr., Wm. R. McDowell, Tom L. Farmer, Dallas, for petitioner.

Jones, Brian & Jones, Marshall, Adams & Sheppard, Longview, for respondent.

CALVERT, Justice.

Respondent sued petitioner Railway Company for damages for the wrongful death of her husband who was killed in a crossing accident. Trial was to a jury. Based on the jury's findings judgment was rendered for petitioner. The judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the cause was remanded for retrial. 315 S.W.2d 82.

Reversal was ordered by the Court of Civil Appeals because of its conclusions that there was error in the trial court's charge and that there was an irreconcilable conflict in the jury's findings. It is our opinion that neither ground of reversal is sound, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury found that two negligent acts of the petitioner Railway Company were proximate causes of the collision. Those findings are unchallenged and need not be further noticed. It is the findings on issues of contributory negligence which were thought by the Court of Civil Appeals to be so conflicting as to form no sound basis for the trial court's judgment denying the plaintiff a recovery.

By way of defense to respondent's suit petitioner pleaded several acts of common law negligence and violation by Snider of Article 6701d, Sec. 86, paragraphs (c) and (d), Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, which reads as follows:

'Sec. 86. Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so safely when:

'(c) A railroad engine approaching within approximately fifteen hundred (1500) feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and such engine by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is an immediate hazard;

'(d) An approaching train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing.'

What we shall have to say in this opinion will be said in context with our analysis of the foregoing statute in Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. McFerrin, 291 S.W.2d 931.

The special issues submitting petitioner's statutory defenses are in substantial conformity with those suggested in 34 Texas Law Review 971 and are reflected in the following summary of the jury's findings: that the train was plainly visible (17) but it was not in hazardous proximity (18) to the crossing before Snider reached a point 15 feet from the nearest rail of the railroad track; that the train was within 1,500 feet of the crossing when Snider's truck was more than 15 feet and less than 50 feet from the nearest rail of the track (23), was emitting a signal audible at the crossing (24), and was in hazardous proximity to the crossing (25) before Snider reached a point 15 feet from the nearest rail of the track; that Snider stopped his truck within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail (26), but that after stopping he proceeded when he could not do so safely (27) and his act in so proceeding was a proximate cause of the collision (28).

A number of special issues were submitted covering petitioner's defenses based on common law negligence. Those having any material bearing on the question before us are indicated in the following summary of the jury's findings: that Snider saw the train before driving upon the track (38), and his act in thereafter driving upon the track constituted contributory negligence (39); that Snider heard the noise of the approaching train before attempting to drive across the track (43), and his act in thereafter attempting to drive across the track constituted contributory negligence (44); that the failure of Snider to stop his truck and wait for the train immediately before driving upon the track constituted contributory negligence (47).

The jury's answers to Special Issues 18 and 25 are obviously conflicting. In answer to Special Issue 18 the jury found that the train was not in hazardous proximity to the crossing before Snider reached a point 15 feet from the nearest rail of the railroad track and in answer to Special Issue 25 the jury found that the train was in hazardous proximity to the crossing before he reached a point 15 feet from the nearest rail of the railroad track. It was that conflict which prompted the Court of Civil Appeals to hold that the trial court's judgment could not stand.

(1, 2) A conflict in jury findings will not prevent the rendition of judgment and require a mistrial unless the findings, considered separately and taken as true, would compel the rendition of different judgments. Howard v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 473, 475, writ refused; Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456; Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991; Siratt v. Worth Construction Co., 154 Tex. 84, 273 S.W.2d 615, 616. Moreover, it is the duty of the courts to reconcile apparent conflicts in jury findings if that can reasonably be done. Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558; 41B Tex.Jur. 798.

(3, 4) The answers to Special Issues 18 and 25, as worded, have a bearing only on the statutory duties of Snider to stop within 50 feet and not less than 15 feet of the nearest rail of the railroad track and not to proceed until he could do so safely. If the train was in hazardous proximity to the crossing before he reached a point 15 feet from the nearest rail he was under a statutory duty to stop at not less than that distance. If the train was not in hazardous...