Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust

• Decision Date: 26 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 07–0945.,07–0945.
• Citation: 354 S.W.3d 384,54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1621
• Parties: TEXAS PARKS AND WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, Petitioner, v. The SAWYER TRUST, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

354 S.W.3d 384

54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1621

TEXAS PARKS AND WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, Petitioner,

v.The SAWYER TRUST, Respondent.

No. 07–0945.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Nov. 19, 2009.Decided Aug. 26, 2011.

Greg W. Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Kent C. Sullivan, 14th Court of Appeals, Jeffrey L. Rose, Attorney General of Texas, Karen Watson Kornell, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Liz Bills, David Preister, Office of the Attorney General, Kristofer S. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General, Austin, TX, for Texas Parks and Wildlife Department.

Jody G. Sheets, Law Office of Jody Sheets, Dallas, TX, for The Sawyer Trust.

William F. Warnick, Texas General Land Office, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas General Land Office.Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice JEFFERSON, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice MEDINA, Justice GREEN, Justice WILLETT, Justice GUZMAN, and Justice LEHRMANN joined.

This appeal involves the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction over a claim against the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department to determine whether the Salt Fork of the Red River is navigable. The Sawyer Trust sued the Department for a declaratory judgment that the river is not navigable and that the Trust owns the riverbed where it crosses the Trust's property in Donley County. The Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. After the Department took the position that the river was navigable—and the State therefore owned the riverbed—the Trust added a constitutional takings claim. The trial court denied the Department's plea and the court of appeals affirmed.

We hold that the Trust's claims for a declaratory judgment are barred by sovereign immunity and the Trust cannot assert a takings claim under these circumstances. We also hold, however, that the Trust is entitled to replead and attempt to assert an ultra vires claim against state officials if it chooses to do so. We reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

The State of Texas owns the soil underlying navigable streams.¹ Tex. Parks & Wild.Code § 1.011(c); Tex. Water Code § 11.021; see Maufrais v. State, 142 Tex. 559, 180 S.W.2d 144, 148 (1944); State v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 50 S.W.2d 1065, 1069 (1932). By statute, a “navigable stream” is “a stream which retains an average width of 30 feet from the mouth up.” Tex. Nat. Res.Code § 21.001(3). The taking of sand and gravel from state-owned waters and beds, including those of navigable streams, is regulated by the Department. Tex. Parks & Wild.Code § 1.011(d); Tex. Nat. Res.Code § 51.291; 31 Tex. Admin. Code § 69.101.

The Salt Fork of the Red River crosses property in Donley County owned by the Sawyer Trust. The Trust had an opportunity to sell sand and gravel from the streambed but was concerned that the Department would seek control of the property and interfere with the sale. See Tex. Parks & Wild.Code § 86.002(a); 31 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 69.104, 69.114(a). The Trust sued the Department ² for a declaratory judgment that the Salt Fork was not navigable.³ The Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction. It asserted that (1) the Trust had not pled a claim that fell within a waiver of sovereign immunity, and (2) the Trust's claims were not ripe because the Department had neither taken action contrary to the Trust's interests nor manifested any intent to do so.

Pursuant to agreement of the parties, and at the urging of the trial court, a surveyor from the General Land Office visited the streambed on the Trust property. He then filed a letter with the trial court setting out that his visit was “for the purpose of determining if the stream was statutorily navigable.” He concluded that the Salt Fork was navigable at the point where he measured it on the Trust's property. The Trust then amended its pleadings and added an allegation that the State's claim of navigability constituted a taking of its property under the federal and Texas Constitutions. The trial court denied the Department's plea to the jurisdiction.

The court of appeals affirmed. It held that a declaratory judgment action seeking the determination of a disputed fact issue—the navigability of the stream—is not a suit against the State that implicates sovereign immunity. 354 S.W.3d 489. The court of appeals concluded that although the declaratory action “may have the collateral consequence of resolving a factual dispute that impacts a claim being made by the State, it is not an action that is in essence one for the recovery of money from the State or for determination of title; therefore, legislative permission to prosecute is unnecessary.” Id. at 490.

The Department no longer urges its ripeness challenge to the Trust's claim: it maintains that the Salt Fork is navigable. Nevertheless, the Department asserts that sovereign immunity deprived the trial court of jurisdiction because (1) there is no general right to sue a State entity for a declaration of rights—such relief is available only in an ultra vires claim against a state official; (2) determination of whether a stream is navigable constitutes a determination of the State's title to property and sovereign immunity bars a suit that would have such an effect; and (3) the Trust's pleadings fail to state a constitutional takings claim. The Trust counters that the trial court had jurisdiction because the suit is (1) a permissible declaratory judgment action under the Texas Constitution; (2) an authorized declaratory judgment action to determine a boundary line as opposed to a trespass to try title suit to determine ownership rights; and (3) a constitutional takings claim because the State has destroyed value and use of the Trust's property. Alternatively, the Trust argues that if this suit involves an ultra vires claim that it should have brought against a governmental actor, we should remand the case with instructions to modify the parties.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002).

Generally, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over a lawsuit in which a party has sued the State or a state agency unless the Legislature has consented to suit. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004). But when the State or a state agency has taken a person's property for public use, the State's consent to suit is not required; the Constitution grants the person consent to a suit for compensation. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex.2007); Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1980).

B. Declaratory Relief

The Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA) generally permits a person who is interested in a deed, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, to obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.004(a). The Department urges, however, that there is no general right to sue a state agency for a declaration of rights. We agree.

1. Actions Against State Entities

While the DJA waives sovereign immunity for certain claims, it is not a general waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. § 37.006(b); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n. 6 (Tex.2009) (noting that the DJA waives immunity for claims challenging the validity of ordinances or statutes); IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855–56. But generally, the DJA does not alter a trial court's jurisdiction. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. Rather, the DJA is “merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction.” Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.1993). And a litigant's couching its requested relief in terms of declaratory relief does not alter the underlying nature of the suit. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 370–71; IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. Consequently, sovereign immunity will bar an otherwise proper DJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against the State for which the Legislature has not waived sovereign immunity. See City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828–29 (Tex.2007) (per curiam).

The Trust argues that sovereign immunity does not apply because the Department acted outside its legal authority when it asserted the Salt Fork was navigable and the State owned the streambed. We disagree—the Department is immune from suit.

The rule remains as it was set out in State v. Lain:

When in this state the sovereign is made a party defendant to a suit for land, without legislative consent, its plea to the jurisdiction of the court based on sovereign immunity should be sustained....

162 Tex. 549, 349 S.W.2d 579, 582 (1961). Neither Heinrich nor the DJA creates an exception to a state agency's immunity in suits for title to land. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 370–73. If the Trust's suit against the Department is in substance a trespass to try title action, it is barred by sovereign immunity absent the Legislature's having waived its immunity. See Lain, 349 S.W.2d at 582.

2. Contesting Title with the State

Generally, a trespass to try title claim is the exclusive method in Texas for adjudicating disputed claims of title to real property. See Tex. Prop.Code § 22.001(a) (“A trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property.”); Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 267 (Tex.2004). “Real property” generally includes the sand and gravel on a tract of land, see, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.1984), and in this case the Department does not claim otherwise.

In 2007, the Texas Legislature added an exception to the rule that a trespass to try title claim is the exclusive method for adjudicating disputed claims of title to real property. Section...