Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Knighten, 14676.
| Decision Date | 30 March 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 14676.,14676. |
| Citation | 186 S.W.2d 843 |
| Parties | TEXAS PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. v. KNIGHTEN. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2, Tarrant County; Thomas J. Renfro, Judge.
Action by J. F. Knighten against Texas Prudential Insurance Company to recover double indemnity benefits under life policy. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Cantey, Hanger, McMahon, McKnight & Johnson, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
Todd, Crowley & Gambill, of Fort Worth, for appellee.
Appellee J. F. Knighten sued appellant Texas Prudential Insurance Company to recover on a policy issued by the insurance company on the life of Oliver Letson who died on November 8, 1943, as a result of gunshot wounds.
The nature of the policy was such that in case of death from any cause the beneficiary should receive $138 and if death resulted from bodily injuries, "solely through external, violent and accidental means," the company would pay double death benefits, that is, the amount of the face of the policy plus an equal amount to that promised on account of death from any cause. The policy contained an exception relating to accidental death, substantially in this language: "No accidental death benefit will be paid if the death of the insured resulted from * * * injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured by himself or any other person. * * *"
The pleadings reveal that appellee had made proof of death and that the company admitted liability to the extent of $138, the amount payable upon the death of insured, and tendered payment of that amount; it kept the tender good at all times. The beneficiary rejected the $138 and claimed the double death benefit; when the company declined payment as demanded, suit was filed for the double death benefit and for penalty and attorney's fees.
The insurance company specially pleaded the provisions of the policy relating to death from injuries intentionally inflicted and alleged that the insured's death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by another party.
The court in his charge gave a definition of the term "accidental means" and no objection was urged thereto. By answer to the first special issue the jury found from a preponderance of the evidence that the insured lost his life solely through external, violent and accidental means. Special issue No. 2 reads: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Oliver Letson died of injuries intentionally inflicted upon him?" Answer: "No." By 3rd issue it was found that $100 was a reasonable attorney's fee for plaintiff's counsel in the case.
Judgment was entered for appellee for $409.12 shown by the judgment to be made up of $276, "being twice the face of the policy involved," $33.12 being penalty of 12 per cent of the first mentioned amount and for $100 attorney's fees found by the jury verdict.
Appellant's motion for new trial was overruled, to which action of the court it excepted and perfected this appeal.
Two points of error are presented and relied upon for reversal. In substance they are: (1) The court should have given appellant's requested peremptory instruction, and (2) court should have sustained its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. The reasons assigned for the points are because there was no evidence that insured did not die from injuries intentionally inflicted and because the evidence shows conclusively that insured died as a result of injuries intentionally inflicted upon him by another person.
The transcript does not show that any peremptory instruction for verdict was requested by appellant nor acted upon by the court; but insofar as this appeal is concerned we think appellant properly presents the same matter in its complaint of the overruling of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Appellant frankly says in its brief that: "The only point which is raised by this appeal is whether the deceased Oliver Letson was...
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