Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Services Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-3442.
Decision Date | 25 June 1990 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-3442. |
Citation | 740 F. Supp. 880 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | TEXAS RURAL LEGAL AID, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Paul Nielsen, Richard J. Oparil, Linda E. Perle, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Charles J. Cooper, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
Plaintiffs in this action are three independent local legal aid organizations participating in programs to assist the poor. Each receives funds from the defendant, Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), a non-profit District of Columbia corporation created by the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 et seq. (the "LSC Act"). Plaintiffs seek to set aside a Final Rule, published by LSC, 54 Fed.Reg. 31954 (Aug. 3, 1989) (the "Final Rule"), that prohibits them from participating in redistricting cases approved by their respective boards under the statutory scheme. Cross-motions for summary judgment have been thoroughly documented, briefed and argued.
The Court has jurisdiction
LSC asserts that it is accountable only to Congress and challenges the Court's jurisdiction to review its actions. However, the Court holds that it has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This holding is amply supported by rulings in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., San Juan Legal Services, Inc. v. Legal Services Corp., 655 F.2d 434 (1st Cir.1981); Spokane County Legal Services, Inc. v. Legal Services Corp., 614 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.1980); National Paralegal Institute v. Legal Services Corp., C.A. No. 76-1260 (D.D.C. August 12, 1976). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has assumed, without directly addressing the point, that such jurisdiction exists. National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Inc. v. Legal Services Corp., 674 F.Supp. 37 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd mem., 861 F.2d 303 (D.C.Cir. 1988).1
Each of the plaintiffs represents clients in current, ongoing redistricting cases which are prohibited by the challenged Final Rule.
The statutory scheme
Before directly addressing the merits, it is necessary to emphasize the nature of the underlying statutory scheme:
First, there can be no dispute as to the intended purpose of the LSC Act. Congress sought to provide "financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a). This purpose is developed and explicated fully by a series of congressional findings in the Act:
Second, it is apparent from the face of the statute that, prior to adoption of the Final Rule, LSC-funded organizations were not prohibited from accepting redistricting cases as a means of effectuating these broad purposes. Congress itself chose in the exercise of its legislative authority to specify the categories or types of activities prohibited under the LSC Act. The statute specifically provides, at § 2996f(b) that LSC shall not make available funds for ten categories of activities:
(1) certain fee-generating cases;
(2) felony criminal cases;
(3) habeas corpus-type cases;
(4) (A) political activity, (B) transporting voters to polls or "similar assistance in connection with an election (other than legal advice and representation)," and (C) "any voter registration activity (other than legal advice and representation)";
(5) grants or contracts with certain private law firms;
(6) training programs for the purpose of advocating political or labor activity, except that this provision "shall not be construed to prohibit" training of attorneys to prepare them to provide legal assistance;
(7) formation or organization of any association, "except that this provision shall not be construed to prohibit" provision of legal assistance;
(8) most abortion cases;
(9) school desegregation cases, "except that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit" counseling clients as to their legal rights; and
(10) most Selective Service cases.
Subsequent to enactment of the LSC Act, Congress has continued to determine what types of litigation are inappropriate for recipients by enacting further case type restrictions in LSC appropriations acts. These presently include bans on class action suits under certain circumstances, lobbying not focused on the specific legal needs of clients, and legal assistance to certain classes of aliens. See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 1032-37 (1989).
In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a), LSC is charged with insuring that no LSC funds are expended to influence legislation or executive orders except where (a) such action is necessary to the provision of legal services affecting a client's legal rights and responsibilities; (b) where a government body or officials requests assistance or testimony; or (c) where government is considering a measure directly affecting LSC or recipient activities. LSC is also specifically charged with insuring recipient compliance with the "political activity" and voting restrictions contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(4) and described above. Thus to the extent LSC itself is mentioned in these case restriction provisions it is only authorized to effectuate specific congressional goals, none of which suggest the authority to ban redistricting cases. Indeed, the prohibitions of § 2996f(b)(4) specifically exempt the provision of legal services from the bans on recipient involvement in voting activities.
At no time has Congress taken any action to bar redistricting activities. Moreover, it is apparent from the record that redistricting litigation can in particular circumstances affirmatively effectuate the overall congressional purpose of providing legal aid to the poor. See note 4, infra, and Memorandum on Behalf of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
Third, Congress recognized from the outset that the purposes of the LSC Act could best be advanced by local organizations which would guide case selection so as to focus on particular problems of special consequence in respective areas of the country. Thus it is not surprising that redistricting litigation has been considered significant in some localities and not others, as is the case with other forms of legal work within the limits set by the statute. Indeed, the special role of the local organizations in shaping the focus of LSC-assisted efforts in a manner best suited to accomplish the goals of the LSC Act has been repeatedly recognized and emphasized.
42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
The difference between this present language of section 2996f(a)(2)(C) and the provision as originally enacted in 1974 suggests a deliberate effort to make clear that recipients, not LSC, have control over the types of cases to be accepted. LSC was left with the task of establishing goals for adopting and insuring that recipients adopted procedures by which recipients would themselves set priorities. At most LSC retains an advisory role with respect to the substance of caseload priorities while recipient organizations hold actual decision-making power.
The committee reports accompanying the 1977 amendment make clear that this interpretation is correct. The House report states:
Reference to goals that may be established by the Corporation permits the Corporation to set as goals the provision of legal assistance in the most effective manner, or so as to have the greatest effect on the problems of poor people, or other similar goals. The reference...
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Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Services Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-3442.
...for summary judgment and the Court found the regulation clearly contrary to LSC's authority. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Services Corporation, 740 F.Supp. 880 (D.D.C.1990). The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 940 F.2d 685 (D.C.Cir.1991). When the mandate was return......