Texas Ry Co v. Anderson
Decision Date | 01 May 1893 |
Docket Number | No. 1,312,1,312 |
Citation | 37 L.Ed. 717,13 S.Ct. 843,149 U.S. 237 |
Parties | TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. ANDERSON et al |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER:
On September 13, 1888, judgment was rendered in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas against John C. Brown and Lionel A. Sheldon, as receivers of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, in favor of Ida May Cox, for $10,000, with interest from date at 8 per cent. per annum, the then rate of interest in Texas, 'to be paid in due course of their administration of their receivership.' Sheldon having resigned as receiver, and his resignation having been accepted, Brown, as sole receiver, prosecuted a writ of error from this court, and gave a supersedeas bond. While the writ of error was pending, the receiver made known to the circuit court that the objects and purposes contemplated in the several proceedings under which he had been appointed had been accomplished by settlement and agreement of the parties, and he was thereupon discharged as receiver, and the property restored to the company. Subsequently, and before the case came on for hearing, the receiver died. Thereafter defendant in error filed a motion in this court to have the railroad company substituted in place of the receiver, and an order of substitution was entered by this court upon suggestion of the discharge and death of said receiver.
At the time of that order a stipulation, signed by counsel on both sides, was filed, which read as follows: 'That the said Texas and Pacific Railway Company may be substituted as plaintiff in error in the above-entitled cause, now pending and undetermined upon writ of error in this court, such substitution, however, not to affect any of the questions or controversies presented by the record herein, and the questions and controversies presented by the record are to stand for the decision of this court the same as if said substitution had not been made.'
The cause having been argued, the judgment was affirmed, May 16, 1892. Railway Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 601, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905.
On May 19, 1892, the mandate of this court was issued, directed to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas, which, after reciting the judgment of that court against the receivers, and the writ of error prosecuted by the remaining receiver, proceeded thus:
'And whereas, at the October term, A. D. 1889, of said supreme court, the discharge of John C. Brown as receiver of the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, and also his death having been suggested, it was ordered that the Texas and Pacific Railway Company be made the party plaintiff in error in this cause;
'And whereas, in the present term of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one, the said cause came on to be heard before the said supreme court on the said transcript of record, and was argued by counsel:
'You, therefore, are hereby commanded that such execution and proceedings be had in said cause as according to right and justice and the laws of the United States ought to be had, the said writ of error notwithstanding.'
Pending the writ of error, the defendant, Ida May Cox, intermarried with one Scott Anderson. Upon reception of the mandate, execution was issued by the clerk of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company for the full amount of the judgment, with 8 per cent. interest and costs. The company thereupon filed its bill against the marshal in whose hands the execution had been placed, asking that he be restrained from levying the same, upon the ground that there was no judgment to support the execution. A restraining order was granted, which was continued in force until November 22, 1892, when it was dissolved. On that day Mr. and Mrs. Anderson filed a motion that execution should issue in their names aganist the defendant company. This motion was resisted, but the objections of the company thereto were overruled, and the court entered an order directing the clerk to record the mandate, and to issue execution against the company for the sum recovered, with interest at 8 per cent. from the date...
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