Texas v. Lesage
| Decision Date | 29 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1111.,98-1111. |
| Citation | 528 U.S. 18 |
| Parties | TEXAS et al. v. LESAGE et al. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Respondent François Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, applied for admission to the Ph.D. program in counseling psychology at the University of Texas' Department of Education for the 1996-1997 academic year. In the year Lesage applied, the school received 223 applications for the program and offered admission to roughly 20 candidates. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22. It is undisputed that the school considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the review process. The school rejected Lesage's application and offered admission to at least one minority candidate. Lesage filed suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief. He alleged that, by establishing and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process, the school had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. III), and 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d.
Petitioners sought summary judgment, offering evidence that, even if the school's admissions process had been completely colorblind, Lesage would not have been admitted. At least 80 applicants had higher undergraduate grade point averages (GPA's) than Lesage, 152 applicants had higher Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores, and 73 applicants had both higher GPA's and higher GRE scores. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-23. In an affidavit, Professor Ricardo Ainslie, one of two members of the school's admissions committee, stated that Lesage's personal statement indicated that he had "`a rather superficial interest in the field with a limited capacity to convey his interests and ideas,' " and that his letters of recommendation were "weak." Id., at A-24. Ainslie stated that Lesage's application was rejected early in the review process, when the committee was winnowing the full application pool to a list of 40. Ibid. The District Court concluded that "any consideration of race had no effect on this particular individual's rejection," and that there was "uncontested evidence that the students ultimately admitted to the program had credentials that the committee considered superior to Plaintiff's." Id., at A-26 to A-27. It therefore granted summary judgment for petitioners with respect to all of Lesage's claims for relief.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 158 F. 3d 213 (1998). The court did not review the District Court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue as to whether the school would have rejected Lesage under a colorblind admissions process. Instead, it held that such a determination was "irrelevant to the pertinent issue on summary judgment, namely, whether the state violated Lesage's constitutional rights by rejecting his application in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admissions program." Id., at 222. An applicant who was rejected at a stage of the review process that was race conscious, the court reasoned, has "suffered an implied injury"— the inability to compete on an equal footing. Ibid. Because there remained a factual dispute as to whether the stage of review during which Lesage's application was eliminated was in some way race conscious, the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case for trial. Ibid.
Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate on Lesage's § 1983 action seeking damages for the school's rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if petitioners conclusively established that Lesage would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy, its decision is inconsistent with this Court's well-established framework for analyzing such claims. Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration. See id., at 287. See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 593 (1998); Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 675 (1996). Our previous decisions on this point have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination, but that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the same: The government can avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive.
Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an...
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