Texas v. Mead

• Decision Date: 21 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-791,83-791
• Parties: TEXAS v. Jimmy Lloyd MEAD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

465 U.S. 1041

104 S.Ct. 1318

79 L.Ed.2d 714

TEXAS

v Jimmy Lloyd MEAD

No. 83-791

Supreme Court of the United States

February 21, 1984

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice STEVENS, respecting the denial of certiorari.

The question that Justice REHNQUIST now believes merits review—the proper standard of review concerning a Witherspoon ruling—was extensively analyzed by the Court of Appeals and presented in the petition for certiorari in O'Brien v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365 (CA5 1983), cert. denied sub nom., O'Brien v. McKaskle, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1015, 78 L.Ed.2d ---- (1984).¹ That question is not, however, presented by the State of Texas in its certiorari petition in this case.² Since the question Justice REHNQUIST has discussed at such length "was neither presented to the [Texas] court[ ] nor presented to this Court in the petition for certiorari," Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 120, 102 S.Ct. 869, 879, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (BURGER, C.J., joined by WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting),³ and since Jus- tice REHNQUIST by not discussing the question that is presented, apparently agrees that it does not merit review, see, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227, 45 S.Ct. 496, 497, 69 L.Ed. 925 (1925) ("We do not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts"); see also Valencia v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S.Ct. 385, 78 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), I simply note that the Court's decision to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case is demonstrably consistent with the principles which inform our exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.

Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justice O'CONNOR join, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Respondent Mead was convicted by a jury of the capital offense of murdering a police officer acting in the line of duty. He was sentenced to death. On appeal, Mead argued that some veniremen were improperly excluded from the jury because of their opposition to the death penalty. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, with four judges dissenting, conducted a de novo review of the voir dire examination of one of the excluded veniremen and agreed with respondent. Mead v. State, 645 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (en banc ).¹ The court gave no deference to the judgment of the trial court that the juror was unalterably opposed to the death penalty and would purposely bias his answers accordingly. Because of the substantial disarray among state and federal appellate courts as to the degree of deference, if any, due to a trial court's determination that a juror may be excluded for cause under Witherspoon, I would grant certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and review the case.²

In Witherspoon, 391 U.S., at 522, 88 S.Ct., at 1777, we held that a venireman cannot be excluded for cause in a capital case simply because he voices "general objections" to the death penalty or expresses "conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." Provided the venireman is willing to fulfill his oath as a juror and consider the full range of penalties provided by state law, he may not be disqualified on account of his beliefs. We stressed, however, that the State is not disabled from challenging jurors for cause when they make it clear that they would "vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings." Id., at 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1777, n. 21. In subsequent cases we have reaffirmed that the State has a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who will consider and decide the facts impartially and faithfully apply the law as charged by the court. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2527, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596-597, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2960-2961, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 1141, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969).

As a result of Witherspoon and these later cases, trial courts are faced with the difficult task of distinguishing between a venireman so unalterably opposed to the death penalty as to be unable to apply the law impartially and one who, despite his objections, will conscientiously seek to apply the law in accordance with the facts developed at trial. We have mandated this inquiry; but we have failed to articulate any standard of review for alleged Witherspoon violations. We have failed to explain whether a trial court's determination that a given venireman may be excluded for cause under Witherspoon should be reversed only if, like other factual determinations, it is clearly erroneous or whether an appellate court must examine the transcript of the voir dire and draw its own conclusions, with no deference accorded the trial court's judgment.³ The result, predictably, has been near chaos throughout the state and federal appellate courts.

A review of the decisions of twenty States which have grappled with the application of Witherspoon ⁴ shows that appellate courts in seven of those States grant trial courts considerable discretion in excusing jurors based on their opposition to the death penalty and will disturb such rulings only for a clear abuse of discretion.⁵ Six States, including Texas, grant no leeway whatsoever to the trial court. The appellate courts conduct their own review of the record and make their own de novo determination of the propriety of any exclusions.⁶ The other seven States, without explicitly mentioning any standard, also appear to engage in de novo review, combing the record for errors with no mention of, or deference to, the trial court's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the veniremen and hear the tenor of their responses.⁷

The degree of confusion and the number of conflicting decisions among the state courts on such an important issue of federal constitutional law are troublesome, to say the least. This same disarray exists in federal courts entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently split three ways on the question.⁸ And the Eleventh Circuit reached opposite results on the proper standard of review in two recent cases and has granted rehearing en banc in one of the cases to consider the issue.⁹ I believe this Court has an obligation to clarify its holding in Witherspoon and to resolve these conflicts.

Obviously, there is no simple litmus test for determining when a juror would automatically vote against imposition of the death penalty or be unable to make an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Of necessity, therefore, the voir dire examination of veniremen in capital cases has become an elaborate and frustrating process. The instant case demonstrates both the difficult position of the trial court and the need for a uniform standard of review of alleged Witherspoon violations.

Venireman Arturo Espindola was excluded from the jury based on the following interchange with the State's attorney: ¹⁰

"Q. Is this belief—you don't believe in the death sentence—as your being part of the jury that would have to inflict the death penalty?

"A. Sir, I don't believe in the death penalty.

"Q. At all?

"A. At all.

* * * * * "Q. And, you could not vote for the death penalty in a case no matter how horrible the facts were?

"A. No, sir, I could not vote for the death penalty.

"Q. . . . [Y]ou are irrevocably committed before the trial begins to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances because of your belief?

"A. That's right."

The State's attorney then explained to Espindola the Texas procedures for capital cases. The guilt and punishment phases are separated, and in the punishment phase the jury never votes directly to impose the death sentence. The jury is instead asked three questions about the nature of the crime and the probability of future violence by the defendant. If the jury answers "yes" to all three questions, the judge must impose the death penalty. Texas Code Crim.Pro.Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon). After explaining these procedures and reading the questions to the venireman, the questioning continued.

"Q. Because you don't believe in the death penalty, then would you automatically vote no to these questions no matter what the facts were to keep the man from getting a death sentence?

"A. I imagine I would.

"Q. All right. Because of your beliefs?

"A. Yes, because of my beliefs.

"Q. And, your beliefs would have a—would enter into these deliberations because you just don't believe in it, and you could not vote yes and you would vote no, is that right?

"A. That's right."

Defense counsel then sought to rehabilitate Espindola on cross-examination.

"Q. And, if the State—the next thing I'll ask you before we get the effect is I will ask you—assume, if you will with me, that the prosecutors prove to you beyond any reasonable doubt that the evidence is there and the questions in your mind, you're convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the questions should be answered yes, okay?

"A. Yes, I understand.

"Q. And, you're convinced of that in your mind beyond any reasonable doubt that the answers should be yes, okay?

"A. Yes, I understand.

"Q. And, would you be untruthful in your answers intentionally and would you just deliberately answer the question untruthful—untruthfully or would you answer the question according to what the evidence showed, according to your oath as a juror? Would you just intentionally and deliberately answer the question untruthfully?

"A. No, I would not.

* * * * *

"Q. So, you wouldn't answer it untruthfully?

"A. I would not answer untruthfully, no way.

"Q. ...