Texas Workers' Compensation Com'n v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 11 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-91-00565-CV,04-91-00565-CV |
| Citation | 862 S.W.2d 61 |
| Parties | TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al., Appellants, v. Hector GARCIA, Jr., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
In this declaratory judgment action, the trial court declared the 1989 Workers' Compensation Act (the Act 1) unconstitutional. We are called upon in this appeal to review that decision. Before we reach the constitutional issues, we must decide whether a justiciable controversy exists. We must also determine whether plaintiffs' suit against the state defendants is barred by sovereign immunity. We find that a justiciable controversy exists at least as to some of the plaintiffs, and that the suit is not barred by sovereign immunity. We further hold that the Act is unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs filed suit in Maverick County on November 30, 1990 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Act took effect January 1, 1991. Defendants are Eagle Pass Auto Electric, 2 the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, and George Chapman in his capacity as executive director of the commission. The Texas Association of Compensation Consumers, Inc., Klinck Globe, Inc., Klinck Drug Store, Inc., and La Esquina were added to the suit as intervenors on the side of the defendants.
Following a temporary injunction hearing in December, 1990, the trial court granted temporary injunctive relief against defendants on the ground that certain provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The merits were tried without a jury. The court signed the final judgment on May 22, 1991, declaring large portions of the Act unconstitutional. The court found that the unconstitutional portions could not be severed from the Act in its entirety, and accordingly declared the entire Act unconstitutional. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed.
Defendants sought to perfect a direct appeal to the supreme court, but the supreme court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Defendants then perfected their appeal to this court.
Defendants' initial argument is that none of the plaintiffs have standing because none have suffered an injury under the Act. They argue, therefore, that the trial court's opinion is advisory and that that court, and this one, lack jurisdiction of this suit.
It is fundamental that a court has no jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion on a controversy that is not yet ripe, or to decide a case on speculative, hypothetical, or contingent fact situations. Camarena v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988). Standing requires some interest peculiar to the person individually and not as a member of the general public. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.1984). As an aspect of justiciability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff has such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
The purpose of a declaratory judgment "is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and it is to be liberally construed and administered." TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1986). A person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute "may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 1986). A declaratory judgment "is an instrumentality to be wielded in the interest of preventative justice and its scope should be kept wide and liberal, and should not be hedged about by technicalities." Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1945). It "is intended as a speedy and effective remedy for the determination of the rights of the parties when a real controversy has arisen and even before the wrong has actually been committed." Id.
The essential difference between the declaratory judgment and the purely advisory opinion lies in the fact that the former is a binding adjudication of the contested rights of the litigants, though unaccompanied by consequential relief; whereas, the latter is merely the opinion of the judges or court, adjudicates nothing, and is binding on no one.
Douglas Oil Co. v. State, 81 S.W.2d 1064, 1077 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1935), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Federal Royalty Co. v. State, 128 Tex. 324, 98 S.W.2d 993 (1936).
As a prerequisite to the declaratory judgment process, there must be a real controversy between the parties, which will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought. Board of Water Eng'rs v. City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. 111, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1955). Chief Justice Hughes set out what is perhaps the classic definition of "controversy" in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth:
A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award of process or the payment of damages.
300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1936) (citations omitted).
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III [of the United States Constitution] requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (citations omitted).
With these rules in mind, we will review the situation of each plaintiff in turn.
Hector Garcia, Jr. is an employee of Eagle Pass Auto Electric in Eagle Pass, Texas. Eagle Pass was a subscriber under the former Act, and Garcia is currently covered by the company's workers' compensation carrier. Garcia testified that he does not wish to be covered by the Act. He is not claiming a compensable injury. The court found that Garcia "will be immediately and irreparably harmed on and after January 1, 1991 by losing his rights to workers' compensation benefit coverage under the old workers' compensation law; by not having similar rights under the [new] Act; and by having no right of election except by resigning his job with Defendant Eagle Pass." (citations omitted).
Defendants assert that Garcia has failed to establish standing because he has not yet been injured. They indicate he may have a complaint regarding coverage under the Act "if and when he is injured." Because we find that as an employee working for a subscribing employer that elected to continue purchasing workers' compensation coverage after January 1, 1991, Garcia has no right to elect common law rights and remedies, he has been injured in this respect by the provisions of the Act. We hold that Garcia has standing to bring this challenge to the constitutionality of the Act.
John Ira Fuller was employed by General Motors in Arlington, Texas, although at the time of the hearings the plant was temporarily shut down. He is a member of the United Auto Workers union, a union affiliated with the Texas AFL-CIO. He suffers from an occupational disease to his knees caused by repetitious physical trauma. He alleged that under the terms of the Act, the period during which he must report his injury and file a claim for compensation has already elapsed, and he is ineligible to recover any benefits under the Act, even though his occupational disease will eventually disable him.
Fuller had surgery on both knees in 1983 or 1984. His doctor told him that he could no longer perform his job, but Fuller said he was refused medical retirement by General Motors and had to return to work. His medical condition will continue to be aggravated by the type of work he does. He filed a claim on the injury under the former Act and settled it in 1986. He has approximately four years of future medical benefits remaining under the settlement.
The court found that under the Act the period during which Fuller "must file a claim for compensation has already elapsed, and he will be potentially ineligible to recover any benefits when his repetitive trauma disables him." The court found that Fuller's injury will "in all likelihood disable him from performing his ordinary tasks as a worker for General Motors" and that he "probably will have no right to obtain medical benefits, disability benefits, or impairment benefits under the Act."
Defendants attack Fuller's...
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