Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co.

• Decision Date: 05 June 1961
• Docket Number: No. 8189.,8189.
• Citation: 291 F.2d 894
• Parties: TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL UNION NO. 1386, Appellant, v. AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY, Clover, South Carolina, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

291 F.2d 894 (1961)

TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL UNION NO. 1386, Appellant, v. AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY, Clover, South Carolina, Appellee.

No. 8189.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

June 5, 1961.

Theodore W. Law, Jr., Columbia, S. C. (Henry W. Kirkland, Columbia, S. C., and Benjamin Wyle, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

Frank A. Constangy, Atlanta, Ga. (Constangy & Prowell, Atlanta, Ga., Perrin & Perrin, Spartanburg, S. C., and Fred W. Elarbee, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges.

BOREMAN, Circuit Judge.

In the present appeal, which is the second taken by the union in this labor arbitration case, it is asserted that the District Court erred in refusing to require the employer to comply with an arbitration award.

D. M. Arrowood, an employee of the American Thread Company, was discharged on November 11, 1957, for allowing, in the words of the company, "a cotton lap to run through a carding machine which he was supposed to be tending without properly straightening or tending to the lap or feeding in another lap so as to avoid damage to the machine or waste of production." On two earlier occasions he had been reprimanded and was given what was determined to be a customary warning for similar offenses. Arrowood filed a grievance against the company, maintaining that he was unjustly discharged, although he did not deny letting the lap run through.

There was full compliance with the preliminary grievance procedures prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the Textile Workers Union. However, as these steps failed to effect a satisfactory resolution of the grievance in accordance with the contract provisions, the union requested arbitration. The company agreed to arbitrate, the parties stipulated the terms of the submission of the dispute and a hearing was held. The arbitrator pointed out that there was no question of Arrowood's guilt, since he did not deny the offense charged, but held that the offense did not amount to just cause for discharge. His award ordered suspension without pay for one week commencing November 11, 1957, and thereafter reinstatement without loss of seniority or other rights. He also awarded the employee back wages after the termination of the one week suspension, but limited to a maximum period of ninety days.

When the company refused to abide by the award, the union instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina, seeking to compel compliance. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and the union's first appeal followed. This court remanded, 4 Cir., 271 F.2d 277, stating:

"This case presents substantially the same question decided by this court in Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation v. United Steel Workers, 4 Cir., 1959, 269 F.2d 327, and Textile Workers Union of America v. Cone Mills Corp., 4 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 920. * * *

"Inasmuch as we decided Enterprise Wheel and Cone Mills after the District Court\'s decision in this case, we think the appropriate action here is to remand the case to the District Court for reconsideration in light of our opinions in Enterprise Wheel and Cone Mills."

On remand, the District Court again declined to order enforcement of the award, and the union again appealed.

A preliminary question concerns the District Court's jurisdiction to enforce the award. When this court remanded, its opinion observed that there might possibly be a difference between this case and the Cone Mills and Enterprise Wheel decisions with respect to the rights of individual employees to control the processing of grievances. Of course, in calling attention to this possibility we did not intend to rule in advance that there was a significant difference or what its legal effect would be. Upon remand, the employer renewed its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court, pointing out that employees could individually present their grievances in accordance with the grievance provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, expressed the view that under the Supreme Court's decision in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1955, 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 489, 99 L.Ed. 510, the court did lack jurisdiction. However, instead of dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, the court proceeded to consider whether the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of the submission, and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, apparently on the latter ground.

In its brief, The American Thread Company argues lack of jurisdiction, although in oral argument it seemed to concede that jurisdiction existed. We think that there can be no doubt that the District Court had jurisdiction. Westinghouse was not a suit to enforce an arbitration agreement in a collective bargaining contract but a union's undertaking to recover back wages due individual employees. Here, we are dealing with a promise by the employer, in a contract with the union, to arbitrate. Unless the matter sought to be arbitrated falls outside the subject matter of the submission, the District Court has jurisdiction under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, to enforce both the promise to arbitrate and the promise to abide by the arbitrator's award. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 1957, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 923, 1 L.Ed.2d 972; Textile Workers Union of America v. Cone Mills Corp., 4 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 920, certiorari denied 361 U.S. 886, 80 S.Ct. 157, 4 L.Ed.2d 121.¹

On examination of the grievance procedure in this collective bargaining agreement, it is found to be not particularly unusual. Article VI provides a four step procedure for processing grievances. The first two steps permit either the employee and/or his union representative to bring a grievance before certain company officials. The third step, in the event the first two fail to bring a settlement, is for the Union Shop Committee to submit the grievance to the company. The fourth relates to grievances filed by the company against the union. Article VII of the contract then makes provision for arbitration in the event that disputes or grievances are "not satisfactorily adjusted under the Grievance Procedure set out in the preceding section." This is one continuous process, leading to arbitration, and the many decisions, beginning with Lincoln Mills, supra, holding that such provisions are enforceable in the courts, leave no room to question the District Court's jurisdiction.

The union maintains, in accordance with the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement, that whether particular conduct constituted just cause for discharge is a question that may be submitted to arbitration. The company, on the other hand, contends that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that the award here was in violation of the contract and the terms of the submission. In arriving at our ultimate conclusions, we are not unmindful of certain principles which are hereinafter noted.

Even in earlier days when courts were less hospitable to arbitration, it was decided that they would not set aside an arbitrator's award for mere errors of fact or law; and mistakes in the admission of evidence or misinterpretation of the contract giving rise to the arbitration would not vitiate the award. It was only where the arbitrator clearly went beyond the scope of the submission that courts would interfere. Burchell v. Marsh et al., 1854, 17 How. 344, 15 L. Ed. 96. Later decisions are to the same effect: Georgia & F. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 5 Cir., 1914, 217 F. 755; Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, 4 Cir., 1935, 74 F.2d 533; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. United Casualty Co., 1 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 390; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corporation, 4 Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 746.

While these principles have met with general acceptance, factual situations do arise where it may be a close question whether the arbitrator actually exceeded his authority, or merely committed what a court might deem error of law or fact. Three recent decisions of the Supreme Court involving labor arbitration agreements, without departing from the above stated principles, have clarified the role of courts in such close cases when dealing with collective bargaining contracts. See: United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 1960, 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1363, 4 L.Ed.2d 1432; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 1960, 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1409, and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 1960, 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424.² In these cases, the court reaffirmed the long established doctrine that an arbitration award is unenforceable if it exceeds the scope of the submission,³ although where it is not "apparent that he the arbitrator went beyond the submission," courts should enforce the promise to arbitrate.

We now look to the terms and conditions of submission to arbitration and certain pertinent provisions of the contract, all of which, in our opinion, should be read and considered together in determining the real question here presented.

The stipulation for arbitration is as follows:

"Under the terms of the contract and within the limits of those terms, including the restrictions on the power of the arbitrator, does Grievance 157 allege, and has the union proved, a violation of the contract? If so, and within the same limitations, what should be the remedy?" (Emphasis here and in the quoted contract provisions is supplied.)

Article III of the collective bargaining agreement, titled "Management Rights," contains the following provisions:

"It is agreed that, except as expressly limited or modified in this Agreement, the Company has the right of

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