Thacker Coal & Coke Co v. Burke
Decision Date | 06 March 1906 |
Citation | 53 S.E. 161,59 W. Va. 253 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | THACKER COAL & COKE CO. v. BURKE et al. |
One who maliciously entices a servant in actual service of a master to desert and quit his service is liable to action therefor.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 34, Cent. Dig. Master and Servant, § 1283.]
If one wantonly and maliciously, whether for his own benefit or not, induces a person to violate his contract with a third person, to the injury of that third person, it is actionable.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 34, Cent. Dig. Master and Servant, § 1283.]
Persons who conspire to induce others to break a valid contract between other persons are liable to action therefor.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 10, Cent. Dig. Conspiracy, § 9; vol. 34, Cent. Dig. Master and Servant, § 1283.]
The act found in Code 1899, § 14, appendix, p. 1053, does not authorize any individual, or number of individuals, to malicious-ly entice servants to desert service in which they are engaged, or to prevent them from engaging in such service under a contract for such service.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 34, Cent. Dig. Master and Servant, § 1283.]
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error to Circuit Court, Mingo County.
Action by the Thacker Coal & Coke Company against Charles Burke and others. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Rucker, Anderson & Hughes and Sheppard & Goodykoontz, for plaintiff in error.
J. H. Gaines, J. L. Stafford, and Douglass W. Brown, for defendants in error.
The Thacker Coal & Coke Company filed a declaration in trespass on the case in the circuit court of Mingo county against Charles Burke and five others for damage for enticing servants from the plaintiff's service, which declaration upon demurrer was dismissed, and the company sued out a writ of error.
Certain legal principles control the case. In Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40 S. E. 591, 56 L. R. A. 804, 88 Am. St. Rep. 895, we find it stated, on authority there given, that "if one wantonly and maliciously, whether for his own benefit or not, induces a person to violate his contract with a third person to the injury of that third person, it is actionable." We find that holding confirmed in Angle v. Chicago Railway, 151 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 240, 38 L. Ed. 55, in the language following: If additional authority were needed for such a proposition of common sense and justice, see the case decided by the highest English tribunal in 1901, Quinn v. Leathern, App. Cases 1901, 495. What I have already said refers to contracts in general. As to the particular contract between master and servant, the law is, if possible, yet more decided. The common law says that one who causes a breach of that contract is liable to damages. It has been said by some that action in such case lies only by reason of the act of Parliament in the reign of Edward III, A. D. 1350, making the act of enticement of a servant from his employer wrongful. If so, we might hesitate in saying that it is actionable in West Virginia; but I assert, believing that I am supported by ample authority, that action is given in such case by the common law. So the text writers and courts treat it. In Comyns' Digest, title "Action on the Case, " A, p. 278, the common-law rule is thus stated: ''In all cases where a man has a temporal loss, or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an action upon the case to be repaired in damages." The Supreme Court of the United States in Angle v. Chicago Railway, cited, stated the rule thus: "Wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact Is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce an injury, an action on the case will lie." It is generally treated as a common-law cause of action. The general principle applicable to contracts in general would give action against a third party for wrongfully causing the breach of contract between master and servant; but as to this particular contract the law has been long settled.
I cite the following authorities: "It is well settled that any person who knowingly entices away the servant" of another, and thereby induces him to violate his contract with his master, or who thereby deprives the master of the services of one then actually in his service, whether under a contract to serve or not, is liable to the master for his actual loss therefrom. But in this action it is necessary to prove not only that the person employed was in the service of the plaintiff, but also that the defendant, knowing the fact, wrongfully Induced him to leave it. The intent of the defendant, and the natural or actual effect of its execution, is the gist of the action, and unless the declaration discloses that the act was done Intentionally or willfully, and that it actually did, or was calculated to, cause damage to the plaintiff, and that it was done without right or justifiable cause, no recovery can be had. Malice is Inferred from the wrongful character of the act, and the dec-claration or complaint must disclose such facts as support the inference. If a contract to serve is established, actual service under the contract need not be shown. It is enough to show that the defendant, with notice of the servant's contract obligation to the plaintiff, has persuaded him not to enter into the plaintiff's service under it." Wood, Master and Servant, §§ 230, 231. 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 1109. Jaggard on Torts, § 155. Blackstone, bk. 2, 142.
I deem It useless to occupy space by quotation from other text-books and decisions to prove the doctrine above stated. They all lay down the law to the same effect 2 Kin-kead on Torts, § 457; 3 Page on Contracts, §§ 1326, 1327; 11 Am. St. Rep. 378, 474, notes; Schouler on Domestic Relations, § 487; Moran v. Dunphy (Mass.) 59 N. E. 125, 52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St Rep. 289; Bowen v. Hall, 6 L. R. Q. B. D. 333; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Quinn v. Leathern, App. Cases 1901, 495; Taff Vale Co. v. Amalgamated Society, App. Cases 1901, 426. Hammon on Contracts, § 350, says:
The first count of the declaration alleges that the company is owner and...
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