Thacker v. State
Decision Date | 19 April 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 65--593,65--593 |
Citation | 185 So.2d 202 |
Parties | Ray Charles THACKER, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ray Charles Thacker, Jr., in pro. per.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Arden M. Siegendorf, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before HENDRY, C.J., and CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.
This is an appeal from a summary denial of the defendant's motion for relief brought pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule Number One, F.S.A. Chapter 924, Appendix.
In March, 1963, the defendant was convicted on the charge of assault with intent to commit armed robbery and sentenced to a term of six months to five years. (Case No. 63--1881).
On April 8, 1964, the defendant escaped from the Division of Corrections and on October 26, 1964, he was arrested and charged with four counts of forgery and uttering a forged instrument and one count of breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony.
On January 12, 1965, the defendant, who was represented by counsel, charged his plea to guilty and was thereafter adjudged guilty and sentenced on each count for a term of 'seven (7) years, sentence to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Case No. 63--1881 by this court and credit to be given for time spent in the Dade County Jail and State Penitentiary prior to sentencing, to-wit: six hundred eighty-one (681) days.'
On January 28, 1965, the Division of Corrections notified the trial judge that their records show that the amount of credit given in the above cases was incorrect. It was their belief that the defendant should receive credit only from the time of his arrest on the current charges, October 26, 1964, to the date of sentencing, January 12, 1964, which amounted to seventy-eight days.
Thus, on February 3, 1965, the court vacated the sentences and resentenced the defendant on each count to an identical seven year term to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in case No. 63--1881 with a credit for time spent in the Dade County Jail prior to sentencing of seventy-eight (78) days.
The defendant alleges that he was not present at the time of resentencing and that this is a denial of due process of law.
It can not be ascertained from the record whether or not the defendant was present at the time of resentencing. It appears by implication that the defendant was present as the printed form upon which these sentences are transcribed contain a question which is to be propounded to the...
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Aguiar v. State, 93-1062
...v. State, 588 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (sentencing is critical stage where defendant has right to be present); Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (same). And, while at one time there was a conflict among the districts as to whether that right could be waived, see Capuzzo ......
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Quarterman v. State, 86-1641
...step in a criminal proceeding and the defendant must be present. (Waiver is recognized only in regard to misdemeanors.) Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.180. While Rule 3.180(b) makes provision for a trial to proceed to verdict if a defendant voluntarily a......
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Capuzzo v. State
...should not be allowed to thumb his nose at the court. The Wagner opinion relied on Quarterman, which in turn relied on Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) for the proposition that a defendant's voluntary and unexcused absence from a sentencing hearing cannot constitute a waiv......
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Scott v. State, 82-524
...language supports the State's position to the effect that it was not necessary for Scott to be present. Regardless, Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Walker v. State, 284 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); and McCrae v. State, 400 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), have held that i......