Thagard v. Lauber
| Decision Date | 03 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:16–CV–00299 EAW,1:16–CV–00299 EAW |
| Citation | 317 F.Supp.3d 669 |
| Parties | Jerome THAGARD, Plaintiff, v. Mark LAUBER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Patrick J. Brown, Losi & Gangi, Buffalo, NY, John J. Molloy, West Seneca, NY, for Plaintiff.
Robert Emmet Quinn, City of Buffalo Department of Law, Buffalo, NY for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jerome Thagard ("Plaintiff") commenced this civil rights action against former City of Buffalo Police Department Detective Mark Lauber ("Defendant"), alleging causes of action for malicious prosecution and the deprivation of his right to a fair trial pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant conducted materially defective identification procedures concerning two of the three eyewitnesses to the murder of Joseph Northrup ("Northrup") and then failed to disclose those defects, which resulted in Plaintiff's criminal prosecution and wrongful conviction at trial. (Id. ).
Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 22). Because there are issues of material fact for a jury to resolve, Defendant's motion is denied.
On the evening of April 29, 2009, sometime after 8:00 P.M., Northrup and his girlfriend, Suzanne Grover ("Grover"), engaged in a verbal altercation at their residence before Northrup fled the house and ran through the nearby housing projects. (Dkt. 22–15 at 92–95).1 Grover pursued him on foot. (Id. at 94–95). Northrup ran through a "big group of people" standing in the back of the housing projects, and then engaged in a conversation with another individual. (Id. at 96, 98). Grover disengaged her pursuit and left the housing projects. (Id. at 98). She then entered a green Jeep driven by her sister, Amanda Basile ("Basile"); Basile's friend, Christina Picone ("Picone"), and Grover's three-year-old son rode as passengers. (Id. at 98–99). Basile and Picone had followed Grover after she and Northrup fled from the residence. (Dkt. 22–18 at 13–14).2
After Basile, Picone, and Grover drove away, they soon spotted Northrup again, at which time Grover left the Jeep and once again gave chase into an empty lot. (Dkt. 22–15 at 99–100). Basile and Picone parked the Jeep in a nearby parking lot. (Dkt. 22–18 at 17–18). Suddenly, a male individual (the "shooter") ran up to the driver's side door, and asked Basile if everything was all right and whether he should "go over there and shoot [Northrup]." (Id. at 18). Basile and Picone both observed that the shooter was carrying a gun in his hands. (Id. at 20; see Dkt. 22–17 at 17).3 Basile was confused by the shooter's question, and before she could fully react, the shooter began to run towards Grover and Northrup. (Dkt. 22–18 at 21). Basile believed that she heard other people "in the background screaming" the name "Jerome." (Id. at 22).
As Grover and Northrup reengaged in their verbal dispute, the shooter appeared from behind Grover carrying a gun. (Dkt. 22–15 at 102–03). The shooter declared that he had been told that Northrup was bothering the girls. (Id. at 106–07). Northrup approached the shooter and stated that "he's not the only one with guns." (Id. at 106–08). The shooter then fired his gun several times at Northrup, who fell to the ground. (Id. at 108). Northrup later succumbed to his wounds and died. (Id. at 112–13).
After the City of Buffalo Police Department secured the scene, the three eyewitnesses were taken to police headquarters. Each witness was interviewed and performed a photo array identification. Defendant conducted a photo array identification with Basile and Grover, while Picone underwent the photo array procedures at the direction of another police officer. (See Dkt. 22–3). Each eyewitness identified Plaintiff as the shooter. (Dkt. 22–7; Dkt. 22–8; Dkt. 22–11). Plaintiff lived near the crime scene (see Dkt. 22–23), and a search warrant executed at Plaintiff's residence produced a black hoodie with print on the front that was similar to the general descriptions provided by the eyewitnesses (Dkt. 22–13; see Dkt. 22–4 at 2; Dkt. 22–5 at 1; Dkt. 22–9 at 1). Plaintiff's trial resulted in his conviction for Northrup's murder.
Subsequently, new evidence was discovered that suggested that the eyewitness testimony, which was the primary evidence supporting the prosecution's case, was unreliable.
Specifically, Basile provided an affidavit averring that Defendant threatened to arrest her if she did not identify someone in the photo array as the shooter. (Dkt. 22–21 at 12). Basile, who was 16 years old at the time (Dkt. 25–1 at 3), also averred that after she had identified Plaintiff as the shooter, Defendant told her that Grover had identified the same person (Dkt. 22–21 at 12). Although Basile had been unsure as to whether she correctly identified the shooter, learning that Grover selected the same individual "convinced" her that she had done so. (Id. ). Grover also submitted a statement to the police indicating that Defendant told her that another eyewitness had already identified one of the six individuals presented in the photo array before she identified Plaintiff as the shooter. (Dkt. 25–2 at 2). Although there is no suggestion that Picone's photo array was conducted improperly, she submitted an affidavit indicating that she only observed the shooter from the side and from the back, and that she was uncertain that her identification of Plaintiff was accurate. (Dkt. 22–21 at 14–15). Instead, she explained that she believed the shooter was of Puerto Rican descent, and that she picked the individual who most closely resembled a Puerto Rican individual. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff's motion to vacate his conviction was granted on the consent of the District Attorney's Office. (See id. ; Dkt. 22–22).
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against Defendant for malicious prosecution and for the violation of his right to a fair trial as a result of Defendant's alleged fabrication and concealment of falsified evidence. (Dkt. 1). Defendant moves for summary judgment, primarily arguing that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of each cause of action, and, in any event, that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and that Plaintiff's lawsuit is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Dkt. 22–25).
I. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).
"Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the ‘evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial.’ " Rowe v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. , 11 F.Supp.2d 265, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party " " Caldarola v. Calabrese , 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. , 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
"In a federal § 1983 suit, the same preclusive effect is given to a previous state court proceeding as would be given to that proceeding in the courts of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Leather v. Eyck , 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999). "Res judicata precludes parties from relitigating claims both actually litigated or which could have been litigated in a prior proceeding." Taylor v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist. , 908 F.Supp. 1165, 1178 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). "Res judicata, or claim preclusion, means that ‘even claims based upon different legal theories are barred provided they arise from the same transaction or occurrence.’ " Burton v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , No. 11-CV-00971, 2013 WL 3423754, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013) (quoting L–Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc. , 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d. Cir. 1999) ). However, "under New York law, the form of relief being sought is an element of the litigant's claim." Leather , 180 F.3d at 425.
Since Plaintiff could not have sought damages for his alleged constitutional violations in his state criminal proceeding, the principles of res judicata do not bar his § 1983 causes of action. See Plonka v. Brown , 2 F. App'x 194, 197 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (); Leather , 180 F.3d at 425 (...
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