Thakker v. Doll

• Citation: 451 F.Supp.3d 358
• Decision Date: 31 March 2020
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-480
• Parties: Bharatkumar G. THAKKER, et al., Petitioners-Plaintiffs, v. Clair DOLL, in his official capacity as Warden of York County Prison, et al., Respondents-Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

451 F.Supp.3d 358

Bharatkumar G. THAKKER, et al., Petitioners-Plaintiffs,

v.Clair DOLL, in his official capacity as Warden of York County Prison, et al., Respondents-Defendants.

1:20-cv-480

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed March 31, 2020

Cecillia D. Wang, Stephen B. Kang, ACLU Foundation Immigrants' Rights Project, San Francisco, CA, David C. Fathi, Eunice H. Cho, ACLU National Prison Project, Washington, DC, Michael Tan, Omar C. Jadwat, ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, New York, NY, Witold J. Walczak, American Civil Liberties Union of PA, Pittsburgh, PA, Carla G. Graff, Pro Hac Vice, Kelly A. Krellner, Thomas James Miller, Will W. Sachse, Dechert LLP, Erika Nyborg-Burch, Pro Hac Vice, Muneeba S. Talukder, Pro Hac Vice, Vanessa L. Stine, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioners-Plaintiffs.

Joanne M. Sanderson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondents-Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

John E. Jones III, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction filed by Petitioners-Plaintiffs Bharatkumar G. Thakker, Abedodun Adebomi Idowu, Courtney Stubbs, Rigoberto Gomez Hernandez, Rodolfo Augustin Juarez Juarez, Meiling Lin, Henry Pratt, Jean HErdy Christy Augustin, Mayowa Abayomi Oyediran, Agus Prajoga, Mansyur, Catalino Domingo Gomez Lopez and Dexter Anthony Hillocks (collectively "Petitioners").¹ (Doc. 7). The Motion has been briefed by the parties. (Docs. 12; 35; 46). The Court has received an amicus brief from a group of public health officials and human rights experts, (Doc. 36), as well as a factual update and supplemental authority filed by Petitioners. (Docs. 33 and 34). Thus, this matter is ripe for our review.

For the reasons that follow, the temporary restraining order shall be granted and the Respondents shall be directed to immediately release Petitioners today on their own recognizance.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioners are a diverse group of individuals from around the world who are being held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison, Clinton County Correctional Facility and Pike County Correctional Facility, ("the Facilities"), while they await final disposition of their immigration cases.

Each Petitioner suffers from chronic medical conditions and faces an imminent risk of death or serious injury if exposed to COVID-19. Thakker is 65 years old and suffers from high blood pressure

and cholesterol and has kidney failure. Further, he is currently suffering from symptoms similar to those of COVID-19. (Doc. 2, Ex. 3). Idowu, 57, had type II diabetes as well as high blood pressure and cholesterol. He is also currently sick. (Doc. 2, Ex. 4). Stubbs is 52 years old and is immunocompromised due to a kidney transplant he received 6 years ago. He has a heart stent and also suffers from type II diabetes and blood clots. (Doc. 2, Ex. 5). Hernandez, 52, suffers from diabetes

, dental problems and an ulcer. (Doc. 2, Ex. 7). Juarez, 21, suffers from diabetes and is currently sick with COVID-19 type symptoms, including trouble breathing. (Doc. 2, Ex. 8). Lin is 45 years old and suffers from chronic pain due to a forced sterilization, as well as chronic hepatitis B and liver disease. (Doc. 2, Ex. 9). Pratt, age 50, suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure. (Doc. 2, Ex. 10). Augustin, 34 years old, suffers from multiple conditions including diabetes, high blood pressure, nerve pain, limited mobility and pain from a prior bladder and intestine reconstruction, anemia, PTSD and depression. (Doc. 2, Ex. 11). Oyediran is a 40-year-old asthmatic suffering from high blood pressure and cholesterol. (Doc. 2, Ex. 12). Lopez, age 51, has contracted the flu four times while in ICE custody since November of 2018 and is concerned that he is especially susceptible to contracting COVID-19. (Doc. 2, Ex. 15). Finally, Hillocks, age 54, has been diagnosed with leukemia. He also suffers from diabetes, anemia, high blood pressure and cholesterol. (Doc. 2, Ex. 16).

Several Petitioners have reported symptoms similar to those of COVID-19. None have been quarantined, isolated, or treated. (Doc. 2 Exs. 3; 4; 8).

Named as Respondents are: Clair Doll, Warden of York County Prison; Angela Hoover, Warden of Clinton County Correctional Facility; Craig A. Lowe, Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility; Simona Flores-Lund, Field Office Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations; Matthew Albence, Acting Director of ICE; and Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.

II. DISCUSSION

In a matter of weeks, the novel coronavirus COVID-19 has rampaged across the globe, altering the landscape of everyday American life in ways previously unimaginable. Large portions of our economy have come to a standstill. Children have been forced to attend school remotely. Workers deemed ‘non-essential’ to our national infrastructure have been told to stay home. Indeed, we now live our lives by terms we had never heard of a month ago—we are "social distancing" and "flattening the curve" to combat a global pandemic² that has, as of the date of this writing, infected 719,700 people worldwide and killed more than 33,673.³ Each day these statistics move exponentially higher. It is against this increasingly grim backdrop that we now consider the Petitioners' claims for habeas relief.

A. Threshold Questions: Standing and the Propriety of a Habeas Petition

Respondents raise two threshold challenges to the Petitioners' Motion. First, Respondents contend that Petitioners lack standing because they have not alleged an injury in fact. Next, Respondents submit that Petitioners cannot challenge their conditions of confinement through a habeas petition. Taking the latter challenge first, we note that federal courts, including the Third Circuit, have condoned conditions of confinement challenges through habeas. See Aamer v. Obama , 742 F.3d 1023, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ; see also Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 432 F.3d 235, 242-44 (3d Cir. 2005) ; see also Ali v. Gibson , 572 F.2d 971, 975 n.8 (3d Cir. 1978). Accordingly, we find that Petitioners have appropriately invoked this court's jurisdiction through a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Respondents' standing challenge can also be easily resolved. Respondents essentially contend that because the Petitioners themselves do not have COVID-19 and their likelihood of contracting the illness is speculative, Petitioners cannot establish that they would suffer a concrete, non-hypothetical injury absent a temporary restraining order. However, as the Supreme Court observed in Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993), "it would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them." The COVID-19 pandemic is moving rapidly and expansively throughout Pennsylvania. Vast regions of the Commonwealth are now under stay-at-home orders, and social distancing the norm to prevent the spread of this deadly virus. And yet, Respondents would have us offer no substantial relief to Petitioners until the pandemic erupts in our prisons. We reject this notion. Since "[a] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event," it is evident that the Petitioners have standing in this matter. Id.

B. Temporary Restraining Order

i. Legal Standard

Courts apply one standard when considering whether to issue interim injunctive relief, regardless of whether a petitioner requests a temporary restraining order ("TRO") or preliminary injunction. See Ellakkany v. Common Pleas Court of Montgomery Cnty. , 658 Fed.Appx. 25, 27 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying one standard to a motion for both a TRO and preliminary injunction). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. , 695 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that "a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) ; Apotex Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin. , 508 F.Supp.2d 78, 82 (D.D.C. 2007) ("Because interim injunctive relief is an extraordinary form of judicial relief, courts should grant such relief sparingly."). "Awarding preliminary relief, therefore, is only appropriate ‘upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’ " Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro–Pro Operating LLC , 774 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Winter , 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365 ).

ii. Irreparable Harm

To succeed on their Motion, Petitioners "must demonstrate...the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted." Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. , 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). "In order to demonstrate irreparable harm the plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial"...the temporary restraining order..."must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm." Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc. , 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). The moving party must demonstrate that it is likely to suffer "actual or imminent harm which cannot otherwise be compensated by money damages," or it "fail[s] to sustain its substantial burden of showing irreparable harm."...