Thaler v. Haynes, No. 09–273.

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 175 L.Ed.2d 1003,130 S.Ct. 1171,559 U.S. 43
• Parties: Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, v. Anthony Cardell HAYNES.
• Docket Number: No. 09–273.
• Decision Date: 22 February 2010

559 U.S. 43
130 S.Ct. 1171
175 L.Ed.2d 1003

Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
v.
Anthony Cardell HAYNES.

No. 09–273.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 22, 2010.

Opinion

130 S.Ct. 1172

PER CURIAM.

559 U.S. 44

This case presents the question whether any decision of this Court “clearly establishes” that a judge, in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), must reject a demeanor-based explanation for the challenge unless the judge personally observed and recalls the aspect of the prospective juror's demeanor on which the explanation is based. The Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that either Batson itself or Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), clearly established such a rule, but the Court of Appeals read far too much into those decisions, and its holding, if allowed to stand, would have important implications. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, grant respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

Respondent was tried in a Texas state court for the murder of a police officer, and the State sought the death penalty. During voir dire, two judges presided at different stages. Judge Harper presided when the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually, but Judge Wallace took over when peremptory challenges were exercised. When the prosecutor struck an African–American juror named Owens, respondent's attorney raised a Batson objection. Judge Wallace determined that respondent had made out a prima facie case under Batson, and the prosecutor then offered a race-neutral explanation that was based on Owens' demeanor during individual questioning. Specifically, the prosecutor asserted that Owens' demeanor had been “somewhat humorous” and not “serious” and that her “body language” had belied her “true feeling.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 187. Based on his observations of Owens during questioning by respondent's attorney, the prosecutor stated, he believed that she “had a predisposition” and would not look at the possibility of imposing a death sentence “in a neutral fashion.”

559 U.S. 45

Id., at 188. Respondent's attorney did not dispute the prosecutor's characterization of Owens' demeanor, but he asserted that her answers on the jury questionnaire “show[ed] that she was a juror who [was] leaning towards the State's case.” Ibid. After considering the prosecutor's explanation and the arguments of defense counsel, Judge Wallace stated that the prosecutor's reason for the strike was “race-neutral” and denied the Batson objection without further explanation. Id., at 189.

The case proceeded to trial, respondent was convicted and sentenced to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Rejecting respondent's argument that “a trial judge who did not witness the actual voir dire cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate a Batson challenge,” id., at 173, the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote:

“There are many factors which a trial judge—even one who did not preside over the voir dire examinations—can consider in determining whether the opponent of the peremptory strikes has met his burden. These include the nature and strength of the parties' arguments during the Batson hearing and the attorneys' demeanor and credibility. And, when necessary, a trial judge who

130 S.Ct. 1173

has not witnessed the voir dire may refer to the record,” id., at 173–174 (footnote omitted).

With respect to the strike of juror Owens, the court held that Judge Wallace's acceptance of the prosecutor's explanation was not clearly erroneous and noted that “[t]he record does reflect that Owens was congenial and easygoing during voir dire and that her attitude was less formal than that of other veniremembers.” Id., at 172. This Court denied respondent's petition for a writ of certiorari. Haynes v. Texas, 535 U.S. 999, 122 S.Ct. 1565, 152 L.Ed.2d 487 (2002).

After the Texas courts denied his application for state habeas relief, respondent filed a federal habeas petition. The District Court denied the petition and observed that this

559 U.S. 46

Court had never held that the deference to state-court factual determinations that is mandated by the federal habeas statute is inapplicable when the judge ruling on a Batson objection did not observe the jury selection. App. to Pet. for Cert. 80, n. 10.

A panel of the Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability with respect to respondent's Batson objections concerning Owens and one other prospective juror. Haynes v. Quarterman, 526 F.3d 189, 202 (C.A.5 2008). In its opinion granting the certificate, the panel discussed our opinion in Snyder at length and then concluded:

“Under Snyder 's application of Batson, ... an appellate court applying Batson arguably should find clear error when the record reflects that the trial court was not able to verify the aspect of the juror's demeanor upon which the prosecutor based his or her peremptory challenge.” 526 F.3d, at 199.

When the same panel later ruled on the merits of respondent's Batson claim...