Tharp v. Media Gen., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:11–cv–01819–TLW.
• Citation: 987 F.Supp.2d 673
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Louis Clay THARP, Plaintiff, v. MEDIA GENERAL, INC.; Media General Operations, Inc. d/b/a WBTW CBS News 13 and the Morning News; Media General Communications Holdings, LLC d/b/a SCNOW.com; Mason Snyder; and Nicole Boone, Defendants.

987 F.Supp.2d 673

Louis Clay THARP, Plaintiff,

v.MEDIA GENERAL, INC.; Media General Operations, Inc. d/b/a WBTW CBS News 13 and the Morning News; Media General Communications Holdings, LLC d/b/a SCNOW.com; Mason Snyder; and Nicole Boone, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:11–cv–01819–TLW.

United States District Court,

D. South Carolina,

Florence Division.

Dec. 16, 2013.

James Mixon Griffin, Margaret Nicole Fox, Lewis Babcock and Griffin, Columbia, SC, David Bruce Wolf, David Wolf Law PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Carl Frederick Muller, Carl Muller Law, Hannah Rogers Metcalfe, Metcalfe Perkins and Atkinson, Greenville, SC, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

TERRY L. WOOTEN, Chief Judge.

This matter is now before the Court on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants, Media General, Inc.; Media General Operations, Inc. d/b/a WBTW CBS News 13 and the Morning News; Media General Communications Holdings, LLC d/b/a SCNOW.com; Mason Snyder, and Nicole Boone (collectively “Defendants”), on May 31, 2013. (Doc. # 71). The Plaintiff, Louis Clay Tharp (“Plaintiff”), filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' motion on July 8, 2013 (Doc. # 80), to which Defendants replied on August 5, 2013 (Doc. # 88).

On October 17, 2013, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein counsel for both parties presented arguments. (Doc. # 99). The Court has carefully considered the pleadings, motions, memoranda and exhibits of the parties. The Court has determined the relevant facts from the record before it and drawn all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiff as the nonmoving party. The Defendants' Motion is now ripe for disposition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this defamation action on July 27, 2011 against the Defendants concerning certain news broadcasts and publications dated August 6, 2010 and January 12, 2012, as well as a posting on the Defendant television station's website and in Defendants' daily newspaper (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “August 6, 2010 disputed publications” or the “August 6, 2010 disputed broadcasts”). (Docs. # 1; 44).

On June 18, 2010, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree kidnapping after a minor identified him. (Doc. # 44). All charges against Plaintiff in connection with the June 18, 2010 alleged incident have since been dismissed and all records of such charges expunged from Plaintiff's record. (Doc. # 44 at 9). On June 19, 2010, Plaintiff was released on bail and returned to his home in New York. (Doc. # 44). On June 20, 2010, the Conway Police Department issued a Press Release regarding Plaintiff's arrest. (Doc. # 80–3; see also Doc. # 44 ¶ 41). Plaintiff was originally scheduled to appear in court in Conway on August 6, 2010; however, he was excused from having to appear on that day. (Doc. # 44 ¶ 29). On that same day, Defendants broadcast and published on their television station, website, and in their daily newspaper an interview taken by Defendant Mason Snyder of the minor and of the minor's mother, conducted in their home, accompanied by a mugshot of the Plaintiff. (Doc. # 44 ¶ 30).

As noted, the Horry County Solicitor's Office dismissed all of the criminal charges brought against Plaintiff on May 19, 2011. (Doc. # 44 at 9). All records of the criminal charges brought against Plaintiff were ordered to be expunged by Order dated July 13, 2011. (Doc. # 44 at 9 ¶ 46–47).

Plaintiff filed the above-captioned defamation case against Defendants on July 27, 2011, seeking actual, compensatory, and special damages in excess of fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000.00), as well as punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and such other relief as this Court deems proper. (Docs. # 1; # 44). Plaintiff asserts defamation claims against Defendants and alleges that “the Defendants, without question or verification, broadcast and published the [minor's] false, and at the very least questionable, charges in a biased and onesided manner that presumed Plaintiff was guilty. The possibility of Plaintiff being innocent and wrongly accused was not even presented by the Defendants as a possibility since the Defendants stated at the end of the August 6, 2010 broadcast and publication that Plaintiff's options were ‘to plead guilty or request a trial.’ ” (Doc. # 44 at 9 ¶ 44, 45).

Moreover, the Plaintiff alleges that the “Defendants did not interview or seek to interview Plaintiff or his attorney for the August 6, 2010 broadcast and publication, nor did Defendants even contact Plaintiff or his attorney prior to the August 6, 2010 broadcast and publication.” (Doc. # 44 at 8 ¶ 42; see also Doc. # 80–5 at 6–7 (Snyder Depo.)). Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n the August 6, 2010 broadcasts and publications, Defendants never questioned the veracity or credibility of the charges made by the [minor] against Plaintiff,” despite, Plaintiff argues, having information that may lead a reasonable person to conclude that there was a reason to question the veracity of the minor's statements. (Doc. # 44 at 9–10 ¶ 43).

II. LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, responses to discovery, and the record reveal “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden requires the movant to identify those portions of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548;see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Though the moving party bears the initial burden, the nonmoving party must then produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 334, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In satisfying this responsibility, the nonmoving party must offer more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” that a genuine issue of material fact exists, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, or that there is “some metaphysical doubt” as to material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In considering the motion for summary judgment, this Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is proper “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there [being] no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).

Summary judgment should only be granted in those cases in which there is no issue of fact involved and inquiry into the facts is not necessary to clarify application of the law. McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir.1992). A district court should not grant summary judgment “unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under the circumstances.” Campbell v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., 21 F.3d 52, 55 (4th Cir.1994).

III. DISCUSSION

South Carolina substantive law is applicable to the claims in this case as federal subject matter jurisdiction is grounded on diversity pursuant to § 1332. The essential elements of a claim for defamation under South Carolina law are: 1) a false and defamatory statement; 2) unprivileged publication to a third party by defendant; 3) fault on the part of the defendant publisher; and 4) actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. See Floyd v. WBTW, No. 4:06–cv–3120–RBH, 2007 WL 4458924 (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2007) (citing Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers, LLC, 368 S.C. 444, 455, 629 S.E.2d 653, 664 (2006)).

A. “Public Figure”, “Private Figure,” or “Limited–Purpose Public Figure”

The legal standard applicable in this matter is dependent upon whether the particular Plaintiff in this case is a “public figure,” a “private figure,” or a “limited-purpose public figure” for purposes of defamation law. Whether the Plaintiff is a public figure, limited-purpose public figure, or a private figure plaintiff is a question of law for the Court to decide. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers, 368 S.C. 444, 474, 629 S.E.2d 653, 669 (2006); see also Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1551 (4th Cir.1994). “The determination [of the plaintiff's status] is a matter of law which must be decided by the court, on a case by case basis after careful examination of the facts and circumstances, before the jury is charged on the law or asked to resolve a case.” Erickson, 368 S.C. at 468–69, 629 S.E.2d at 665–66.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment places limitations on tort liability for defamation in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) (holding that when a plaintiff is a private...