Thayer v. Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC
| Decision Date | 13 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-10744 |
| Citation | 30 F.4th 1290 |
| Parties | Cindy THAYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RANDY MARION CHEVROLET BUICK CADILLAC, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Brian James Lee, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Jacksonville, FL, Hannah Dantzler-Fleming, Joseph T. Dunn, Keith R. Mitnik, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Therese Ann Savona, AT, Cole Scott & Kissane, PA, Orlando, FL, Alexandra Valdes, Law Office of Alexandra Valdes, Miami, FL, Geraldine P. Asher, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Orlando, FL, Joseph T. Kissane, Jennifer Lee Watson, Cole Scott & Kissane, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before Jill Pryor, Grant, and Anderson, Circuit Judges.
The Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, shields "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person" from vicarious liability "for harm ... that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease" if two other conditions are met. This case requires us to decide whether a vehicle provided by the service department of an automobile dealership to a customer while that customer's car was being serviced is a vehicle that the service department "rents or leases" to the customer. The district court found that it was. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC ("Randy Marion") is an automobile dealership in North Carolina that also operates a service department. When a customer brings a car to Randy Marion for service, Randy Marion allows the customer to use a Randy Marion-owned vehicle while the customer's car is being serviced.
Samuel Pope brought Rebecca Lowthorp's car to Randy Marion for service on September 4, 2015, the day before Pope and Lowthorp's wedding.1 While the car was being serviced by Randy Marion, Randy Marion provided the Popes with a vehicle to use. The Popes used that vehicle to go to Florida for their honeymoon. On September 13, 2015, the Popes were driving that vehicle on Interstate-4 in Florida and collided with Cindy Thayer ("Thayer").
Thayer brought this lawsuit against Randy Marion for vicarious liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Randy Marion moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defenses, including the Graves Amendment. The district court granted Randy Marion's motion for summary judgment on the Graves Amendment.
The district court noted that, for the Graves Amendment to apply, a defendant must meet the following four elements: (1) the defendant owned the vehicle; (2) the defendant was "engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;" (3) the defendant committed "no negligence or criminal wrongdoing"; and (4) the defendant "rent[ed] or lease[d] the vehicle." 49 U.S.C. § 30106. Thayer argued to the district court that it was disputed whether Randy Marion owned the vehicle, whether Randy Marion engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing, and whether Randy Marion rented the vehicle to the Popes. The district court found for Randy Marion on all three issues.
The district court found that Randy Marion presented evidence that it owned the vehicle and that Randy Marion, as an automobile dealership, was engaged in the business of leasing vehicles. The district court found that Thayer failed to provide evidence to create a dispute regarding those issues. Thayer also argued that summary judgment was improper because Randy Marion interchangeably referred to the vehicle as a "rental" and a "loaner," creating a dispute of material fact. The district court found that these labels did not foreclose summary judgment because the substance of the transaction, not the labels Randy Marion applied, mattered.
Finally, the district court found that Randy Marion rented the vehicle to the Popes. Citing dictionary definitions, the district court held that to fall within the Graves Amendment, the Popes’ use of the loaner vehicle needed to be supported by consideration. The district court found there was consideration here. The district court found that the Popes brought their own vehicle to Randy Marion for service and agreed to pay therefor. In exchange, the Popes received the loaner vehicle to use. Therefore, the district court concluded that the Graves Amendment protected Randy Marion and granted summary judgment to Randy Marion. This appeal followed.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing "all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Shuford v. Fid. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 508 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007). Thayer only appeals two aspects of the district court's summary judgment order: (1) whether Randy Marion rented or leased the vehicle and (2) whether summary judgment was improper because Randy Marion used conflicting labels for the vehicle.
In pertinent part, the Graves Amendment, enacted in 2005, provides:
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a). We have previously held that the Graves Amendment, when applicable, preempts Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. See Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. , 540 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2008).2 On appeal, Thayer makes two arguments for why summary judgment should not have been granted to Randy Marion based on the Graves Amendment. First, she argues that the vehicle provided to the Popes was not rented or leased. Second, she argues that Randy Marion's interchangeable use of the words "rental" and "loaner" to refer to the vehicle precludes summary judgment. We address each in turn.
"The starting point for all statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself." United States v. DBB, Inc. , 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). "We interpret words that are not defined in a statute ‘with their ordinary and plain meaning because we assume that Congress uses words in a statute as they are commonly understood.’ " United States v. Frank , 599 F.3d 1221, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Veal , 153 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 1998) ). Therefore, the important language from the Graves Amendment for us to interpret is "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle." 49 U.S.C. § 30106. We, then, must determine what it means to rent or lease a vehicle.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "rent" as "[c]onsideration paid, usu. periodically, for the use or occupancy of property (esp. real property)." Rent , Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).3 It also defines "lease" as "[t]o grant possession and use of (land, buildings, rooms, movable property, etc.) to another in return for rent or other consideration." Lease , Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). From these definitions, it is clear that to rent or lease a vehicle requires an exchange of consideration for the use of the vehicle. And Black's Law Dictionary defines "consideration" as "[s]omething (such as an act, a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from a promisee; that which motivates a person to do something, esp. to engage in a legal act." Consideration , Black's Law Dictionary ...
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Massachusetts High Court Finds Federal Law Exempts Dealers From Liability For Loaner Vehicles
...federal courts that have considered the question, including the Eleventh Circuit in Thayer v. Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC, 30 F.4th 1290 (11th Cir. 2022). A Florida state court reached the opposite conclusion in Romero v. Fields Motorcars, Inc., 333 So. 3d 746 (Fla. 5th Dist.......