The Adams Express Co. v. Harris
| Decision Date | 09 May 1889 |
| Docket Number | 13,706 |
| Parties | The Adams Express Company v. Harris et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Petition for a Rehearing Overruled Sept. 25, 1889.
From the Morgan Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
J. H Jordan and O. Matthews, for appellant.
G. A Adams and J. S. Newby, for appellees.
The material facts pleaded by the appellees as their cause of action are these: On and prior to the 17th day of January, 1885, they were partners, engaged in business as nurserymen; on that day a lot of fruit trees was delivered to the United States Express Company at Champaign, Illinois; the trees were owned by the plaintiffs, and were directed to them at Mooresville, Indiana; the United States Express Company undertook to carry the trees to Indianapolis, and there deliver them to some other carrier to be transported to their destination; a written contract was made between the United States Express Company and the plaintiffs, which contained, among others, these provisions: That the person or corporation to whom the trees shall be delivered for transportation from the end of that company's line to their destination, shall not be deemed the agent of the company, but shall be deemed the agent of the plaintiff; that the company shall not be liable for injury to the goods, unless it "be proved to have occurred from the fraud or gross negligence of the company or its servants, nor shall any demand be made upon the company for more than fifty dollars, at which sum said property is hereby valued." There is no provision in the contract for the benefit of any carrier except the United States Express Company, nor is any other carrier named. The trees were delivered to the defendant in good condition, at Indianapolis, and it carried them to Mooresville; after they had reached there, the plaintiffs went to the office of the defendant prepared to pay the charges and receive the trees, and, although they were then in the possession of the defendant's agent, he denied that they had been received; on a subsequent day the plaintiffs went again to the defendant's office, received the trees and paid the freight on them. The trees were so injured, through the negligence of the defendant, as to be utterly valueless. The plaintiffs had sold the trees to divers persons, and had agreed to deliver them on the 19th day of October, 1885, and the refusal of the defendant to deliver the trees when first demanded caused the plaintiffs to lose the profits of the sales made by them, for the reason that the delay prevented them from delivering the trees to the purchasers in accordance with their contract.
The contention of the appellant is, that the contract between the United States Express Company and the plaintiffs bound both them and the appellant, that the latter, when it accepted the goods for transportation, became bound to comply with the provisions of the contract, and secured a right to all its stipulations in favor of the first carrier, and that the contract continued in force for the benefit of all the parties until the goods were delivered at their destination. The opposing contention is, that the contract between the United States Express Company and the plaintiffs did not enure to the benefit of the appellant, and that when it accepted the goods for transportation it received them under the law, and became bound by the ordinary rules which prevail in cases where there is no special contract.
If the appellant had been designated in the contract with the first carrier as one of the intermediate carriers, or if the contract had provided that its stipulations should enure to the benefit of all the carriers, then the contention of the appellant would find strong support from the authorities. U. S. Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127; St. Louis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397, 8 S.W. 134; Halliday v. St. Louis, etc., R. W. Co., 74 Mo. 159 (41 Am. Rep. 309); Railroad Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 89 U.S. 594, 22 Wall. 594, 22 L.Ed. 724; Maghee v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 45 N.Y. 514; Lamb v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 46 N.Y. 271.
But the contract does not provide that its stipulations shall enure to the benefit of any other carrier than the one with whom it was made, nor does it designate any other carrier along the line. Its provisions apply only to the carrier with whom the contract was directly made, and they leave it to that carrier to select the carrier from the termination of its line to the end of the route. The authorities are substantially agreed that in such a case the intermediate carrier can not successfully claim the benefit of the provisions of the original contract. Martin v. American Ex Co., 19 Wis. 336; Bancroft v....
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Adams Exp. Co. v. Harris
... ... J.The material facts pleaded by the appellees as their cause of action are these: On and prior to the 17th day of January, 1885, they were partners engaged in business as nursery-men. On that day a lot of fruit trees was delivered to the United States Express Company at Champaign, Ill. The trees were owned by the plaintiffs, and were directed to them at Mooresville, Ind. The United States Express Company undertook to carry the trees to Indianapolis, and there deliver them to some other carrier, to be transported to their destination. A written contract ... ...