The Aetna Powder Company v. Hildebrand
Decision Date | 17 April 1894 |
Docket Number | 17,195 |
Citation | 37 N.E. 136,137 Ind. 462 |
Parties | The AEtna Powder Company v. Hildebrand et al |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Marion Superior Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
F. H Blackledge and W. W. Thornton, for appellant.
S. M Chambers, S. O. Pickens, C. W. Moores, U. J. Hammond and E St. G. Rogers, for appellees.
Jacob S. Hildebrand and James L. Fugate had been partners in the mercantile hardware business in Indianapolis for many years. Becoming embarrassed and insolvent, one of them, Jacob S., filed a petition in the superior court against the other, James L., alleging their insolvency and asking a dissolution of the partnership and the appointment of a receiver to take charge of, and wind up, the affairs of said partnership. Whereupon such proceedings were had at special term as that Alonzo P. Hendrickson was duly appointed receiver for, and who took possession of, the assets of said firm.
The appellant, the AEtna Powder Company, appeared and filed an intervening petition asking to make Edwin St. George Rogers and Philip M. Hildebrand parties defendant.
The substance of the intervening petition is that the appellant had, on the 11th day of February, 1886, entered into a written contract with the firm of Hildebrand & Fugate, a copy of which, as an exhibit, is filed with the petition, and by which, it is claimed, the appellant, constituted said firm the agent and trustee of appellant to sell, as such agent, powders manufactured by appellant.
It is further alleged that said contract continued in force until the 25th day of September, 1893, when it was terminated by appellant; that appellant, during that time, furnished to said firm many thousands of pounds of its high explosive powders to sell in accordance with the terms of said contract; that said firm, pursuant to said contract, on the first day of May, 1893, in writing, reported to appellant that for the sixty days immediately preceding that date there was due from them to appellant, on sales made of said powder so furnished after deducting their commissions and other lawful charges, the sum of $ 677.27. And on July 1, 1893, a like report was made by said firm showing that for the sixty days immediately preceding that date, there was due from them to appellant on sales made of said powders so furnished, after deducting their commissions and other lawful charges, the sum of $ 515.07. And that on the 1st day of September, 1893, a like report was made by said firm, that for the sixty days immediately preceding that date there was due from said firm to appellant, on sales of said powders so furnished, after deducting their commissions and other lawful charges, the sum of $ 313.55; that from the last report to the termination of the contract the amount reported as due appellant on account of sales in that time, after deducting commissions and other charges, amounted to the sum of $ 26.40, amounting in all to $ 1,694.54, all of which is due appellant and remains wholly unpaid; that no note was at any time executed by said firm to appellant for all or any part of said sums so reported due appellant on powder sold by said firm, as aforesaid; that of the moneys due on said sales of powders during the sixty days immediately preceding said May 1, 1893, and the sixty days immediately preceding September 18, 1893, said firm collected, before the appointment of the receiver, large sums, the amounts of which appellant is unable to state, which amounts so collected they placed and deposited with moneys of said firm, either in or out of bank or both, and never remitted or paid the same to appellant; and that parts of such amounts thus collected, but how much appellant is unable to state, said firm, without the consent of appellant, used for the purpose of purchasing goods, wares and merchandise for their said business, and the goods thus purchased became a part thereof, and are now a part of the assets of said firm, and the moneys derived from the sale by said firm of the goods, wares, and merchandise thus purchased were either used by said firm in their said business or were on hand at the time said receiver was appointed, but whether all of said fund was used or kept, or whether a part was used and a part kept, or whether said receiver has received parts of the amounts of said sales since his appointment, appellant is unable to state; that the receiver had taken possession of all the accounts and contracts of sale of said powders, that had been made during the sixty days previous to said May 1, 1893, and from that date to said September 18, 1893, the date of the last report, which had been uncollected and unsatisfied, and has, as such receiver, collected and received a part or the whole of the amount due thereon, and now has the same in his possession, but how much he has thus collected appellant is unable to state; that before the appointment of said receiver said firm of Hildebrand & Fugate had executed a mortgage upon all of the assets of said firm to Philip M. Hildebrand and Edwin St. George Rogers, including the property that had been purchased by said firm, with the moneys collected by said firm on said contracts of sale of said powders; that said mortgage was executed to said Philip M. Hildebrand and Rogers to secure debts and obligations of said firm to said mortgagees due before the execution of said mortgage; and that the same was not given for an extension of time of payment of said indebtedness nor for any new obligation or indebtedness.
Prayer that appellant's claim be declared a preferred one to all other creditors, and to the mortgagees' claim.
The contract on which the petition is founded reads as follows:
A demurrer to the petition, for want of facts sufficient, was sustained by the special term, and the appellant standing by the demurrer, and refusing to plead further, the appellees had judgment upon the demurrer. On appeal to the general term the judgment was affirmed, holding that the demurrer was rightly sustained to the petition. That ruling of the general term is assigned here for error.
The appellant contends that the contract...
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