The Arizona v. Anelich

Decision Date27 April 1936
Docket NumberNo. 667,667
Citation298 U.S. 110,56 S.Ct. 707,80 L.Ed. 1075
PartiesTHE ARIZONA et al. v. ANELICH
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Ralph S. Pierce, of Seattle, Wash., for petitioners.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 111-114 intentionally omitted] Mr. Wilbur Zundel, of Seattle, Wash., for respondent.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case certiorari was granted, 297 U.S. 701, 56 S.Ct. 573, 80 L.Ed. 989, because of the importance of the question, to review a determination of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, 183 Wash. 467, 49 P.(2d) 3, that assumption of risk is not a defense to an action brought under the Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act, 1920, § 33), 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (46 U.S.C.A. § 688), to recover damages for the injury and death of a seaman caused by a defective appliance, a part of the equipment of a fishing vessel on which he was employed.

The injury occurred at sea, when respondent's intestate was engaged in hauling in, with a power winch, the purse line of a fishing net. During this operation the drums of the winch, as was customary, were kept in continuous revolution at a speed of about eighty revolutions per minute. The two ends of the purse line, whose function is to purse, or close, the net at the bottom, were reeved through blocks hanging from a davit at the side of the vessel, from which they ran respectively to the aft and forward drums of the winch. Decedent was stationed at the aft drum, where his duty, like that of the winchman at the forward drum, was to take several turns of his end of the purse line about the revolving drum and hold the line taut, so that the winch would haul it in, and to coil the line as it came off the drum. When the rings at the bottom of the net through which the purse line passes came to the surface of the water, a bridle, or strap, was passed around the net and rings and attached to block and tackle suspended from a boom of the vessel. The purse line is then customarily thrown off the drums, and the net is raised higher by taking several turns about the forward drum with the line from the block and tackle, which then carries a load of about a ton and a half, and hauling on it. It was at this stage of the operation that decedent was injured. The purse line had been removed from the forward drum, and several turns of the line from the block and tackle, which was supporting the net, had been taken around this drum, when, in some way which do § not clearly appear, the decedent's leg became entangled in the purse line, which was not clear of the aft drum. Before the winch could be stopped his leg was drawn onto the drum by the purse line, the bones were broken and the flesh lacerated. Septicemia ensued, from which he died.

Power was transmitted to the winch by a countershaft connected by a chain gear drive with the main, or propeller, shaft. There were two methods for starting and stopping the winch. One was by the operation of a lever located between decks, near the engine, which controlled the clutch on the main shaft. The other was by a lever located above deck, on the starboard side of the winch frame, between the drums, by which the jaws of the clutch connecting with the chain drive of the winch could be engaged with the corresponding jaws of the clutch keyed onto the main shaft. Attached to the winch frame by a string was a forked piece of wood designed for use as a brace to hold the winch lever in a position which would cause the clutch to engage, and prevent is slipping or disengaging while the winch was in motion. When placed in position this brace extended from a cleat on the frame of the winch to the winch lever.

It is respondent's contention that the clutch was so defective, through long wear, that it would not remain engaged without the use of the brace to hold it in position; that the presence of the brace in position at the moment of the accident so prevented or delayed use of the lever at the winch that it was necessary to use the lever below deck to disengage the clutch on the main shaft in order to stop the winch; and that the consequent delay, after the alarm was given, was the proximate cause of decedent's injury.

The trial court refused petitioners' request to charge that voluntary assumption by decedent of the risk of injury by the unsafe appliance was a defense to the action, and denied their motion for a non-suit and for a directed verdict. It left it to the jury to say whether petitioners had negligently failed to provide decedent with a safe appliance with which to work, and whether such failure was the proximate cause of the injury and death. The state Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the trial court upon a verdict for respondent, holding that, in the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, assumption of risk is not a defense in a suit under the Jones Act.

We granted certiorari to review the ruling upon the assumption of risk, and not for the purpose of reexamining the evidence of negligence and probable cause. With respect to the latter, it suffices to say that, although the testimony was conflicting, there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the clutch controlled by the lever at the winch was negligently allowed to remain in a defective condition; that because of the defect it would not remain engaged and the winch drums would not turn continuously unless the lever controlling the clutch was held in position by the brace; that the use of the brace to prevent the worn clutch from slipping or disengaging rendered the winch defective, and unsafe to those required to work in its vicinity, and that the use of the brace, and the consequent delay in stopping the winch from the engine room, when the alarm was given, was the proximate cause of the injury and death. We do not discuss other questions of lesser moment including those growing out of the alleged negligent failure of petitioners to provide decedent with prompt and appropriate medical attention as a contributing cause of his death, but direct our attention to the question brought here for review, whether assumption of risk is a defense to suits under the Jones Act.

Since the maritime law allowed no recovery for the wrongful death of a seaman, see Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 50 S.Ct. 207, 74 L.Ed. 686, respondent's asserted right of action is conferred by section 33 of the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (46 U.S.C.A. § 688), which gives to a seama injured in the course of his employment, at his election, a right of action for damages at law, with trial by jury, in which 'all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply.' In case of the death of the seaman, as a result of the injury, it similarly gives a right of action to his personal representatives in which 'all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.'

Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (45 U.S.C.A. § 51), thus incorporated in the Jones Act by reference, gives a right of recovery for the injury or death of an employee of a common carrier by rail, in interstate or foreign commerce, 'resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its * * * appliances, machinery * * * or other equipment.' By section 3 of the Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 53 (45 U.S.C.A. § 53), contributory negligence does not bar recovery, but is ground for apportionment of the damages between employer and employee, and by sections 3 and 4, 45 U.S.C. §§ 53, 54 (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 53, 54), it is provided that no employee shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence or 'to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.'

The Jones Act thus brings into the maritime law new rules of liability. The source from which these rules are drawn defines them but prescribes nothing as to their operation in the field to which they are transferred. 'In that field their strength and operation come altogether from their inclusion in the maritime law' by virtue of the Jones Act. The election for which it provides 'is between alternatives accorded by the maritime law as modified, and not between that law and some nonmaritime system.' Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388, 389, 44 S.Ct. 391, 394, 68 L.Ed. 748; and see Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 380, 381, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 49 S.Ct. 75, 76, 73 L.Ed. 220.

In applying the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51—59), in suits brought by railroad employees, it has been settled by numerous decisions of this court that assumption of risk is a defense in a suit brought to recover for injuries resulting from defective appliances, the use of which is not required by the Federal Safety Appliance Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), see Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 34 S.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062, L.R.A.1915C, 1, Ann.Cas.1915B, 475; Jacobs v. Southern R. Co., 241 U.S. 229, 36 S.Ct. 588, 60 L.Ed. 970; Boldt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 245 U.S. 441, 445, 38 S.Ct. 139, 62 L.Ed. 385. The fact that the statute deals with and extends a common-law form of liability, provides for its enforcement in common-law courts, and prescribes that certain common-law defenses, including assumption of risk, shall not be available in specified cases, led to the conclusion that such defenses, when not excluded by the terms of the statute, are impliedly authorized.

But the Jones Act does not, by its own terms, or by those adopted by...

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    • U.S. Supreme Court
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    ...1082. Similarly state courts may not apply their doctrines of assumption of risk in actions arising under the Act. The Arizona, 298 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 1075; Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 265. State courts, whether or not applying the Jones Ac......
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1 books & journal articles
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    • United States
    • Loyola Maritime Law Journal Vol. 22 No. 1, January 2023
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