The Armourdale State Bank v. The City of Kansas City

Decision Date08 November 1930
Docket Number29,036
Citation292 P. 745,131 Kan. 419
PartiesTHE ARMOURDALE STATE BANK, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, Appellant
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Decided July, 1930.

Appeal from Wyandotte district court, division No. 2; FRANK D HUTCHINGS, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--Zoning--Prerequisites to Change of Classification. Where a municipality has been mapped, platted and zoned pursuant to statute and ordinance, a statutory prerequisite to the enactment of an ordinance changing private property from one zoning classification to another is that the proposed change be first considered by the city planning commission, or by a special committee or commission where no city planning commission exists, and an ordinance changing the established classification of private property by ordinance without conforming to such prerequisite is void and may be enjoined at the instance of a property owner aggrieved thereby.

L. S. Harvey, city attorney, A. H. Skinner and John C. O'Brien, all of Kansas City, for the appellant; David F. Carson and William Drennen, both of Kansas City, of counsel.

J. H. Brady, T. F. Railsback and N. E. Snyder, all of Kansas City, for the appellee.

Dawson J., Harvey, J., not sitting.

OPINION

DAWSON, J.:

This was an action to enjoin the city government of Kansas City from enforcing an amendment to its general zoning ordinance which would have the effect of changing the classification of some town lots of plaintiff from one for light industrial purposes to another for residential purposes.

Plaintiff's petition alleged that the amended ordinance was arbitrary, oppressive and illegal. A particularly alleged infirmity in the ordinance was based on the ground that the statutory prerequisites to the enactment of a zoning ordinance or amendment thereto had not been followed.

The cause was tried on the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. From these it appears that pursuant to the enactment of chapters 99 and 100 of the Laws of 1921 (R. S. 12-701 et seq.; R. S. 13-1101 et seq.) the defendant city created a city planning commission of fifteen resident taxpayers. In due time this body mapped and planned the municipal territory of Kansas City into zones, parks, playgrounds, etc., in accordance with its statutory powers. The planning commission submitted a report of its deliberations and doings to the governing body of the city, and in accordance with its recommendations, and in conformity with the statute, a zoning ordinance was passed, effective July 31, 1924. In that zoning ordinance plaintiff's town lots, which were located adjacent to some railway switch tracks in an outlying section of the city, were classified for light industrial purposes. At the time the original zoning ordinance was enacted plaintiff's town lots were vacant property, nor have any improvements been erected thereon since that time.

For some years after the creation of the city planning commission appointments were made to its personnel from time to time as the terms of its first appointees expired, but about the time of the passage of the amending ordinance complained of in this action, June 26, 1928, the planning commission as a whole had become inactive. The terms of some of its members had expired and they had neither been reappointed nor had other persons been appointed in their stead. The city government had provided the planning commission with a secretary, and the planning commission had selected three of its own members as a subcommittee, called the change of zone committee, to deal with petitions proposing changes in the zoning classifications of the city.

In some way a proposal to change the classification of plaintiff's town lots was submitted to the subcommittee of three, and on May 16, 1928, that subcommittee directed the secretary of the planning commission to write a letter to the governing body of the city saying that the change of zone committee--the subcommittee of three--recommended a change in the zoning ordinance so as to classify plaintiff's town lots for residential purposes. Such a letter was written, but certain protests against the proposed change were made and the first letter was followed by another on May 25, 1928, recommending that no action be taken on the proposed change of classification until all parties interested could be heard.

It is stipulated in the agreed statement of facts that the proposed change of classification of plaintiff's property was never considered by the city planning commission, that body never heard of it, never had a meeting, nor had it any part in the deliberations of...

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11 cases
  • City of Norton v. Hutson
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1935
    ... ... 1923, 13--1103) ... Constitutional ... provision that state shall not deprive person of his property ... without due process of law ... 978; State ex ... rel. v. Wade, 128 Kan. 646, 278 P. 1067; Armourdale ... State Bank v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 419, 292 P. 745; ... Hoel v ... ...
  • Asmann v. Masters
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • January 27, 1940
    ... ... fact that part of business district of city was zoned as a ... "light industrial" district ... 478, 31 ... P. 1052, 18 L.R.A. 756; the Kansas City cancer hospital, ... Stotler v. Rochelle, ... S., 49; the Topeka private lunatic asylum, State ... v. Lindsay, 85 Kan. 79, 116 P. 207, 35 ... Armourdale ... State Bank v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 419, ... ...
  • Barker v. Kansas City
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1937
    ... ... that Minnesota avenue is an east and west business ... thoroughfare of the city, and State avenue is the first ... street north of it, and that each of these streets previously ... had ... were hurriedly sold to a local bank in an attempt to get them ... into the hands of innocent purchasers before suit could be ... We ... think that should have been done under the authority of ... Armourdale State Bank v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 419, ... 292 P. 745; Simmonds v. Meyn, 134 Kan. 419, 7 P.2d ... ...
  • Spurgeon v. Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County, 40648
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • November 9, 1957
    ...has been followed and quoted in many subsequent cases and it would serve no purpose to quote it at length here. Armourdale State Bank v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 419, 292 P. 745; Hoel v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 290, 291 P. 780; Ford v. City of Hutchinson, 140 Kan. 307, 37 P.2d In a later case, W......
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