The Atchison v. Vanordstrand

• Decision Date: 10 July 1903
• Docket Number: 13,059
• Citation: 67 Kan. 386,73 P. 113
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Parties: THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY v. WILLIAM P. VANORDSTRAND

73 P. 113

67 Kan. 386

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY v. WILLIAM P. VANORDSTRAND

No. 13,059

Supreme Court of Kansas

July 10, 1903

Decided July, 1903.

Error from Finney district court; WILLIAM EASTON HUTCHISON, judge.

Judgment reversed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. CONTRACT--Release of Claim for Damages. A person who, without reading it, signs a written contract releasing his right to maintain an action for damages resulting from an injury occasioned by the negligence of his former employer will be held to have executed the instrument with full knowledge of its contents, when his only excuse for not reading it was that he was "somewhat hurried."

2. CONTRACT--Allusions to Future Employment. Such a contract cannot be avoided by the party signing it because he relied upon "allusions to future employment" made by the agent of his former employer in the negotiations consummated by the written release, which employment was not furnished him.

3. CONTRACT--Parol Proof Inadmissible. Such a contract made without fraud in its execution, full and complete in its terms, unambiguous, reasonable, and plain, but containing no agreement for the future employment of the releasor, cannot be supplemented by parol proof of such an agreement, claimed to have been made in the negotiations concluded by the release, even though it be asserted that such agreement was the inducement for making the release.

A. A. Hurd, and O. J. Wood, for plaintiff in error.

F. J. Oyler, B. F. Milton, and W. R. Hopkins, for defendant in error.

BURCH J. All the Justices concurring.

OPINION

BURCH, J.:

The plaintiff was a brakeman on one of defendant's freight-trains, and received injuries in alighting from the train while it was in rapid motion, for the purpose of closing a switch. The action was founded upon the negligence of the company's employees in failing to reduce the speed of the train. With other defenses, the company pleaded a contract of settlement and release, of which the following is a copy:

"Claim No. 4123.

(Form 514 Regular.)

Audit No. 18905.

Series 6.

Recorded in . . . .

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,

To Wm. Vanordstrand, Brakeman, Dr.

Dodge City, Kansas.

1899.

Jany. 10. For, and in full release, discharge and satisfaction of all claims, demands or causes of action arising from or growing out of all personal injuries sustained by me in alighting from way-car on train No. 31, while said train was in motion, at La Junta, Colo., June 15, 1898. In making this settlement no promise is or has been made for future employment. Settled in full for $ 750.

Division Acc't No. 56.

Examined by C. S.

Approved: J. D. M. HAMILTON, Claims Attorney.

Correct C. W. Ryus, General Claim Agent.

Approved: J. E. MCLEOD, For General Manager.

Approved:

Approved: J. S. LAUCK, Auditor of Disbursements.

Received of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, seven hundred fifty & 00/100 dollars, in full payment of the above claim. In consideration of the payment of said sum of money, I, Wm. Vanordstrand, of Dodge City, in the county of Ford and state of Kansas, hereby remise, release and forever discharge the company of and from all manner of actions, causes of actions, suits, debts and sums of money, dues, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or equity, which I have ever had or now have against said company, by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatever, whether the same arose upon contract or upon tort.

"I have read the above voucher and receipt and fully understand the same.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, this 10th day of January, 1899.

WM. VANORDSTRAND.

"Witnesses: C. W. RYUS.

"NOTE.--Claimant must insert in his own handwriting, in the space above the words 'In testimony whereof,' the following: 'I have read the above voucher and receipt and fully understand the same.'

"NOTE.--The above receipt must be dated and signed by the party in whose favor this voucher is made, or when signed by another party the authority for so doing must, in all cases, accompany it; and when signed 'his mark,' signature must be witnessed. When receipted for a railroad company or other corporation or organization, the party signing will please designate his official title and name of corporation or organization. One party signing for another must give his own name in full."

The plaintiff replied admitting the execution of the release, but alleged that it had been procured through the fraud of the company. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and made answer to special questions submitted by the defendant, certain of which were as follows:

"10. Did the plaintiff write in such release with pen and ink the words, 'I have read the above voucher and receipt and fully understand the same'? Ans. Yes.

"11. Was the plaintiff able to read the release that he signed and to understand it, if he read it? A. Yes.

"12. Was the plaintiff in any way prevented from reading the release in question before signing it? A. Yes?

"13. If you answer the question numbered 12 in the affirmative, state in answer to this question in what way the plaintiff was prevented from reading the release. A. Somewhat hurried.

"14. Was the plaintiff induced to sign the release by any fraud on the part of defendant's agent or agents? A. Yes.

"15. If you answer question No. 14 in the affirmative, state in answer to this question in what such fraud consisted. A. It consisted in intimidation, and undue influence was brought to bear on plaintiff, owing to his stringent financial condition, and reliance of plaintiff upon allusion to future employment by defendant's agents, as shown by testimony and correspondence between defendant's agents and plaintiff."

"17. Did the defendant company by its representatives at all times deny that defendant was under legal obligation to pay plaintiff anything? A. Yes."

Judgment was rendered on the verdict, and the company brings the case to this court.

The plaintiff's evidence disclosed that he sought the settlement himself, and that it was consummated at the defendant's offices in Topeka, whither he had gone for the purpose of effecting it. There is no testimony in the record which will support the finding of intimidation. Intimidation is a different kind of imposition from fraud. It involves the use of violence or threats of violence, express or implied, as a means of compulsion; and no question relating to that subject was raised by the pleadings or submitted to the jury by the court. The only influence, if any, brought to bear upon the plaintiff, or which he claimed in any way induced him to sign the written agreement, was the matter of future employment. This he very much desired, on account of his financial situation. The fifteenth finding of fact goes no further, therefore, than to declare that the fraud which induced plaintiff to sign the contract of settlement and release consisted in allusions to future employment made to him while he was under the stress of a stringent financial condition, and upon which he relied. The plaintiff testified that he partially read the instrument he signed, and that he understood it was a release. After the execution of the contract plaintiff was paid the sum of $ 750, which he has not offered to return. Upon this state of the record, may the judgment of the district court be upheld?

It needs neither argument nor citation of authority to show that allusions to future employment are insufficient to establish fraud. It is very probable that the jury intended to find no more than is involved in the ordinary meaning of the word "allusions." The written contract denied that any actual promise of future employment had been made. The testimony of an employee of the defendant company, who claimed to have heard the conversations resulting in the settlement, also denied such promise. The conversation of the parties did involve a reference to the matter of future employment, and the agent of the company who conducted the negotiations gave the plaintiff an unsealed letter for him to deliver to the company's superintendent at Pueblo, Col., recommending the plaintiff for employment if it could consistently be furnished him. But if an absolute agreement on the subject had been made, naturally the letter would have been couched in something like positive and definite terms. Therefore, the jury were probably unwilling to go to the extent of finding that any express promise had been made; and accepting the word "allusion" in its ordinary sense of passing, casual, slight or incidental reference, of hint, suggestion, or insinuation, the defendant is entitled to a judgment on the special findings.

Allowing to the jury, however, some ineptitude of expression, and assuming that it meant to find a promise of future employment, can any different result be reached? The plaintiff himself wrote into the contract the statement that he had read it and fully understood it and signed it. He was able to read it. He admitted reading a part of it, and he was able to comprehend its meaning upon a perusal of it. The jury, found, however, that he was prevented from reading it by being "somewhat hurried." There was no finding of any special relation of trust and confidence between the parties; no representation by the agent of the company as to what the paper contained; no misreading of the instrument by such agent; no stealthily-made change in either its form or its substance; no surreptitious substitution of one paper for another; nor any trick or deception in any matter touching the execution of the paper. The plaintiff was simply "somewhat hurried"; that is, hurried "in some degree or measure; a little." (Webst. Dict "Somewhat.") ...