The B.F. Woolsey

• Decision Date: 13 April 1883
• Citation: 16 F. 418
• Parties: TOWN OF PELHAM v. THE B.F. WOOLSEY, etc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

16 F. 418

TOWN OF PELHAM v. THE B.F. WOOLSEY, etc.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

April 13, 1883

Dudley R. Horton and H. B. Kinghorn, for libelant.

Scudder & Carter and Geo. A. Black, for claimant.

BROWN J.

The libel in this case was filed to recover $132 wharfage at the libelant's dock at City Island, Pelham, from January 8 to May 19, 1880, being at the rate of one dollar for each 100 tons per diem. The right of the libelant to recover is contested on the ground that the act upon which the libelant's authority to collect wharfage is based is unconstitutional. The constitution of this state (article 3 Sec. 16) provides that 'no private or local bill * * * shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. ' The act in question, passed March 8, 1871, (N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1871, c. 79,) is entitled 'An act to authorize the town of Pelham, in the county of Westchester, to raise money for the purpose of constructing a town dock on City Island, in said town.'

The first section of the act authorizes the town auditors to construct, at an expense of not over $8,000, a public dock on City Island, to remain, when completed, the property of the town of Pelham, and to be kept and maintained in good repair at the expense of the town, and under control of the town auditors, 'who shall have power to make all necessary regulations as regards dockage, and as to the sums to be paid to said town for the use thereof.'

Section 2 authorizes the town auditors to issue town bonds to defray the expense of constructing said dock, payable on or before the expiration of 12 years, with semi-annual interest not exceeding 7 per cent. per annum. Section 3 provides that the 'supervisors of the county shall from time to time levy and assess upon the property and inhabitants of the town of Pelham such sums of money as it shall be necessary to raise to provide for the payment of the principal and interest of said bonds. ' This act, providing for the construction and maintenance of this dock, and for raising the moneys therefor, is a local act. It clearly embraces but one subject; but it is contended that the whole subject is not expressed in the title of the act, and that the only purpose of the act indicated by its title is to 'raise money for the purpose of constructing a town dock,' not for maintaining it afterwards, nor to provide means for its subsequent maintenance, nor the charge dockage. One purpose of the constitutional provision referred to was to prevent secret or fraudulent legislation, and to prevent the legislature or people from being misled by the title of any local or private act, and that reasonable notice of the object of the bill should be given by its title. It is therefore, not sufficient that the subject of the act be single; it must be expressed in the title. Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill, etc Co. 22 Barb. 634, 641; People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553, 561; In re Blodgett, 89 N.Y. 392; People v. O'Brien, 38 N.Y. 193.

In the above cases, and in others in which acts of the legislature have been held void for not expressing the subject involved in the litigation, the distinction between the matter embraced in the body of the act and that indicated by the title has been broad and well defined; in all of them the title of the act furnished no indication of the particular matter objected to in the body of the act. The nearest approach to the present case, to which I have been referred, is that of People v. Com'rs of Palatine, 53 Barb. 70, where an act entitled an act 'to regulate' a road, was held not a sufficient expression of the authority contained in the body of the act to alter and reduce the width of the road, and to donate the excluded land to the adjoining owners. POTTER, J., in that case, regarded the title as intentionally concealing this purpose, and as conceived in fraud.

In the case of People v. Allen, 42 N.Y. 404, an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Schenectady Astronomical Observatory' was held not sufficient to express in its title one of the provisions of the act, which made it the duty of the state to make a gift or loan of money to supply means to build the observatory, and because that is no proper part of an act creating an incorporation or defining its powers. The court say: 'The title of the act in question was deceptive, and calculated to mislead all concerned in regard to the main purpose of it, which was to obtain $60,000 from the treasure without any adequate security for its repayment.'

On the other hand, In the Matter of the Public Parks, 86 N.Y. 437, it was held that an act entitled 'An act to provide for the surveying, laying out, and monumenting certain portions of the city and county of New York, and to provide means therefor,' was sufficient to include the opening of streets and proceedings to acquire and pay for the land taken for that purpose. The court say:

'The words 'laying out' must be interpreted in a broad and liberal sense, * * * and may be regarded as covering the opening, for without such opening the laying out would be of no avail. The laying out is the main thing to be done, and, as a part of the subject, necessarily comprehends the opening, which is absolutely essential before the completion of the work. * * * The title should fairly and reasonably announce the subject, and so long as it is a single one, and the various provisions thereof have respect to and relate to the same, and legitimately tend to accomplish the object to be attained, it is enough to satisfy the requirements of the constitution. * * * It is a sufficient compliance with its terms if this is done fairly, and in such manner as to convey to the mind an indication of the subject to which it relates. ' See, also, In re Upson, 89 N.Y. 67.

In the present case, it may be said, it is true that, strictly, the maintenance of this dock, or the power 'to keep and maintain the same in good repair at the expense of the town,' is not identically the same as 'constructing the dock' spoken of in the title. No one, however, could imagine that the dock was to be abandoned by the town the moment its original construction was completed. Subsequent repair is necessary in the nature of the case; and authority to construct the dock would, therefore, in a general sense seem to imply and include the power to keep it...