The Bank of the United States, Appellants v. John Ritchie, Jun and Others, Appellees

• Decision Date: 01 January 1834
• Citation: 8 L.Ed. 890,8 Pet. 128,33 U.S. 128
• Parties: THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS v. JOHN T. RITCHIE, JUN., AND OTHERS, APPELLEES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

33 U.S. 128

8 Pet. 128

8 L.Ed. 890

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS v. JOHN T. RITCHIE, JUN., AND OTHERS, APPELLEES.

January Term, 1834

ON appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia.

The appellees filed their bill of complaint in the circuit court, in the nature of a bill of review against the appellants, in which they set forth, that in the year 1825, the appellants filed their bill against the complainants and others, as heirs at law of Abner Ritchie deceased, under the act of assembly of Maryland of 1785, chap. 72, sec. 5, alleging themselves to be the creditors of said Abner Ritchie in the several sums of money mentioned in said bill;—that John T. Ritchie, son of said Abner, and one of said defendants, had obtained letters of administration upon the estate of said Abner;—that complainants had frequently applied to him for the payment of their debts, which he refused; saying, that he had not assets of the said estate to pay them, or any part thereof, and that said Abner had died without leaving personal estate to discharge the debts due by him;—that said Abner died possessed of real estate described in an exhibit filed therewith, and that the defendants are the heirs at law of the said Abner, and pray process, &c. against them. The bill of review proceeds to aver, that said process did accordingly issue, and that before said these complainants appeared to the same, an order was obtained by the solicitor for the then complainants, appointing Thomas Turner guardian, to appear and answer for them: that this order was obtained without their knowledge or approbation, and without it having been made to appear that the said parties were infants, and without it appearing, by the terms of the said order, that Turner was appointed guardian for these parties: that said Turner did, however, appear for them as their guardian, and filed an answer for these complainants, admitting the truth of all the allegations in the bill: that said bill is not on the oath of said pretended guardian, as is usual. They further state, that John T. Ritchie, Sen. filed his answer to said bill, and alleging, that he himself was a large creditor of deceased, suggested a reference of the various claims to an auditor. That in the year 1826, B. L. Lear, solicitor for said complainants, and T. Swann, also solicitor of said court, misled by some person or persons, entered into an agreement to set the cause for hearing, and did consent that a decree should pass, and which was passed by said court, decreeing that said real estate should be sold, and that trustees should convey the same, and that these parties, on their arrival at age, should release to the purchasers all their title to the same. That said sale was accordingly made, and said T. Ritchie, Sen. became the purchaser, and hath received a conveyance.

The parties aver, that Mr Swann had no authority to appear for them, or to enter into any consent or agreement on thier behalf, or that any decree should be entered against them; and that said proceedings were had without their knowledge or assent, and have never been acquiesced in; that their friends and natural guardians were overlooked and unconsulted. That they are aggrieved by said decree, and ought not to be bound thereby—that they ought not to convey their estate as by the decree is directed, that said decree is erroneous, and ought of be reversed—and assign several errors:-

1. There is no allegation in the bill or evidence filed in the case, that Abner Ritchie died without leaving personal estate sufficient to pay his debts.

2. That there is no allegation or evidence that his real estate descended to a minor.

3. That said decree was made without any legal or sufficient answer by these complainants, and without the several matters contained in the bill being taken pro confesso against them.

4. That there is neither allegation nor proof, that either of said defendants was a minor, and incapable of answering without a guardian.

5. That the court appointed a guardian, ad litem, without naming the infant defendants, or causing them to be brought into court to have a guardian appointed, and without any averment or proof that either of them was a minor.

6. That the order appointing a guardian is vague, uncertain and void.

7. That the answer of Turner, professing to be guardian, &c. not being under oath, is insufficient and void.

8. That said decree purports to be by counsent, whereas, it appears, that these complainants never appeared to said suit, in person or by guardian, and therefore, never could have assented, and cannot, as minors, be bound by the consent of an attorney.

9. That there is not sufficient matter alleged in the bill to sustain the decree, if the parties had been competent to assert, and had asserted.

10. Because the decree, contrary to right and equity, and the uniform rule and practice of the court, directs the trustee to convey, without a ratification of his sale.

11. Because the decree is an absolute one, without giving complainants a day after they shall arrive at age, to show cause against the decree.

The bill then avers the death of Henry Carbery, one of the complainants to the first bill, about three years before the filing of said bill, and prays a review and reversal, &c.

Several of the defendants appeared, and disclaiming any interest, &c., assent to the review and reversal

John T. Ritchie answers, averring the correctness of the proceeding, and prays a confirmation of what has been done.

The Bank of the United States, and Union Bank of Georgetown, answering, admit that the original was filed as stated, and require proof of the further allegations of complainants; they aver the sufficiency and correctness of the former proceedings, and deny that there is any sufficient cause for a review, & c.

The circuit court decreed a reversal of the original decree, and annulled all the proceedings had under it, declaring the parties to be restored to their original rights.

The proceedings in the former case, constitute the only evidence in the case of the review.

For the appellants, it will be contended,

1. That no decree can be set aside or reversed on a bill of review, for any reason not appearing on the face of the decree itself, whereas most of the objections here urged, were dehors the decree.

2. Because such of the reasons as are alleged to appear on the face of the decree itself, are wholly insufficient.

3. Because a bill of review will lie only where the original decree, of which complaint is made, has been fully executed by the party complainant; whereas, the contrary is apparent on the face of the bill of review.

4. Because the decree of reversal transcends the power of the court, and extends further than the court had jurisdiction to decree.

5. Because it is in other respects inequitable and illegal.

The case was argued by Mr Coxe, for the appellants; and by Mr Marbury, for the appellees.

Mr Coxe, for the appellants.

The appellees filed their bill of review in the circuit court, for the purpose of reversing a decree of that court, passed several years since.

Various grounds of reversal are assigned, as well in the proceedings, as in the decree; and many allegations are introduced, which are wholly irrelevant in a bill of review, but which are unsupported by any testimony. They would, in an English court of chancery, be deemed scandalous and impertinent.

The circuit court reversed their former decree, and from this judgment the parties aggrieved have entered this appeal.

It will be contended,

1. That among all the grounds assigned for the reversal of the original decree, none are to be regarded, excepting those which point out error on the face of the decree itself.

Error in the proceedings, in the want of conformity of the decree to the evidence, ought to be taken advantage of, either by petition for a rehearing, or by appeal; and where the original proceedings are infected with fraud, an original bill lies to vacate them on that ground. But the peculiar and appropriate object of a bill of review is, to obtain a reversal for some defect, apparent on the face of the decree, or for some cause arising or discovered since the date of the decree.

It is urged however, that the chancery practice of Maryland varies essentially from that of England; it not being customary here to introduce into the decree, the matters upon which it is based. Certainly, a somewhat looser practice has prevailed, than is known in the English courts; but the legal result contended for, cannot flow from it. The character of the bill of review is still the same; and there is no precedent or dictum by any Maryland chancellor sustaining the ground relied upon.

The party aggrieved is not without remedy; he has his appeal, he may have a re-hearing; but it is no legitimate conclusion, from the fact that we have introduced a looser practice, that the whole nature, object and design of the bill of review shall, therefore, be changed. The case in 1 H. and Gill, 393, 424, shows, that in Maryland, the English rule still prevails.

This view of the character of this proceeding, dispenses with the necessity for examining in detail, the reasons assigned for a reversal of the original decree: or for showing upon what slender foundation, either of fact or law, they rest.

The four last are all that purport to come within the legitimate scope of a bill of review.

8. The decree purports to be by consent; whereas it appears that these complainants never appeared to the suit.

Here again we are required to examine the previous proceedings, to determine the validity of the objection.

The proceedings show that Mr Turner, a highly respectable gentleman, acted as guardian. That Mr Swann acted as counsel. In this summary way, the validity of their authority and acts cannot be questioned.

9. That there is not sufficient matter alleged in the bill to...