The Bd. of Supervisors of Bureau County v. the Chicago

• Decision Date: 30 April 1867
• Citation: 44 Ill. 229,1867 WL 5135
• Parties: THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF BUREAU COUNTYv.THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY R. R. COMPANY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

44 Ill. 229

1867 WL 5135 (Ill.)

THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF BUREAU COUNTY

v.THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY R. R. COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April Term, 1867.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of La Salle county; the Hon. MADISON E. HOLLISTER, Judge, presiding.

The facts in this case are fully presented in the opinion.

Messrs. LELAND, BLANCHARD & HERON, for the appellant.

Mr. GEORGE C. CAMPBELL, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This cause was argued and submitted at April Term, 1866, and carefully considered with a desire to reach a conclusion which should be entirely satisfactory. After much reflection, it was thought advisable to direct a reargument of the cause, as the questions presented were of great magnitude and of great public importance. Accordingly, the case has been reargued at this term, with consummate ability, affording us much aid in coming to the conclusions which we now an nounce.

The power of the legislature to impose taxes is expressly granted by the Constitution, and is found in the following provisions of that instrument. They are just, wise and simple. Section 2, article 9, requires the general assembly to provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise. Section 5 of the same article provides, that the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same.

In the exercise of this grant of powers, several laws have been passed by the general assembly, and among them the act of February 12, 1853, relating to the assessment of property for taxation in counties adopting township organization.

The 10th section of this act provides, that “each separate parcel of property shall be valued at its true value in money, excluding the value of crops growing thereon; but the price for which such real property would sell at a forced sale, shall not be taken as a criterion of such value; and personal property of every description shall be valued at the usual selling price of similar property at the time of listing and in the county where the same may then be; and if there be no usual selling price known to the person whose duty it shall be to fix a value thereon, then at such price as it is believed could be obtained therefor in money at such time and place.” Scates' Comp. 1046, 1050.

The fourth section provides, that every owner of real property shall list it in the town or district in which the property belongs, and personal property shall be listed in the town or district wherein the owner resides. Section 6 provides the mode by which this listing is effected.

It is apparent these provisions have special reference to the ordinary kinds of property which the people generally have in possession and own; therefore, by the act of February 14, 1855, a discrimination is made in regard to the property of railroad companies. They are required, by section 4, of that act, to set forth in their schedules, or lists of taxable property, a description of all the real property owned or occupied by the company in each county, town and city through which their railroad may run, and the actual value of each lot or parcel of land, including the improvements thereon (except the track or superstructure of the road), must be annexed to the description of each lot or parcel of land. This list must set forth the number of acres taken for right of way, stations, or other purposes, from each tract of land through which the road may run, describing the land as near as practicable in accordance with the United States surveys, giving the width of the strip or parcel of land, and its length through each tract; also, the whole number of acres and the aggregate value thereof in such county, town and city. All this is denominated real property, and such list must set forth the length of the main track and the length of all side tracks and turn-outs in each county, etc., through which the road runs, with the actual value of the same, and the value of the improvements at each of the several stations, where such stations are not a part of the city or town lots. This track and these stations are denominated “fixed and stationary personal property.”

This list must also contain an inventory of the rolling stock belonging to the company, with the value thereof. This rolling stock is denominated personal property. This list must also contain a statement of the value of all other personal property owned by the company, and also must state the length of the whole of the main track within the State and the total value of the rolling stock, which rolling stock is taxed in the several counties, towns and cities pro rata, in the proportion the length of the main track in such county, town or city bears to the whole length of the road; all other property must be listed and taxed in the county, town or city where the same is located or used. This section then proceeds to define the description of all lands owned by any railroad company for right of way or station purposes other than those which are a part of a laid off town, city or village, under which it shall be entered by the assessor in his books. Scates' Comp. 1166.

The second section provides, that this list or schedule of taxable property belonging to a railroad company shall be made to the county clerk, instead of the assessor, and the clerk is required to lay the same before the board of supervisors when they meet to equalize the assessment of property.

If a majority of this board are satisfied that the schedule is correct, they are required to assess the property according to it; but if they believe such schedule does not contain a full and fair statement of the property of the company subject to taxation in such county, made out and valued in accordance with the requirements of the law, the board is authorized to assess, or cause it to be assessed, in accordance with the rules prescribed for assessing such property. Scates' Comp. 1105.

Bureau county, in which these proceedings originated, it is admitted, is under township organization, and the above provisions of the law are applicable to them.

The appellees, in the attempted performance of the duty enjoined on them by these statutes, presented their list, or schedule of their taxable property, for 1863, owned by them in Bureau county, to the clerk of the County Court, in all respects, as alleged by them, in strict compliance with the statute; which the clerk laid before the board of supervisors when they met to equalize the assessments in that county. This schedule presented an aggregate valuation of $282,383 27/100, of their property owned in Bureau county, which, by the action of the board was increased to $395,336 57/100, being forty per cent above the valuation by the company.

Availing of the act of 1861, by which an appeal is allowed to the Circuit Court from the action of the board of supervisors, the company took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Bureau county, and, by change of venue, the cause was transferred to La Salle county, in the Circuit Court of which county, at the March Term, 1866, such proceedings were had as resulted in a deduction by that court of the per cent thus imposed by the board of supervisors, leaving the schedule of the company as originally presented to the county clerk intact.

To reverse this judgment, the county of Bureau bring the case here by appeal, and assign various errors, which we have fully considered.

The first question they make is, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the appeal,--that it was a case not provided for by the fundamental law, and we are referred to that clause of the Constitution conferring judicial power, in support of the position. Section 1 of article 5 declares, that the judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, in County Courts and in justices of the peace. Provided, that inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the general assembly in the cities of this State, but such courts should have a uniform organization and jurisdiction in such cities. By section 8 of the same article, it is provided, that there shall be two or more terms of the Circuit Court held annually in each county of this State, at such times as shall be provided by law; and said courts shall have jurisdiction in all cases at law and equity, and in all cases of appeal from all inferior courts.

It is argued with great force and ability, that, inasmuch as the board of supervisors is in no sense a court of any description, an appeal cannot lie to the Circuit Court from any of its determinations, and, consequently, the act of 1861, allowing an appeal by a railroad company from their determinations, is unconstitutional and void. Much ingenious, forcible and persuasive argument has been used by appellants here...