The Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York

• Decision Date: 14 March 2022
• Docket Number: 5:82-CV-1114,5:89-CV-0829 (LEK/TWD),5:82-CV-0783
• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York
• Parties: THE CANADIAN ST. REGIS BAND OF MOHAWK INDIANS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

THE CANADIAN ST. REGIS BAND OF MOHAWK INDIANS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 5:82-CV-0783, 5:82-CV-1114, 5:89-CV-0829 (LEK/TWD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

March 14, 2022

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE E. KAHN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves a long-running dispute over ancestral land claims between three Mohawk plaintiffs^[1] and intervenor-plaintiff United States of America (collectively “Plaintiffs”), and defendants State of New York and Governor of the State of New York (“State Defendants”), and County of St. Lawrence, County of Franklin, Village of Massena, Town of Massena, Town of Bombay, Town and Village of Fort Covington, Key Bank of Northern New York, N.A., Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Niagara Mohawk Power Co. and Canadian National Railways (“Municipal Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 768 (“St. Regis Mohawks' Motion”), 768-1 (“St. Regis Mohawks' Memorandum of Law”), 768-3 (“St. Regis Mohawks' Statement of Material Facts”), 769 (“Akwesane Mohawks' Motion”), 769-1 (“Akwesane Mohawks' Statement of Material Facts”), 769-2 (“Akwesane Mohawks' Memorandum of Law”), 770 (“Longhouse's Motion”), 770-1 (“Longhouse's Memorandum of Law”), 771 (“United States' Motion”), 771-2 (“United States' Statement of Material Facts”), 773-1 (“United States' Memorandum of Law”), 788 (“State and Municipal Defendants' Opposition” or “Opposition”), 790 (“Response to St. Regis Mohawks' Statement of Material Facts”), 791 (“Response to United States' Statement of Material Facts”), 792 (“Response to Akwesane Mohawks' Statement of Material Facts”), 793 (“United States' Reply”), 794 (“Akwesane Mohawks' and Longhouse's Reply”), 795 (“St. Regis Mohawk's Reply”). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants St. Regis Mohawks' Motion, Longhouse's Motion, and United States' Motion in full, and grants Akwesane Mohawks' Motion in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Because the underlying history of this case extends back nearly to the founding of the United States of America and has been retold many times, the Court does not provide a recitation of the facts except as necessary to contextualize and resolve the relevant issue. For an account of the history leading up to this case, and of this case itself, see Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 82-CV-0783, 2013 WL 3992830, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (Kahn, J.). After numerous stays for settlement negotiation or pending resolution of potentially relevant Second Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court cases, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(c) on the ground of laches. See Id. The motions for judgment on the pleadings were granted in part and denied in part. See id. at *22. Since then, the case has been stayed while the parties attempted to reach a settlement. See Docket. On January 11, 2021, the Honorable Thérèse Wiley Dancks, United States Magistrate Judge, lifted the stay. Dkt. No. 756. Furthermore, Judge Dancks ordered that any dispositive motions be filed by May 17, 2021. Dkt. No. 758. Subsequently, Plaintiffs each filed their motions for partial summary judgment. See St. Regis Mohawks' Mot.; Akwesane Mohawks' Mot.; Longhouse's Mot.; United States' Mot. Generally, each plaintiff is seeking partial summary judgment on some or all of the elements of a prima facie case under the Nonintercouse Act (“NIA”), 25 U.S.C. § 177, as well as summary judgment against the State and Municipal Defendants on some of their counterclaims and defenses. See generally St. Regis Mohawks' Mem. of L.; Akwesane Mohawks' Mem. of L.; Longhouse Mohawks' Mem. of L.; United States' Mem. of L. Although the motions have a lot of similarity, the Court will examine each motion individually.

State and Municipal Defendants requested to file a joint opposition, which the Court agreed to. See Dkt. No. 783. In their Opposition, Defendants argue that the motions for partial summary judgment should be denied because (1) they do not address whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred under City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) and Cayuga Indian Nation v. State of New York, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006); and (2) the motions are premature. See generally Opp'n. Plaintiffs then timely filed their replies. See St. Regis Mohawk's Reply; Akwesane Mohawks' and Longhouse's Reply; United States' Reply.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs courts to grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, ” and a dispute is “‘genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, while “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment, “summary judgment will not lie if . . . the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Only when no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party should summary judgment be granted.”).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Similarly, a party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party has failed “to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322.

In attempting to repel a motion for summary judgment after the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). At the same time, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Thus, a court's duty in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is “carefully limited” to finding genuine disputes of fact, “not to deciding them.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

IV.DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Arguments

Before addressing Plaintiffs' claims, the Court begins by reviewing Defendants' arguments. Once more, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' NIA claims do not help the parties reach a final resolution and that Plaintiffs' motions are premature. The Court disagrees.

1. Sherrill^[2]

Defendants claim that “the only issue remaining in this action is whether Plaintiffs' claim to the Hogansburg Triangle is similarly barred under Sherrill and Cayuga” and that “Plaintiffs' motions do not address the issue of whether their claim to the Hogansburg Triangle is barred under Sherrill and Cayuga.” Opp'n at 1, 7. It is important to correct Defendants' contention that “the Court's focus is on the threshold question of Sherrill's applicability.” Id. at 9. This Court merely found that it could not “conclude that these claims are barred by laches and therefore [could not] grant Defendants judgment on the pleadings on the Hogansburg Triangle claims.” Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians, 2013 WL 3992830, at *20. There is no indication that the Court narrowed the case on Sherrill's applicability. The Court had to consider Sherrill because Defendants raised it in their motions for judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, Defendants misconstrue the difference between rights and remedies. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 (“The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant has any duty, and if so what it is, are very different questions from the remedial questions whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the measure of the remedy is.”); see also Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987) (“The distinction between a claim or substantive right and a remedy is fundamental.”); Town of Verona v. Jewell, No. 08-CV-0647, 2015 WL 1400291, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (holding that Sherrill “clearly distinguished between questions of right and questions of remedy”) (Kahn, J.). There is no question that Sherrill could bar recovery, see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Cty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he [Sherrill] defense is properly applied to bar any ancient land claims that are disruptive of significant and justified societal expectations that have arisen as a result of a lapse of time during which the plaintiffs did not seek relief.”) (emphasis added), but this goes more to the question of remedy than of rights. In many ways, it is similar to an affirmative defense, which “does not negate the elements of the plaintiff's claim, but instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim are proven.” Roberge v. Hannah Marine Corp., No. 96-1691, 1997 WL 468330, at *3 (6th Cir. 1997).

With that in mind, Plaintiffs can focus on questions of rights (i.e. whether they can establish a prima facie NIA claim or elements of a prima facie NIA claim) at the summary judgment stage without addressing questions of remedy. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil...