The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal and Mining Company v. Britton
Decision Date | 01 June 1896 |
Docket Number | 36 |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Parties | THE CHEROKEE & PITTSBURG COAL AND MINING COMPANY v. SIMON BRITTON, as Administrator of the Estate of William James, deceased |
Opinion Filed June 2, 1896.
MEMORANDUM.--Error from Crawford district court; S. H. ALLEN judge. Action by Simon Britton, as administrator of the estate of William James, deceased, against The Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal and Mining Company to recover damages for the killing of plaintiff's intestate. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings the case to this court. Reversed. The opinion herein, filed June 2, 1896, states the material facts.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
A. A. Hurd, O. J. Wood, and W. Littlefield, for plaintiff in error.
M. Byrne, and Kimball & Osgood, for defendant in error.
OPINION
This suit was commenced by Simon Britton, as the administrator of the estate of William James, deceased, against the Cherokee & Pittsburg Coal and Mining Company to recover damages for wrongfully causing the death of William James, which suit was brought by the administrator for the benefit of the father and mother of William James. To the petition filed by the administrator the following affidavit is attached.
"I, Simon Britton, do solemnly swear that the cause of action set forth in the petition hereto prefixed is just, and I do further swear that by reason of my poverty I am unable to give security for costs."
On the 18th day of October, 1889, the defendant below filed its motion to quash the summons in said action, for the following reasons:
This motion was overruled by the court and excepted to by the defendant below, and this ruling is the first error complained of in this court.
It is contended by plaintiff in error that, as paragraph 4682 of the General Statutes of 1889 requires the plaintiff, before he can commence an action, or a summons issue upon the petition filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, to file with the clerk of said court a bond to be approved by the clerk, conditioned that the plaintiff will pay all costs that may accrue in said action which he is adjudged to pay, or in lieu thereof make a deposit of $ 15 with the clerk before he has any authority to issue a summons, no bond for costs was given, and the clerk was not authorized to issue summons; that as the summons was issued without a bond being given or the deposit of $ 15 with the clerk, the summons should be quashed and the defendant not be required to answer in said action, nor be put to the trouble and expense of appearing and defending said action; that the provisions of the statute in paragraph 4682, which provides that, in case the plaintiff make an affidavit setting forth that he has a just cause of action against the defendant, and on account of his poverty is unable to give such security for costs, no bond shall be required, and of paragraph 4683, do not apply to actions brought by a person in his representative capacity, but only refer to actions brought by an individual, where he has a just cause of action and on account of his poverty is unable to give the bond required or deposit the sum of $ 15. We do not think this position tenable. The statute makes no distinction between a party suing in his individual capacity or a party suing in a representative capacity. The language of paragraph 4682 is:
"Provided, That in any case where the plaintiff or plaintiffs having a just cause of action against the defendant or defendants, by reason of his, her or their poverty, is or are unable to give such security for costs, on affidavit of the plaintiff or plaintiffs made before the clerk that such is the fact, no bond shall be required."
Counsel for plaintiff in error insist that as paragraph 2787, General Statutes of 1889, requires an administrator, on his appointment, to qualify by giving a bond with two or more sufficient sureties in a sum double the value of the personal property of the estate, payable to the state of Kansas, with conditions therein mentioned, before entering upon the duties of administrator such bond must be given, and that before the commencement of this action he must give the bond required by paragraph 4682 of the General Statutes of 1889; that unless these bonds were executed as required by the statute he would not be authorized to commence this suit, nor have any standing as an administrator; that this action is not brought by him as an individual, but in his representative capacity as administrator of the estate of William James, deceased; that, if he was able to give the bond required before entering upon the duties as administrator, he certainly was able to give a bond for costs, or at least make a deposit such as the statute requires. We do not think that this contention is sound. The bond he gives as administrator is for the faithful performance of the duties of an administrator. It is for the personal obligation of the administrator and for his individual liability. The bond for costs in the prosecution of the action for damages is an obligation against the estate of William James, deceased. The action is prosecuted by the administrator in his representative capacity, but is for the benefit of the next of kin of William James, deceased, and is not the obligation of Simon Britton, individually. He is not personally liable for the payment of the costs accruing by reason of the prosecution of such action. He may be abundantly able to give security for any amount in a matter where he would be personally liable, but the estate may be entirely insolvent, and, on account of extreme poverty of the beneficiaries of said estate, be entirely unable to give the bond required by law, or to make the deposit required before summons can issue, and, upon the making of the affidavit required by law, he is entitled to commence the action and prosecute it to a final determination.
For a second assignment of error, it is set forth that, after the overruling of the motion of the defendant below to quash the summons, defendant filed its answer to the petition, and the plaintiff below filed an amended petition, after having obtained leave of the court to do so. This petition stood in the place of the original petition and became the petition in the case. The plaintiff below alleged:
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