The Chicago v. Reidy

• Citation: 66 Ill. 43,1872 WL 8492
• Parties: THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC R. R. CO.v.RICHARD W. REIDY.
• Decision Date: 30 September 1872
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

66 Ill. 43

1872 WL 8492 (Ill.)

THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC R. R. CO.

v.RICHARD W. REIDY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1872.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. CHARLES H. LAWRENCE, for the appellant.

Mr. SIDNEY THOMAS, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action on the case, brought by appellee, in the circuit court of Cook county, against appellants, to recover for injuries sustained by appellee, in killing his horse and in breaking his wagon and harness, by an engine and train of cars which were being operated by the company.

A trial was had by the court and a jury, which resulted in a verdict of $300 in favor of plaintiff. Defendants entered a motion for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and judgment rendered on the verdict, and the case is brought to this court on appeal.

It is admitted that the general assembly has the power to adopt any and all police regulations necessary for the protection of the life and property of the citizen; but it is contended that the act of 1865 (Sess. Laws, 103) is unconstitutional. It provides that whenever any railroad company shall, by themselves or their agents, run or permit their trains to be run at a greater rate of speed through the incorporated limits of any city or town than is permitted by the city or town ordinances regulating the speed of trains, such company violating the ordinance shall be liable to each individual sustaining damage done by such train or engine, to the full extent of the damage; and if any live stock be killed by any railroad companies or their agents, in the manner set forth in the first section of the act, the same shall be presumed to have been done by the negligence of the company or their agents.

The ordinance adopted by the city, and read in evidence, prohibited railroad engines and trains from running at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour within the city; and the witnesses on the part of appellee testified that the train was running at the rate of fifteen miles per hour, whilst the witnesses on behalf of appellants swore that the speed did not exceed six miles an hour. Appellee's witnesses testified that no bell was rung or whistle sounded, but this was contradicted by appellants' witnesses. The collision occurred at one of the street crossings in the city.

The objection urged against this law is that it takes private property from one person and gives it to another, without regard to their relative rights. This, we think, is not the purpose or operation of the law. It prohibits the running of trains above a certain rate of speed, and declares that the company shall be liable for all injuries inflicted by them whilst running at the prohibited rate of speed. This only requires the company to make compensation for the damage done by their engines and trains. It is not a penalty, or in the nature of a penalty. It only requires compensation to be made where the company has wrongfully inflicted injury. It may be that the law has changed the rule of evidence, and has made the fact of running at the prohibited speed prima facie evidence of such neglect on the part of the company, when injury ensues, as shall render them liable. See Chicago and Alton R. R. Co. v. Engle, 58 Ill. 381.

An observance of the law is all that is required to relieve them from the presumption, and that is no...